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In the wake of government reform in Kenya, fiscal decentralization has been adopted as a new 
framework to share fiscal powers and functions between national and county governments. 
Primarily, the objective for this new approach is to create an effective means to provide efficient 
basic services such as healthcare, clean water, food, education, security, transport and other 
pressing community needs. The Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was established as a 
fiscally decentralized initiative administered at the constituency level under the flagship of 
Members of Parliament. A decade after the rolling out of this initiative, evidence was rife that 
despite a few successes, most constituencies were reported to have expropriated or mismanaged 
the Fund, while others were accused of underspending. The Fund was also marred by endemic 
corruption, ghost projects, abandoned and unfinished projects. This study interrogates how and 
why fiscal decentralization has been implemented as a governance reform strategy in Kenya in 
general, and also looks as the CDF as one of Kenya’s local economic development funds. The 
outcomes of the CDF were explored in the Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies through 
conducting interviews with 90 officials involved in the day-to-day management of CDF projects; 
through first-hand observation; and through perusing the scant documents available.  
Kenya’s newly inaugurated Constitution in 2010 is the first time that Kenya has officially adopted 
a decentralized system of government.  This study concludes that legislatively speaking, Kenya is 
indeed a decentralized country.  The CDF is indeed aimed at addressing fiscal inequality among 
the different local constituencies and can, in theory, contribute to local economic development as 
per the theory of fiscal decentralization.  This in turn, could strengthen local constituency’s 
autonomy.  The fieldwork of this study showed that these theoretical postulations were only true 
to some extent.   A legal framework for decentralization, including fiscal decentralization and a 
fiscal equalization fund, like the CDF in itself will not automatically bring about local economic 
development.  The responses from my interviews, government reports and my own first-hand 
observations showed some implementation failures.  However, the study revealed some interesting 
insight into potential factors for future success.  One key factor is that of good leadership as being 
one of the core and inevitable values needed to enhance the intrinsic norms of LED such as: fiscal 
participation and budgeting; economic efficiency; transparency; accountability and effectiveness.  
The study concludes by presenting a table which synthesizes the findings of the study.  It is a 
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toolkit designed for the Kenyan context and recognizes that there are different local challenges.  
Nevertheless, it offers a systematic approach and strategies on how the key drivers of LED can be 
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Background to the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief theoretical background of fiscal administration by governments in 
developing countries and particularly those in Africa. It provides a rationale of why most of these 
governments preferred central administration of economic resources to devolving such functions. 
The chapter briefly introduces some of the key factors (to be expounded in Chapter 2) that 
pressured these governments to cede their powers to subnational governments with discretionary 
powers to administer development in tandem with local preferences. This chapter also presents: 
the rationale behind the choice of this topic for investigation; the research problem and objectives; 
principal theories upon which this study is structured. The chapter also elaborates the methodology 
applied while conducting this research, and concludes by delineating the structure of this 
dissertation pursuant to each of the six chapters of this study. 
1.2 Background  
In order for governments to fulfill their mandate and provide efficient service delivery, ensure 
macroeconomic stability, promote equalization of growth across regions, as well as achieve local 
economic development, the art of managing national revenue becomes one of the central concerns 
of any given government. Notably, governments across the globe have attempted to devise and 
implement policies in search for the best possible means to deliver these objectives. Musgrave 
(cited in Bahl and Linn, 1994: 3), emphasises that the objectives of a government’s budgets are 
aligned to ‘stabilize growth, redistribute income, and allocate fiscal resources and has long being 
the starting point for discussing the division of fiscal powers and responsibilities among units of 
government’. Manor (1999) argues that the pertinent budget objective of central government is to 
stimulate a stable economic growth and reduce poverty. 
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A broad spectrum of governments from developing countries, particularly those in Africa, have a 
history of being more centralized in their approach to administration of their development plans 
than their highly industrialized counterparts. Apparently, this system of governance in developing 
countries has been linked with daunting development and general weakness in local government 
associated with: 
[e]arly emphasis of development economics on central planning, concentrated urbanization, 
scarce managerial and technical expertise, and perhaps most important, strong central 
government dominated by ethnic, religious, or economic groups reluctant to share power 
(Smoke, 1993: 901). 
In the last decades, many national governments in developing countries had remained the sole 
development and planning agents. National governments were regarded as better placed and 
embedded to design and implement far-reaching policies and programs to address erratic needs of 
the citizenry. The rationale behind central planning in developing countries thus was seen as a 
means of providing comprehensive policies and using scarce resources to promote economic 
growth (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). 
Henderson and Mills (cited in Smoke, 2001: 2) argue that early development economists 
discouraged the development of local government by advising officials of developing countries 
that they could maximize growth by centralizing control over the economy. Therefore, 
development strategies were based on central planning and spatial centralization to capture 
economies of scale and promote growth. Thus, the development responsibilities were concentrated 
at the center, and local authorities were largely neglected. However: 
While the reality of the historical forces pushing in the direction of centralization 
must be recognized, the real explanations for reluctance to decentralize lay in the 
absolute power enjoyed by the political power holders and the threat that 
democratic decentralization could pose to this entrenched governance mode. In 
addition, there were problems concerning institutional design, alternative 
institutional options and the lack of information on local government systems 
(Olowu, 2003: 509).  
Werlin (1970: 186) argues that the control of the central government became considerably more 
repressive or ‘inelastic’, because the officials of the state opted to rely on tools of coercion instead 
of techniques of persuasion. A centralized approach to political order in Africa was strongly 
advocated by social scientists when the new states emerged from the breakdown of colonial 
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empires. However, the argument for centralization changed as such pattern of governance became 
increasingly associated with severe errors in development policy, the emergence of autocratic and 
corrupt governments, and the exploitation of rural masses by the miniscule urban elites, and the 
wastage of vast amount of resources on poorly planned development projects. There were other 
dysfunctions that were associated with centralization that included the difficulty of effective 
administering from the center resulting to local problems being poorly addressed (Wunsch & 
Olowu, 1990: 6-7). 
Nevertheless, the inability of central governments in Africa to reach their citizens effectively 
suggested that something else was necessary. The continuing strength of the democratic norm in 
the city and countryside demonstrated the persistent desire of people to participate in the 
management of their own affairs (Kasfir, 1993: 25).  
In recent years however, political and economic changes, including international pressures on 
developing countries have significantly raised the prospects for decentralization among these 
countries. Smoke (1993: 901) argued that the introduction of Structural Adjustment Policies 
(SAPs) adopted in the 1980s was central to relegating the functions, scope, and activities of central 
governments and with an attempt to improve the quality of the services they deliver. This move 
paved way for the raising potential of local governments to raise revenue, budget, provide services, 
stimulate private investments, and facilitate the implementation of national policies (Smoke, 1993: 
901). 
Policy activists, reformers and authors of decentralization debate such as Smoke (2007); Olowu 
and Wunsch (2004); Crook and Manor (1998); Grindle (2007), and Rondinelli and Rondinelli 
(1983) argued that for the last decades in the sub-Saharan region, a perceived urgency was initiated 
to adopt decentralization strategy for managing public policy. This is being driven by the urge to 
break from the control of central government over the citizens’ lives, and to engender participation 
in democratic governance. As argued by Bratton (2011: 516), this nostalgia was motivated by the 
urge to reform the operation of local government authorities, coupled with efforts to enhance the 
potential of these institutions to extort local revenues, and be agents of local economic 
development by responding to local preferences.  
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Initiatives towards decentralization are not entirely new in Africa. Ribot and Oyono (2005: 205) 
argue that governments across the African continent have repeatedly undergone decentralization 
reforms since the early colonial period. Since 1917, there have been noticeable waves of 
decentralization in Francophone West Africa- after each of the World Wars, shortly after 
independence, and in the current decade, while the Anglophone and Lusophone African countries 
have also witnessed multiple pre- and post-colonial decentralizations (Ribot, 2002: 4).  
Local government was introduced in many developing countries, especially in Africa through 
colonialization and development assistance, often taking a form that neither met the intended 
purpose nor gained acceptance from the local people (Mawhood, 1987: 14). Seemingly, in recent 
years, decentralization of fiscal management has been geared towards the promotion of local socio-
economic wellbeing. However, past decentralizations in Africa were constructed to manage local 
populations either through administrative customary rulers or colonial administrative authorities 
followed by post-colonial governments. By extension, local institutions were designed to operate 
as instruments of central authority (Ribot and Oyono, 2005: 250). Mamdani (cited in Ribot and 
Oyono, 2005: 250) alleges that these institutions were oppressive and were only used by the central 
organs as instruments of management and control.  
Oyugi (2000: 16) maintains that there is not a single country in Africa that did not have some form 
of local government in operation, while emphasizing that virtually all decentralization reforms 
were meant to strengthen democratic governance and service provision. Oyugi (2002: 6) observes 
that despite these attempts, through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, decentralization efforts across 
the continent failed to produce autonomous local development agents. They failed to devolve 
significant powers to local representative bodies and thus such functions retained under the control 
of the national government.  The United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) notes that 
towards the end of 1970s, it was apparent that the framework for decentralization by African 
governments had neither promoted participation, nor promoted any significant socio-economic 
agenda (UNCDF, 2000: 2). Furthermore, as Oyugi (2000: 17) reports from his survey conducted 
on West African countries, no local government was found having autonomous control over its 
budget or any with autonomous powers and discretion in policy making. 
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Soon after Kenya’s independence in 1963, the central government was quick to gain control over 
its financial resources. It pursued economic development through central planning. However, 
according to Gutierrez-Romero (2013: 72), the centralization of authority and the exclusive 
management of resources led to unequal distribution of resources across the regions, resulting in 
growing inequality of service provision, infrastructure and development. Policy formulation and 
implementation of community development projects remained the realm of the central 
government.  
Accordingly, the ruling elite maintained control over the disbursement of national resources. Only 
those who showed loyalty to the presidency and the ruling party benefited from the regime. In the 
late 1980s to early 1990s, civil society organizations, religious groups, and the international 
community exerted pressure on Moi’s government. In effect, this paved the way for the 
reformation of the governance system in Kenya. Eventually, executive powers in the control of 
public affairs were reduced (Maltz, 2007: 132). Gituto (2007: 1) maintains that at this point (early 
1990s), Moi designed a caricature of reform that bore some characteristics of decentralization. 
Progressively, Kenya began to embrace a variety of sub-sovereign financing schemes as key 
policy, administrative and technical financial instruments to provide solutions to the various 
manifestations of social exclusion, poverty and inequality.  
Since independence in 1963, the Kenyan government implemented a number of programs aimed 
at local economic development. Among them: The District Development Grant Program (DDGP) 
(1966); The Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) (1969-1970); The District 
Development Panning (DDP) (1971); The District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) (1983-
1984). However, these initiatives suffered the same fate - that of a lack of funding and excessive 
bureaucratic capture by the central government (Bagaka, 2008: 2).  
Before the creation of county governments in Kenya, Constituencies in Kenya, under the 
leadership of the Member of Parliament were seen as critical in lobbying for local development. 
Since the economy was centrally administered, Kenya lacked a system that streamlined funding 
for development at the constituency level. In fact, this initiative was hijacked by the members of 
the executive, who disseminated such funds at their own discretion. Members of the executive elite 
were politically motivated to expand their patronage, and it meant that constituencies aligned to 
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government received extraordinary allocations as a reward for their loyalty. In this case, such 
political leaders used public resources to “buy” themselves power. And since most constituencies 
are largely drafted along tribal jurisdictions, this meant that certain tribes were deprived of 
development while others thrived. This resulted in unequal distribution of wealth, development, 
and economic opportunities across the country (Kimani, 2012).  
In December 2002, the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government took over 
power from the highly centralized Kenya African National Union’s (KANU) regime. It was NARC 
that facilitated the introduction of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in 2003 through an 
Act of Parliament. This concerted initiative symbolized shift of power and saw 2.5 percent of the 
annual government ordinary revenue being distributed across the 210 constituencies. The Fund 
was meant to stimulate growth of local development from the level of the constituency by fast-
tracking delivery of basic services such as healthcare, clean water, food, education, security, 
transport, and other pressing needs identified and prioritized by local communities. The 
administration of this Fund was entrusted under the flagship of Members of Parliament (MP) (Also 
known as Members of the National Assembly (MNA)).1 This initiative was seen as an attempt to 
transform government by adopting fiscal decentralization as a policy objective that was expected 
to improve service delivery and uplift the poor by devolving public funds to be administered at the 
local government level. It was also expected to augment more interaction between the government 
and its citizens. This was seen as a critical step towards levelling the existing social, economic and 
growth imbalances in the constituencies.  
Although the CDF is not the only fiscally decentralized initiative in Kenya, it stands out as the 
foremost practice and continues to persist. Even though these funds are monitored through 
directives and regulations designed by the national government, the formulation, identification, 
and implementation of projects are designed to emerge from the grassroots. Ongoya and Lumallas 
(2005: 22) argue that through the implementation of the CDF, the Legislative arm of parliament 
has clearly usurped Executive powers and functions which include the use of government funds, 
while parliament is to monitor such use. Moreover, unlike other development funds that filter from 
the central government through a large number of layers of administrative organs and 
                                                          
1 Member of Parliament (MP) and Member of National Assembly (MNA) will be used interchangeably in this 
research. 
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bureaucracies, funds under CDF go directly to local levels, providing people at the grassroots with 
the opportunity to make expenditure decisions. This opportunity  maximizes their welfare, and 
thus is consistent with the theoretical predictions of fiscal decentralization theory (Kimenyi, 2005: 
1), that is, to enhance efficiency of government in providing public services and to accelerate local 
social and economic wellbeing with local communities as the principal agents (Tiebout, cited in 
Vigneault, 2007: 133).  
1.3 Rationale for the study: 
This research has been motivated by the current trends of decentralizing government functions in 
Kenya with an aim of enhancing local economic delivery to local populations. The outcome of the 
introduction of a decentralized system of governance in Kenya has not yet been fully explored.  
This study is instructively situated at a time when Kenya is at the height of rolling out a concerted 
process of devolving government functions geared to enhance local economic development (LED) 
as one of its main objectives. This initiative is supported by a new constitutional framework that 
was inaugurated in 2010, having been voted for through a national referendum.  
In the context of the aforementioned, the establishment of a new constitution has created a new 
platform for policy makers and researchers to seek viable development solutions that would lead 
to eventual social and economic growth for local populations. This study is based on the 
assumption that there is a general consensus among the 47 newly established county governments 
and their respective sub counties towards creating a favourable environment for devolution as 
envisaged by the CoK 2010. The constitution allows these subnational governments to undertake 
development functions with legislated discretion and autonomy to design and implement their own 
development priorities and preferences. Thus, a new political dispensation and policy environment 
provides a strong justification for conducting this study as a means of gaining an in-depth 
understanding of prospects for and challenges of the implementation of the CDF. This study 
identified that CDF is the most appropriate “trial decentralization initiative” that enjoyed 
consistent government funding and political support from its establishment in 2003 to the 
establishment of decentralized governments in 2013. The authority for project identification, 
allocation, and implementation is left to the discretion of the local stakeholders at the constituency 
level. 
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Efforts to assess empirical evidence that support the premise that fiscal decentralization contributes 
to improved means of poverty eradication through an improved local economic delivery system 
have yielded mixed results. Some have shown positive relationship, others have noted no impact, 
while others have recorded a negative impact. The rationale behind the formulation of this study 
therefore seeks to gain an in-depth understanding of how and why fiscal decentralization was 
initiated in Kenya, and determine how the implementation of CDF, has contributed to the 
enhancement of local economic development.   
Based on the fact that CDF has been implemented in Kenyan constituencies for the last decade, it 
became critical for the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the perceptions of respondents 
drawn from Gatanga2 and Naivasha3 constituencies that were purposively selected4. This 
experience has the potential to present compelling evidences that could be used not only to offer 
credible lessons with potential to reform CDF implementation processes, but also to inform the 
development of a comprehensive decentralized system in both constituencies.  
In a nutshell, the rationale behind this study is to determine the form that fiscal decentralization in 
Kenya has adopted and how its evolution has influenced development in local jurisdictions; and 
to consider whether or not the implementation of CDF is conducive for local economic 
development in Gatanga and Naivasha.  
1.4 Research objectives and questions  
The key objective of this study is to seek understanding of fiscal decentralization in the Kenyan 
context, keeping in mind that, prior to 2013, Kenya has always been a centralized system of 
government. The study pays special attention to the implementation of CDF in Gatanga and 
Naivasha constituencies. Specific objectives aligned to this study are: 
                                                          
2 Gatanga in this study refers to Gatanga Constituency 
3 Naivasha in this study refers to Naivasha Constituency 
4 How the two constituencies were included in the sample will be explained in section 1.6.5.1. 
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 To determine the rationale behind: fiscal decentralization theory; the implementation of fiscal 
decentralization in Kenya; and the design and establishment of the Constituency Development 
Fund.  
 To determine the extent to which fiscal decentralization meets its intended objectives in 
Kenya 
 To explore the extent to which CDF has contributed to the enhancement, or otherwise, of local 
economic development in the selected constituencies of Gatanga and Naivasha.  
 To identify CDF implementation challenges as evidenced in the selected constituencies of 
Gatanga and Naivasha.  
 To propose recommendations to meet the intended objectives of fiscally decentralized funds 
in Kenya.  
In order to address the main objectives above, this study attends to the following sub-questions: 
 What is the rationale behind the fiscal decentralization theory? 
 What was the rationale behind centralization policies in Kenya, and what factors led to the 
shift towards fiscally decentralized initiatives managed at subnational government levels 
in Kenya prior to 2010?  
 What are the policies that guide the implementation of CDF in Kenya?  
 What is the level of awareness of local communities in Gatanga and Naivasha 
constituencies regarding the implementation of CDF development projects? 
 To what, if any extent has fiscal decentralization framework in Kenya, through the 
implementation of the CDF, entrenched governance values such as: fiscal accountability; 
participatory budgeting; project identification and implementation; and monitoring and 
evaluation of development projects in Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies? 
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 What are CDF implementation challenges in Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies in 
Kenya? 
1.5 Conceptual Framework 
The literature on decentralization, more particularly fiscal decentralization, informs the conceptual 
framework of the study. 
Kee (2004: 168) argues that the theoretical case for fiscal decentralization dates from 17th and 18th 
century philosophers, including Rousseau, Mill, de Tocqueville, Montesquieu, and Madison. It 
started at a time in which central governments were distrusted and decentralized governments were 
seen as the principal hope to preserve the liberties of the citizenry. In recent decades, fiscal 
decentralization has become part of the reform agenda, supported by the World Bank, USAID, the 
Asian Development Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (among many others), and has become an integral part of 
economic development and governance strategies in developing and transitioning economies 
(Bahl, 1999). These organizations do not confine themselves to urging countries to adopt fiscal 
decentralization as the new development path: rather, they actively assist countries to establish 
such strategies as part of enhancing greater efficiency of the public sector. It is also apparent that 
these organizations assume that fiscal decentralization strengthens participatory decision making 
at the local level which eventually would yield to accelerated economic growth and development 
(Grewal, 2010:1-12). 
Davoodi and Zou (1998: 244) note that the conceptual framework of fiscal decentralization, or 
devolution of fiscal powers from the national to local governments, is seen as part of a reform 
package to improve efficiency of service delivery in the public sector. 
The World Bank (cited in Kee, 2004: 3) links fiscal decentralization initiatives with globalization, 
where the desire for local discretion and devolution of power are seen as one of the most important 
forces shaping governance and development today. According to Rezk (1998: 206), theoretical 
and policy-oriented interest in fiscal decentralization arose during the 1980s as a result of various 
unprecedented situations faced by countries all over the world. Fiscal decentralization can be 
assessed depending on the degree of decision-making empowerment  of the lowest levels of 
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government; whether it is characterized as deconcentration (dispersion of responsibilities within a 
central government to regional branch offices, or local administrative units), delegation (where 
local government acts as agents for the central government, executing certain functions on its 
behalf), or devolution (where implementation and authority to decide what is done is in the hands 
of the local government) (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998: 3). This leads to fiscal decentralization 
theorem that: 
[t]he governments closest to the citizens can adjust budgets (costs) to local 
preferences in a manner that best leads to the delivery of a bundle of public services 
that is responsive to community preferences (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003: 103-104). 
Kee (2004: 168) attests that the modern case for fiscal decentralization was articulated by Wolman 
(in Bennet, 1990), who spearheaded the two arguments underpinned under two principal 
characteristics: efficiency, and governance values. Firstly, Kee (2004: 168-169) understands 
efficiency as an economic value where provision of social welfare is maximized. Liu (2007: 10) 
states that fiscal decentralization is widely advocated on the premise that it improves economic 
performance by increasing efficiency in the provision of public services. Rao (1998: 78) states that 
in general, fiscal decentralization has been prompted by the emphasis placed on providing efficient 
and responsive public services.  
Kee (2004: 168-169) argues that decentralizing fiscal functions has a potential to enhance 
governance values such as: effectiveness, responsiveness, accountability, diversity and equity, and 
participation. Likewise, Bird and Vaillancourt (1998: 3) argue that fiscal decentralization leads to 
improved governance due to the fact that local leaders are more responsive to development needs 
of their respective communities and the latter are given a chance to participate in the project 
identification and implementation process. Decentralization places allocational decision making 
closer to the people, fostering greater responsiveness of local officials and greater accountability 
to citizens (Dillinger, et al 2003: 233).  
Arguably, fiscal decentralization not only  produces more efficient and equitable service delivery 
through making better use of local knowledge, but it also leads to greater participation and 
democracy (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998: 3). Local decision-makers are endowed with more 
knowledge about the problems and needs of their local area as opposed to centralized decision-
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makers. As such, the theory and literature on fiscal decentralization posit that it is an integral part 
of local economic development (Kee, 2004: 269). 
 The literature on decentralization and fiscal decentralization points to a variety of arguments that 
have motivated various countries (both developed and developing) to pursue decentralization in 
different forms. This study analyses the implementation of the Constituency Development Fund. 
The CDF is a decentralization initiative that was established in Kenya in 2003, a decade earlier 
than the constitutionally enshrined system of devolution established in 2013. The CDF, being the 
only major decentralized initiative that has constantly enjoyed government funding, with local 
stakeholders at the constituency level being charged with its implementation. The CDF became a 
core component in Kenya’s experience and policy that has the potential to inform the current 
proposed devolution of government fiscal functions in the CoK, 2010. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
Research methodology refers to the methods, techniques, and procedures that are put in place in 
the process of executing the design or plan of the research. This includes underlying principles and 
assumptions used in informing and shaping the proposed research. Research methodology also 
encompasses identifying how the study will affect elements being studied, and how the research 
is aligned with ethical rules governing research. (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 103-104 & 646). 
1.6.1 Research Design 
This study takes the form of an empirical qualitative case study design. According to Bergmann 
(2004: 146), empirical refers to the material/phenomena being studied that may include situations, 
cases, or persons. Baxter and Jack (2008: 544) posit that in a case study, the phenomena/cases 
under study should be done within their (natural) contexts. According to Baxter and Jack (2008: 
545), case study design facilitates exploration of a phenomenon from different perspectives using 
different data sources. This means that the issue under investigation is not only considered from 
one perspective, or using one lens, but rather using a variety of data sources that makes it possible 
for the phenomenon that is under investigation to be comprehensively revealed and understood. 
Stake (1995) and Yin (2003) maintain that information derived from different sources in a case 
study design would ensure that the topic under investigation is broadly explored and that the 
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essence of the phenomenon is revealed. Two constituencies in Kenya namely: the Naivasha 
Constituency (located in Nakuru County) and the Gatanga Constituency (located in Muranga 
County) were selected as case study in this research. 
1.6.2 Research Approach 
This research assumes a qualitative triangulation approach. In this approach, the researcher tries 
to seek understanding into a particular phenomenon based on the perspective of those who 
experience it (Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013: 398). According to Flick (2008: 178), 
‘triangulation’ refers to the observation of a research phenomenon from (at least) two different 
points. Triangulation is mainly done as a process of validating procedures and results of empirical 
social research. Using various methods to collect data to understand a single phenomenon is 
commonly known as “triangulation of data” where data is sourced from different people 
differently (Flick 2008: 178). This research approach sought a deeper understanding of the 
implementation of the CDF in Gatanga and Naivasha by conducting a literature review, a 
structured questionnaire, a semi-structured questionnaire or interview guide, and an observation 
checklist. These methods facilitated the exploration and understanding of meanings that 
individuals or groups ascribe to social or human phenomena under investigation (Creswell, 2009: 
4).   
1.6.3 Research Paradigm 
Kuhn (cited in Brink, Van de Walt and Rensburg, 2012: 24) defines the term paradigm as a 
discipline’s specific method of structuring reality. The term paradigm can also be used to describe 
a set of assumptions regarding basic kinds of entities in the world, and how these entities relate 
and interact, including the methods to use for constructing and testing theories of these entities 
(Laudan, cited in Brink, Van de Walt and Rensburg, 2012: 24). There exist different assumptions 
which can influence the nature of the researcher’s investigation. Therefore, the researcher must 
decide what assumptions are acceptable and appropriate for the topic of interest, and must use the 
method consistent with that paradigm (Brink, Van de Walt and Rensburg, 2012: 24). 
This study utilized the transformative paradigm with its associated philosophical assumptions to 
provide a framework for addressing the research objectives of this study. According to Mertens 
(cited in Mertens et al., 2010: 195), the philosophical assumptions of the transformative paradigm 
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lead to consideration of approaches to research that reflect explicit recognition of community 
values and self-realization that form the core for methodological decisions. Transformative 
paradigm’s axiological assumption rests on the recognition of power differences and ethical 
implications that derive from those differences in terms of discrimination, oppression, 
misrepresentation, and being made to feel and be invisible (marginalized) (Mertens, Holmes and 
Harris, 2009: 85). This resonates with the case study element of this research as it is largely based 
on seeking how to close gaps that have been created through social and economic marginalization 
in Kenya, thus employing its potential to address injustices and inequalities in the society using 
triangulation of qualitative methods of data collection. 
1.6.4 Population 
In academic research, ‘population’ describes the total quantity of cases of the type which are the 
subject of the study. Therefore, a population may consist of objects, people or events (Waliman, 
2005: 276). In this research, the population comprises individuals living within jurisdictions of 
two constituencies in Kenya namely: the Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies. The rationale 
behind the selection of these two constituencies is provided in section 1.6.5.1. 
1.6.5 Sampling 
According to Walliman (2005: 276), a sample is regarded as a selected number of cases in a 
population. A sample is preferred in circumstances where populations are huge and may be 
extremely difficult if attempts were made to reach all units of the whole population. Therefore, a 
sample is selected, informed by certain methods and researcher’s judgment, which portrays a fair 
representation of all members of the population. And since there are basically two major sampling 
procedures, random and non-random, the latter cannot generally be used to make generalizations 
as compared to the former. Random sampling has significantly higher chances of ensuring more 
reliable representation of the whole population. No matter the criteria employed in selecting the 
sample, the selected sample must be free from bias because eventually the sample selected has a 
significant effect in affecting the reliability of subsequent generalizations. 
According to Bergman (2010: 383), sampling refers to the method of selecting units of analysis 
from a study population, which in turn is to be subjected to the analysis. This is determined by 
available resources, both human and material, disposed for the purpose of the proposed research. 
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There exist a range of methods that are available for drawing up a sample. There are those methods 
that aim to represent the population from which the sample is drawn, while other methods may 
compromise on this ideal. This choice is guided by the nature of the research, the availability of 
information, and the cost in determining the choice of any particular method (Blaikie, 2010: 172-
173). Sampling methods are divided into two dimensions; probability versus non-probability as 
demonstrated in Table 1 below:  





(Blaikie, 2010: 172-173). 
This study employs non-probability sampling where the researcher is required to select the 
participants from among those who know most about the phenomenon being studied. The non-
probability sampling is therefore to be constructed from an objective judgment (Burns & Grove, 
2011: 312; Field and Morse, cited in Brink, Van de Walt and Van Rensburg, 2012: 140). 
1.6.5.1 Purposive/Judgmental Sampling 
Purposive/judgmental sampling is a type of non-probability sampling5. Purposive sampling uses 
the judgment of the researcher in selecting cases, or cases are selected with a specific purpose in 
mind. However, the cases selected are not necessarily a representative of the population. It is 
particularly appropriate in particular circumstances: first, where the researcher selects unique cases 
that are especially informative; second, a researcher may use purposive sampling to select 
members of difficult-to-reach specialized populations. Alternatively, a researcher may employ this 
method with an aim of identifying particular types of cases for in-depth investigation, whereby the 
purpose is less to generalize to a larger population than it to gain a deeper understanding (Neuman, 
                                                          
5 In non-probability sampling, the sampling elements are chosen from the population by non-random method (Brink, 
Van de Walt and Van Rensburg, 2012: 140). 
Sampling methods 
 
Probability                   Non-probability 
 
Simple random   Accidental/convenience 
Systematic      Quota 
Stratified    Judgmental/Purposive 
Cluster    Snowball 
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1994: 198). On the one hand, the advantage of using purposive sampling is attributed to the space 
that enables  the researcher to select the sample on the basis of the case being studied. On the other 
hand, the disadvantage is the potential for sampling bias whereby the elements included in the 
sample do not give a proximate representation of the sample, therefore, limiting generalizability 
of the results (Brink, Van de Walt and Van Rensburg, 2012: 141). 
In this study, the researcher aligned the sampling rationale with the fact that the two constituencies 
selected out of 210 constituencies in Kenya, are unique in the manner in which they were recorded 
to have used the CDF funds. The two cases are instructive as they are selected from extremes in 
relation to their CDF performances. The two constituencies selected are Naivasha (in Nakuru 
County) and Gatanga (in Muranga County). Both constituencies were purposively selected based 
on their performances in the management of the CDF. Naivasha was selected because it emerged 
as one among those constituencies that poorly accounted for CDF funds, and Gatanga was selected 
as among the most efficient and accountable with CDF funds.  
The data used to determine the selection of these constituencies was derived from the National 
Taxpayers Association (NTA) Report published in March 2012. According to the Report (2012), 
the key findings for the projects funded and monitored in the financial year (fy) 2009/10 for 
Naivasha indicated that Kenya shillings (Kshs) 8,993,095 of CDF money was wasted on badly 
implemented projects, amounting to 13% of the total CDF funds allocated to the monitored 
projects in the 2009/10 fy; Kshs. 2,500,000 of taxpayers’ money was wasted on abandoned 
projects, amounting to 4% of the total CDF funds allocated; furthermore, Kshs. 15,377,212 of CDF 
money went unaccounted for, amounting to 23% of the total CDF funds allocated to the monitored 
projects in the 2009/10 fy. On the contrary, the key findings for the Gatanga projects funded and 
monitored in the same 2009/10 fy indicated that there was no CDF money wasted.  In addition, 
there was no CDF money unaccounted for.   
Naivasha Constituency comprises 7 county assembly wards (Hellsgate, Lakeview, Mai Mahiu, 
Maiella, Naivasha East, Olkaria, and Viwanda). Gatanga comprises 6 county assembly wards 
(Gatanga, Ithanga, Kakuzi/Mitubiri, Kiriara, Kihumbu-ini, and Mugumo-ini). All the 13 county 
assembly wards from the two constituencies were included in the sample.  
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All the above respondents in both Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies were purposively recruited 
due to the roles they played in the CDF funded local economic development. Largely, these 
community development workers or representatives were involved in one or combination of the 
following: drafting local economic development project proposals, implementing local economic 
development projects or monitoring and evaluating of CDF funded local economic development.   
Respondents recruited were all relatively literate in both constituencies.  It was assumed that they 
would be most knowledgeable in the subject matter. They were also deemed to be in a better 
position to provide the researcher with relevant information regarding the local dynamics in CDF 
funded local economic development initiatives. The professions of those who formed part of the 
CDF funded local economic development ranged from business people, teachers, chiefs, to 
farmers, among others. 
The purpose was not to generalize to a larger population but to gain a deeper understanding. 
1.6.6 Data Collection Methods 
Four data collection methods (literature review, interviews, questionnaires, and observations) were 
used to collect data in this study. The combination of this form of data collection methods 
(observing data from at least two different positions) is known as triangulation (Flick, 2004: 178; 
Armstrong, Gosling, Weinman, & Marteau, 1997: 597). Triangulation is commonly known as 
combination of methodologies to study the same phenomenon. It is commonly used as a method 
for cross validation when two or more methods are congruent and result in comparable data 
(Denzin, 1978: 302). Jick (1979) presents an analogy whereby the effectiveness of a leader could 
be seen from different angles. This could include interviewing the leader, observing his/her 
behavior, or assessing his/her performance records. The focus remains that of understanding the 
leader, but modes of gathering data vary. The combination of these modes portrays a deeper 
understanding of the leadership phenomenon under study. Pratt (2006) argues that by employing 
multiple methods in studying a single phenomenon, the researcher increases the potential to 
acquire a more in-depth and accurate perception of the phenomenon being studied. He notes that 
the commonest used forms of triangulation by combining interviews with observations. In this 
case, observation is used to validate or negate accounts provided during the interviews. In addition 
to interviews and observations employed in this study, structured questionnaires and review of 
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existing literature on the implementation of the CDF were also used. Data collection methods used 
in this study included: 
1.6.6.1 Literature Review 
According to Creswell (2009: 28), literature review means locating and summarizing previous 
studies about a topic, including other conceptual articles or thought pieces that provide frameworks 
related to the topic. A literature review is meant to accomplish several purposes. Firstly, it is aimed 
at examining studies that are closely related to the one that is being undertaken. It relates the study 
to the larger, on-going dialogue in the literature, filling in gaps and extending prior studies (Cooper, 
1984; Marshall & Rossman, cited in Creswell, 2009: 25). Secondly, reviewing literature provides 
a framework for establishing the importance of the study as well as the benchmark for comparing 
the results with other findings (Creswell, 2009: 25). Cooper (cited in Creswell, 2009: 28) suggests 
that a literature review is at times integrative, whereby the researcher summarizes broad themes in 
the literature. On the other hand, the researcher may focus on expounding on the theory that relates 
to the problem under study. Literature review provides important data that forms the introduction 
to the research and underpins the argument about why the study is worth doing, emanating from 
the gaps identified in the field of research under study (Walliman, 2005: 75). This study conducted 
a desktop review of literature which comprised an analysis of existing knowledge, previous 
investigations, and contemporary practice of fiscal decentralization, including the politics, 
management and implementation of fiscal resources in Kenya. This review included previous 
literature on various aspects of the implementation of Constituency Development Fund in varying 
constituencies in Kenya.  
1.6.6.2 Interviews 
Lincoln and Guba (1985: 273) maintain that a major advantage of choosing to use interviews is 
because they allow the respondents to move back and forth in time – to reconstruct the past, 
interpret the present, and predict the future. Pickard (2007: 172) declares that interviews are usually 
used when the interviewer is seeking qualitative, descriptive, in-depth type of data from specific 
individuals who are deemed knowledgeable. In addition, interviews can be used for reconstruction 
of events, describing and expressing feelings about particular current phenomena, including 
predictions of future developments. Even though interviews provide the interviewer and the 
respondent with an opportunity to clarify meanings and assertions, while allowing respondents to 
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respond in their own terms and within their own linguistic parameters (Bertrand and Hughes, cited 
in Pickard, 2007: 172), they can be limited because they often occur within circumstances in which 
respondents are not in a position to recall great quantities of precise factual data without consulting 
records of some sort (Pickard, 2007: 172).  
This study conducted interviews with key informants selected in Gatanga and Naivasha 
constituencies. A semi-structured questionnaire was used (see appendix 2). The researcher 
interviewed 10 respondents and 11 respondents in Gatanga and Naivasha respectively.  (These 
were supplemented with a questionnaire, see 1.6.6.3).  Initially, the research had targeted to 
interview 12 respondents (2 respondents in every county ward) to be interviewed in Gatanga, 
which translated to 83% response rate. In Naivasha Constituency, the researcher had aimed to 
interview 14 (2 respondents in every county ward) respondents which translated to 79% response 
rate. Respondents for interviews were not recruited so much on the basis of their academic 
qualifications but most particularly for their positions and experiences in dealing with CDF funded 
local economic development projects.  Respondents included those involved in local economic 
development projects such as opinion leaders, civic leaders, and local administrators. The 
researcher conducted semi structured interviews with the guide of an interview schedule. These 
interviews were particularly aimed at getting in-depth knowledge from respondents, through their 
experience, their understanding of the CDF; implementation challenges experienced in their 
respective constituencies; and their views on whether the CDF is conducive to LED.  
The questions used for the interview were all in an open ended format. According to Brink, Van 
de Walt, and Rensburg (2012; 155), open-ended questions are not designed according to any 
preconceived answers, and are therefore relevant to providing data that may seek more explanation 
on certain issues. In asking open-ended questions, the researcher asks from the respondent items 
that demand the latter to respond using their own words to the question. Often, open-ended 
questions are aimed to seek out and understand the feelings of the respondent regarding a particular 
phenomenon under study (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 233). These types of questions provide richer 
and more diverse data as compared to the one that can be obtained using closed-ended questions. 
Although they are easier to construct, they may take longer to answer which makes them more 
difficult for the researcher to code and analyze (Brink, Van de Walt, and Rensburg, 2012: 155). 
The interviews conducted as described above used open-ended questions in the form of semi-
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structured questionnaires with an aim to seek in-depth knowledge about local government funding 
processes and policies. 
1.6.6.3 Structured Questionnaires  
Questionnaires are not usually the most commonly used methods used in qualitative research. 
However they can often be useful while collecting information from a wider sample which might 
be difficult to reach with limited time and resources. In this case, clearly defined facts and opinions 
are identified beforehand by more qualitative methods (Pratt, 2006). There are a number of reasons 
associated with conducting a questionnaire: it provides the researcher with an opportunity to reach 
a larger sample than would be possible by using other techniques; anonymity and confidentiality 
can be assured and data analysis can be determined from the outset (Pickard, 2007: 183). An 
apparent limitation of using this technique is that the researcher lacks the opportunity to engage 
deeply with the respondents (Foddy, 1993: 8). 
The questionnaire (see appendix 1) used in this study was largely composed of closed-ended 
questions. Respondents were required to select the most suitable answer from among a set of 
options provided by the researcher. Closed-ended types of questions are favored by researchers 
because of their potential to produce uniformity of responses and are easily processed. They were 
coded before being processed for computer analysis.  Despite the advantages of using these types 
of questions, closed-ended questions contain a major shortcoming: the fact that it is the researcher 
who structures the responses. However, this study, as suggested by Babbie and Mouton (2001: 
233-234), ensured that the questionnaire was exhaustive by including all possible responses, and 
a label/category of “other [please specify______]” was included to accommodate other responses 
not captured in the set of options.  
A total of 99 questionnaires were conducted in this research. 50 were administered in the Gatanga 
Constituency and 49 in the Naivasha Constituency.  (The main reason was to supplement the 
interviews).   Initially, the research had targeted to administer 48 questionnaires (8 respondents in 
every county ward) for Gatanga, which translated that the researcher over-recruited with 2 
respondents to 104% response rate. In Naivasha, the researcher administered 56 questionnaires (8 
respondents in every county ward) which translated to 88% response rate. The respondents for the 
questionnaires were drawn from leaders of community development groups involved in CDF 
funded projects. Member of these community development groups were either involved in project 
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formulation, or monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of approved projects. 
Respondents were selected through non-probability sampling.   Largely, these community 
development workers or representatives were involved in one or combination of the following: 
drafting local economic development project proposals, implementing local economic 
development projects or monitoring and evaluating of CDF funded local economic development.  
Respondents recruited were all relatively literate in both constituencies.  It was assumed that they 
would be most knowledgeable in the subject matter. They were also deemed to be in a better 
position to provide the researcher with relevant information regarding the local dynamics in CDF 
funded local economic development initiatives. The professions of those who formed part of the 
CDF funded local economic development ranged from business people, teachers, chiefs, to 
farmers, among others. 
The purpose was not to generalize to a larger population but to gain a deeper understanding. 
1.6.6.4 Observations  
Observation is a method used in recording conditions, events, and activities without through the 
non-inquisitorial involvement of the researcher. The non-participant researcher takes a detached 
approach to the phenomenon and aims not to be visible. One of the ways to carry out observation 
is when a researcher records the nature of the conditions of objects such as the nature of objects, 
for example, buildings or other infrastructure (Walliman, 2005: 287). According to Lincoln and 
Guba (1985: 273) a major significance of direct observation is that it has a potential of providing 
‘here-and-now’ experience in depth. In addition, observation of objects can be a quick and efficient 
method of gaining preliminary knowledge or making a preliminary assessment of a certain 
phenomenon being studied (Walliman, 2005: 288). In this research, observations provided 
valuable information through visiting the geographical sites where various CDF projects have been 
established. This study presents the outcome of observations (in Chapters 5 and 6) in the form of 
photographs and  commentary on the status of newly started, on-going, finished and unfinished 
CDF funded projects in both constituencies 
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1.6.7 Reliability 
Reliability in qualitative methodologies is embedded in the principles of: fidelity to real life, 
context-and-situation-specificity, authenticity, comprehensiveness, detail, honesty, depth of 
response and meaningfulness to the respondents (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2007: 149). In 
order to enhance reliability, research instruments were pre-tested to ensure that respondents would 
be in a position to comprehend all the items therein and to minimize the risk of misinterpretation 
of terminologies and concepts. This was done in line with Babbie and Mouton’s (2001: 244) 
proposal that no matter how carefully researchers design their data collection instruments, there is 
always a possibility of error. They suggest that a way to mitigate this is by pre-testing data 
collection instruments. Data collected was comprehensively transcribed and themes were 
systematically identified. More reliability was ensured by the use of various data collection 
methods including a questionnaire, interview schedule, and an observation checklist.   
1.6.8 Validity 
Validity determines whether the research truly measures that which it was intended to measure or 
how truthful the research results are. The methodology selected for this research, triangulation, is 
identified as a strategy for increasing validity of research or evaluation findings (Mathison, 1988: 
13). Campbell and Fiske (1959), Denzin (1978); Web, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest (cited in 
Mathison, 1988: 13), concur that triangulation is essentially a strategy that has a potential of 
eliminating bias and consequently allow the dismissal of plausible rival explanations such that a 
truthful proposition about some social phenomenon can be made. In order to ensure validity, this 
research not only gathered views and opinions from the political elite and CDF managers, it also 
reached out to the members and leaders/representatives of the local community who are the direct 
beneficiaries of CDFs. The researcher also asked a series of questions with a similar dimension in 
attempting to establish the consistency of the responses. In addition, the in situ observations 
assisted this research in counterchecking the data received through other instruments.   
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1.6.9 Data Analysis 
Data collected from key informant interviews were analyzed using thematic analysis. Thematic 
analysis is a form of descriptive approach where themes of data collected are identified and 
analyzed (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 79). DeSantis and Ugarriza (2000: 352) and Boyatzis (1998: 
vi-vii) maintain that thematic analysis is a process where encoding involves enlisting themes, 
qualities and indicators that have common relationships. This process of analysis involves 
searching and identifying common threads/themes and establishes recurring patterns. 
Data generated from conducting a questionnaire (see appendix 1) in Gatanga and Naivasha 
constituencies were coded and computed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 
software. The reason that SPSS was used is mainly because of its capacity to compute and analyze 
large data sets generated from conducting a questionnaire with large number of respondents. 
Results generated through SPSS are determined from the outset and such computation and analysis 
would be tedious if administered manually. According to Alan (2008: 340), SPSS is the most 
widely used package of computer software for analyzing this type of data extracted from a 
questionnaire. Descriptive and inferential statistics were computed to establish the relationships 
among various variables. Such variables included the level of public awareness of CDF and its 
intended operations; the levels of public participation, involvement in project identification and 
prioritization; management and evaluation of CDF among other variables.  
 
However, the objective was not to generalize the data generated, but to gain a deeper understanding 
of the challenges facing community development workers.  The thesis therefore present common 
trends and outcomes in the form of narratives, at times comparing responses between the 
respondents from the Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies as well as with studies existing 
conducted on the CDF.  
1.6.10 Ethical Considerations 
This research identified ethical considerations as an important factor in doing social research. This 
research ensured that all ethical issues were approached with honesty, respect, and with a sense of 
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moral obligations. It therefore aligned itself to the policies and guidelines set by the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Research Policy6, 2007: V). During the research, respondents were informed about 
the purpose of this study and the reason for which they were selected was also explained. All 
respondents selected for the purpose of this study were invited to sign a consent form, as proof that 
they had responded freely to the questions asked.  The researcher  applied and received the 
following authorizations: Ethical Clearance Letter from the University of KwaZulu-Natal (see 
Appendix 5); authorization from County Commissioner, Muranga County – County Headquarters 
for Gatanga Constituency (see Appendix 6); authorization from County Direcctor of Education, 
Muranga County (see Appendix 7); County Director of Education, Nakuru County – County 
Headquarters for Naivasha Constituency  (see Appendix 8); authorization from County 
Commissioner, Nakuru County (see Appendix 9). Informed Consent Letter signed by respondents 
who participated in the study is also attached (see Appendix 10).   
                                                          
6 University of KwaZulu-Natal 2007, Research Policy: http://research.ukzn.ac.za/EthicsPolicy12111.aspx  
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1.7 Structure of Dissertation 
Chapter One: Background to the Study 
Chapter one presented the background information pertaining the research problem. It elaborated 
the research methodology and presented the research problem, objectives, research questions, and 
explained how research instruments were utilized to collect data.  The rationale and the sampling 
technique behind the selection of Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies for the purposes of this 
study was presented. It also presented how validity and reliability was ensured in order to produce 
credible results. Methods of data collection and analysis were highlighted. Ethical considerations 
and procedural measures taken during the course of the research were also presented. 
Chapter Two: Conceptualizing Decentralization and Fiscal Decentralization 
Chapter two expounds on the paradigm and the models guiding this research. The chapter begins 
by a conceptual analysis of broader themes of centralization and decentralization. It provides a 
particular focus on fiscal decentralization theory that contains the philosophical assumptions on 
which this research is grounded.  
Chapter Three: Fiscal Decentralization in Kenya 
Chapter three provides a background and a comprehensive survey of prior research related to the 
management of fiscal resources in Kenya. It also reviews various programmes regulating 
decentralization policies in Kenya.   
Chapter Four: Research Analysis and Interpretation 
Chapter four analyses the research findings in relation to the research problem being studied. 
Results from data presented in the previous chapter in analyzed. Literature from previous studies 
is been used to compare or contrast the resultant data.  This chapter identifies the main themes of 
the study.  It refers to the data collected during the fieldwork and presents the common trends and 
outcomes in the form of narratives, at times comparing responses between the respondents from 
the Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies.  However, it only does so in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of key issues affecting the implementation of the CDF in Kenya.   
Chapter Five: Conclusions and recommendations 
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Chapter five summarizes the dissertation with emphasis on results obtained, contribution made by 
results. It presents the relevance of the study on policy, provides recommendations that would 
improve the impact of CDF on LED, and makes suggestions for further research. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the contextual background regarding the theory and practice of fiscal 
decentralization. It highlights that development planning in Kenya, as in many countries in the 
developing world, for decades remained the preserve of the central government. It explains that 
the new trend of meaningful decentralization inaugurated by the CDF in 2003 provided a motive 
for this study.  This chapter elaborates the research problem, objectives, and research questions. 
The chapter presents the research methodology utilized in guiding this study to achieve its 
objectives. Methods and instruments of data collection are explained. The rationale and the 
sampling technique behind the selection of Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies for the purposes 
of this study are presented. It also explains how validity and reliability was ensured in order to 
produce credible results. Methods of data collection and analysis are highlighted. Ethical 
considerations and procedural measures taken during the course of the research are also presented. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Conceptualizing Decentralization and Fiscal Decentralization 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores both the concept of centralization and decentralization in the management 
of resource allocation and development planning. It outlines common theoretical arguments and 
motivations that explain why governments prefer centralization or decentralization of their powers 
and functions in carrying out their development mandate. The literature in this chapter reviews 
decentralization in general and focuses on the dimension of fiscal decentralization. In particular, 
the analysis is geared towards unfolding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the 
enhancement, or otherwise, of local economic development. It presents the broader concept of 
decentralization with its dimensions (political, administrative, and fiscal) and forms 
(deconcentration, delegation, and devolution).  It concludes by exploring key purposes of fiscal 
decentralization, that is:  fiscal equalization; economic efficiency; fiscal accountability; fiscal 
participation; and fiscal transparency and information sharing. 
2.2 Centralization  
This section explores why governments prefer centralization of development planning and resist 
sharing those powers and functions with subnational lower levels of government.  
Killick (1976: 169) maintains that centralization is concerned with the maintenance of a well-
coordinated system of fiscal economic policies regulated by central government agents. Central 
governments fear the emergence of complexities associated with delegating such powers and 
functions to self-seeking and conflicting subnational agents. Fiscal centralization entails a process 
where central government remains in control regarding the provision of public goods in the 
regions; determines the mode of collecting taxes; and delegates and oversees the implementation 
of public goods on local jurisdictions (Albornoz and Cabrales, 2010: 4).  
Governments that implement fiscal centralization policies argue that central government is better 
placed to implement far-reaching policies and programs to address the diverse needs of its 
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citizenry. The rationale behind the need for central planning is often associated with developing 
countries and is seen as a means of providing comprehensive policies and the efficient use of scarce 
resources to promote economic growth through economies of scale (Cheema and Rondinelli, 
1983). Bahl and Linn (1994: 3) argue that the main reason that fiscal centralization is associated 
more with developing countries is because their economies are not diversified and remain 
relatively low. Central governments therefore try to protect their economies from international 
fluctuations in commodity prices, worldwide recessions, natural disasters, and wars. In other 
words, they prefer central government to harmonize their economies. 
Similarly, given the fact that the delivery of public goods is carried out by regional authorities 
through decisions made at the center, it is argued that there is an advantage linked to this scheme. 
Due to the fact that central agents lack direct vested interests in local political fabric, they stand a 
better chance to command the delivery of public goods that are not linked to potential bias of self-
interest of local politicians (Albornoz and Cabrales, 2010: 3). 
Bahl and Linn (1994: 18-19) argue that developing countries adopt more centralized fiscal systems 
of government by comparison with  highly industrialized countries that have a solid decentralized 
format. Those that prefer to maintain a more centralized system contend that centralization enables 
governments to, among other things, maintain a more stable macroeconomic policy since they are 
not able to capture economic efficiency advantages of fiscal decentralization. Some developing 
countries do this through retaining fiscal taxing powers at the center and later dispersing them to 
the subnational governments through fiscal intergovernmental transfers. 
Governments that pursue fiscal centralization policies prefer to determine the level of expenses 
and revenues. They fear that when subnational levels of governments are granted such powers and 
functions, they may end up designing their own agenda that might conflict with national 
development policies. In the end, coordination problems arise (Jalil, Harun, and Mat, 2012: 151-
152). As such, decentralizing fiscal responsibilities to the subnational governments poses the risk 
of increasing the incentives for opportunistic behaviour among local governments which may shift 
their tax burdens to the national government. This is resultant on the complexity in coordinating 
national fiscal policies, and eventually ends up posing a challenge to national stability 
(Prud’homme, 1995: 201). Liu (2007: 10-11) argues that fiscal decentralization can impact 
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negatively on macroeconomic performance when sub-national governments incur uncontrolled 
expenditures, and adversely affect national fiscal policy. 
In addition, Litvack et. al. (1998: 8) contend that not only can decentralization fail to ensure an 
effective delivery of services at the local level, it may also risk national economic stability.  
Prud’homme (1995: 206-207) refers to Brazil’s case to demonstrate a negative impact of fiscal 
decentralization on macroeconomic stability. After Brazil went through constitutional reform in 
1988, the role of the central government in conducting macroeconomic policies was significantly 
reduced. This was related to three significant factors: it lowered the share of taxes collected by the 
central government; subnational governments (states) were given more autonomy and freedom in 
setting tax rates; and increased the quantity of fiscal transfers from the central to the subnational 
governments. These changes, as Prud’homme argues, are responsible for Brazil’s poor 
macroeconomic performance in subsequent years (1995: 207).  
Bogoev (cited in Prud’homme, 1995: 206-207) cites another example, that of former Yugoslavia, 
which was known as one of the most decentralized economies in the world. The central 
government had been rendered so weak by the decentralized system such that in 1986, the central 
government was only controlling a mere 22 per cent of the total public revenues. These revenues 
were obtained from taxes related to sales and custom duties, which were not efficient to foster 
stabilization policies. Consequently, the central government ended up controlling a meager portion 
of the economy that incapacitated it to execute its functions. In fact, it relied on the contributions 
from lower levels of government negotiated every year. As a consequence, the federal government 
was unable to implement stabilization policies, leading to excessive inflation resulting in poor 
macroeconomic management. In sum, Ebel and Yilmaz (2002: 14-15) contend that governments 
prefer to remain centralized because they are unable to create decentralized systems, rather than 
adopt inadequate decentralized systems that are likely to destabilize their economies.  
2.3 Decentralization  
Rondinelli (1981: 134) defines decentralization as a process that involves the transfer of planning, 
decision-making, or management roles and functions from central government to field 
organizations, subordinate units of government, private corporations, or local development units 
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or organizations. Mawhood  and Smith  (respectively cited in Ribot, 2002: ii) define 
decentralization as any act in which a central government formally cedes powers and functions to 
actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy. For 
Kasfir (1993: 24), decentralization means distributing authority and power horizontally rather than 
hierarchically. The purpose is to gain more effective achievement of locally selected goals. The 
assumption of this argument is that instruments at the local level will be more attentive in 
delivering development as compared to centrally controlled mechanisms. In fact, Hutchcroft, 
(2001: 23) argues that in the policy debates by the wake of the 21st century, the wave of 
decentralizing government is commonly seen as “a very fashionable idea”, “the latest fashion”, or 
“a fashion of our time”. 
Decentralization has been at the center of policy experiments in a number of developing countries 
and this trend has become a governance theme in an effort to deliver social and economic benefits 
to their populations (Bardhan, 2002: 187).  This study has identified several objectives of why 
governments decentralize their functions to subnational governments and accord them with 
discretionary authority to implement local economic development policies:  
The inclination towards decentralization approach has been triggered by much dissatisfaction and 
disappointing results of centralized service delivery. In many countries, central governments failed 
to provide any meaningful delivery of services due to excessive bureaucracy. Following the 
foregoing argument, decentralization is seen as an alternative government policy framework that 
has the potential to fast track service delivery to huge populations simultaneously (Litvack, 1996). 
According to Nel and Binns, (2003: 108) the widespread failure of ‘top- down’ development 
interventions has led to a move in both developed and developing countries towards the 
decentralization of developmental responsibilities to local government and community-based 
agencies. The rationale behind decentralization is essentially promoted under the platform of the 
failure of the central system of governance to ensure the equitable distribution of the country’s 
resources and the marginalization of grassroots communities in decision-making regarding the 
affairs that affect their daily lives. Grindle (2007: 4) traces the shift in fiscal, political, and 
administrative responsibilities in the process of reconstructing democratic governance. This trend 
has gained support among scholarly and policy circles, and various countries are experimenting 
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with decentralization as a mean to improve their democratic space and augment their development 
blueprint (Hutchcroft, 2001: 23).  
Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird (1998: 5) argue that the  drive for efficiency in governance is the most 
common rationale for decentralization. Decentralized government, they argue, creates a more 
favorable environment where local actors are actively involved in policy formulation and 
implementation. Due to this fact, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2001: 170) argue that 
decentralizing government is likely to bring about ownership for policy solutions among 
beneficiaries and implementers, which can lead to higher use rates of policy goods and services, 
reduced maintenance and operating costs, and better conformity between policy intent and 
outcomes.  
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2001: 171) note that empowering local actors is significant from a 
democratic perspective because of its empowerment potential, bringing about accountability, 
transparency, and responsiveness - features of good governance that are components of building 
an efficient governance system in the delivery of public goods and services. Similarly, Robertson 
(2002: 59) argues that among the reasons behind decentralization is to enhance the efficiency of 
government and enable it to meet demands from special sections of community for a degree of 
control over their own affairs. In this regard, efficiency is judged by the level at which a 
government is committed to answer needs of the local actors and communities. 
Schmidt (1997:45) highlights that decentralization has leverage in  engaging citizens to participate 
in influencing decisions pertaining their own development. Ginter (1992:66) argues that 
decentralisation strengthens participation by bringing governments closer to the people that have 
elected them to coordinate service delivery. Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002:53) argue that 
decentralization can foster participation of local stakeholders where they are in a position to 
influence and share control over development initiatives and make the decisions over resources 
within their local jurisdictions. Thus, decentralization is known to aid in the narrowing of the gap 
betweeen citizens and the state and to facilitate the emergence of the (expected)  interactive and 
responsive state.  Empirical studies have indicated that the shift towards decentralisation has 
recorded significant development in participatory democracy. For example, Shah (1998:20) who 
collected data  from a variety of countries found that decentralisation is positively corelated with 
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citizen participation. Similarly, Rondinelli (1983: 51) argues that decentralization has increased  
local participation in public affairs.  
Bekker (1988:28) observes a close connection between decentralization and local participation in 
decision making on development. He acknowledges decentralization as valuable because it creates 
an environment that promotes participation of locals in the formulation and implementation of 
government development policies. Consequently, local stakeholders, local communities and 
interest groups are involved in making decisions over development initiatives that affect them, for 
example health, security, infrastructure, and environment, Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 56) 
believe that better policy outcomes are likely to be achieved. In decentralizing governance, 
therefore, participation becomes one of the main objectives central to development policy 
implementation. 
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002:51) argue that throughout the developing world over the past decade 
or so, citizens have increasingly organized to expand their influence over policy debate, and are 
using decentralization frameworks and settings to pressure their governments to be more 
responsive and accountable, and to demand greater role in governance. Regardless of the kind of 
government system in place, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2001: 170) argue that participation 
remains an important factor, and since centralized governments have not realized their aspirations, 
they are turning to decentralization to offer policy solutions that can satisfy their development 
needs and preferences. 
In Brinkerhoff and Crosby’s (2002:75) argument, decentralization increases the opportunities for 
citizens to lobby local officials and to hold them accountable through the ballot box in elections 
and through voice in public hearings.  Furthermore, participation is expanded to greater numbers 
of local populations. Decentralization, warn Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002:75), is no guarantee 
that participatory opportunities, especially for the poor and disadvantaged, will automatically 
increase, although there is sufficient evidence that it is an important factor in contributing to the 
supply side of participation. 
Wampler (cited in Shah, 2007:21) argues that one of the core reasons why central governments 
adopt decentralization strategies is as an effort to enhance citizen participation. He maintains that 
citizen participation in governance matters is indispensable because it improves local performance 
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and development, thereby enhancing the quality of democracy. Narsiah (2011:88) argues that 
decentralization is perceived as a key tool to evoke visions of democratic participation and as an 
argument against centralized bureaucratic control. Similarly, Heller (2001:132) argues that 
strengthening and empowering local government has been justified not only on the grounds of 
making local government more efficient but also on the grounds of increasing accountability and 
participation. For Fung and Wright (cited in Narsiah, 2011:91), decentralizing state power 
“downwards” to the local scale is a necessary feature, both in conceptualization and 
implementation of locally based policy and development solutions.  
Fjeldstad (2004: 1) and Ribot and Oyono (2005: 205) argue that decentralization initiatives are 
ostensibly devised to enfranchise local people through rights and representation in local public 
decision-making. In the light of political dispensation, they view local institutions being cast as 
instruments of democratic decision-making, so that local people can make decisions based on their 
own needs and aspirations. Effective political decentralization is based on the assumption of 
creating a realm of local autonomy, defined by inclusive local processes and local authorities 
empowered with decisions that are meaningful to local people (Ribot, 2002: 2). In order for this 
local based decentralization to serve its ends, it demands transfer of discretionary powers from 
central authorities to the hands of local representatives or at least downwardly accountable local 
authorities (Agrawal and Ribot, cited in Wisner et al, 2005: 205). 
Oates (cited in Altunbas and Thorton, 2012: 67) argues that decentralized governments are well 
positioned to understand local conditions and are better able to satisfy citizen preferences. 
Seabright and Tabellini (respectively cited in Altunbas and Thorton, 2012: 67) also maintain that 
citizens are better informed through more localized governments as compared to through central 
government ministries. When local populations are well informed, they are able to make informed 
decisions that are favorable to their own social and economic development. Fjeldstad (2004: 1) 
argues that by bringing these functions closer to subnational governments and their populations, it 
increases the likelihood of matching development policies to local needs.  
Bardhan (2002: 185) argues that decentralization is being favored within the context of rampant 
ethnic conflicts and separatists movements as a way of defusing social and political tensions and 
ensuring local cultural and political economy. In this case, regional ethnic blocks, particularly 
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those from minority groups are able to contribute and share benefits both from block fund 
allocation by national government or from revenues earmarked to be collected by local 
governments. Conyers (1984: 188) further argues that the focus is on decentralization as a tool to 
entrench national development. In this regard, decentralization has been regarded as a means of 
achieving a variety of different development objectives-ranging from popular participation to 
better management of rural development and the maintenance of national unity. Similarly, Litvack 
(1996) alludes to the fact that in certain cases, government succumb to adopting decentralization 
from regional ethnic blocks who continue to pressure central government for more control in 
political, administrative, and fiscal powers. Thus, in an attempt to maintain unity and stability, 
local and regional governments are given some or most functions as a way of appealing to various 
dissenting local communities.  
Bird and Vailancourt (Cited in Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002: 2), argue that the reason developing 
countries are turning to decentralization is as an attempt to address inadequate social and economic 
growth, and macroeconomic stability. The initiative to decentralize is founded on the premise that 
it expands the opportunity for local governments, and their citizens to directly contribute to their 
respective social and economic development. Smith (1985:85) argues that decentralization and its 
manifestations are necessary to enhance social and economic development.  
Miller (2002:10) attempts to establish a link between decentralization and growth of local 
development. She notes that decentralization presents an edge in the facilitation and mobilization 
of local resources in support of local development process, and enables value-added contributions 
to the provision of services and development efforts, which increases the total value of services 
provided, or development achieved from the limited resources available. She further commends 
the maximization of local potential where local people are able to identify and mobilize 
local/indigenous resources which otherwise would not be available to centrally run programmes. 
Under a decentralization framework, citizens are often willing to volunteer free or cheap labour 
and expertise, and other forms of in-kind contributions, in order to support social and development 
initiatives (Miller 2002:10).  
Even though there has not been a clear connection between decentralization and social-economic 
growth, Scott (2009:13) argues that localizing functions of government has a higher potential to 
improve service delivery and consequently social and economic development. He maintains that 
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providing an effective, reliable provision of basic services may be the best way in which local 
governments can foster local economic growth. This means that policy work on implementing 
decentralization in a way that improves service delivery carries a double benefit of also enhancing 
social and economic development.  
Decentralization can take on various forms namely: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution: 
i)  Deconcentration: Rondinelli (1983: 189) and Hutchcroft (2001: 30) describe 
deconcentration as the process in which government transfers or relocates some of its 
functions to be conducted by field managers in regional offices and local administrative 
units that are part of the central government. However, other than such shifting of 
responsibilities to local administrative units, deconcentration has very little that reflects 
decentralization (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2001: 2). For example, deconcentration of 
fiscal functions would mean the distribution of fiscal planning and implementation on 
behalf of the central government to the regional offices or units in local administration 
(Bird and Villancourt, 1998: 3). 
Bahl (2008: 5) argues that such forms of decentralization do not lead to the empowerment 
of local populations. In this form of arrangement, the central government allocates some 
functions such as program planning and implementation to be dispensed by sub-national 
offices within the same government sectors that are linked to the center. Such functions 
may be carried out at provincial, county, sub-county, or village levels. Such execution is to 
follow one line of command with lower level offices and levels accountable to state 
ministers (Swanson & Samy, 2002: 4-5).   
ii) Delegation: Delegation is a form of decentralization that denotes a scenario where a central 
government assigns a parastatal or a similar government agency the responsibility of 
implementing some programs at regional or lower jurisdiction levels (Swanson & Samy, 
2002: 5). For Bird and Villancourt, (1998: 3) and Cheema, (2005: 122), delegation refers 
to a situation in which regional or local governments act as agents for the central 
government. This could include executing certain fiscal functions. However, they continue 
to be solely accountable to the center. Functions such as personnel recruitment, contracting, 
budgeting, procurement and other functions with ultimate responsibility remain under the 
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central government (Rondinelli, 1983: 189). Therefore, local government officials are first 
and foremost accountable to the central government 
iii) Devolution: Devolution is seen as the most extensive form of decentralization. In this case, 
development planning, management, and co-financing are relocated to lower level 
governments such as provinces, regional, county or local governments. These sub-national 
level authorities are legally vested with discretionary powers and functions to exercise their 
responsibility in tandem with national development policy plans (Swanson & Samy, 2002: 
5). Rondinelli (1983: 189) and Hutchcroft, 2001: 30) argue that devolution refers to the 
transfer of decision-making powers and functions over local development to lower levels 
of government that are legally incorporated. It refers to  a situation in which not only the 
implementation of development projects but also the authority to decide what is done with 
regard to  the utilization of  fiscal resources is in the hands of local governments (Bird and 
Villancourt, 1998: 3; Cheema, 2005: 122).  
In addition to the foregoing, decentralization also manifests itself in three key dimensions namely: 
political, administrative, and fiscal: 
i) Political decentralization: Political decentralization is concerned with empowering 
communities to democratically elect their representatives at local and regional level.  
Through discretionary powers and functions, this facet of decentralization is aimed at 
giving local populations and their leaders more power and authority to influence the design 
and implementation of laws and policies within their jurisdictions (Daughters and Harper, 
2007: 213). Largely, arguments in support of political decentralization suggest that most 
countries desire to decentralize political power in order to empower local populations, and 
locally elected leaders by legally creating a platform where they can actively engage in 
their development. The assumption is that local stakeholders are in a better position to 
discern preferential local projects and initiatives that are in tandem with local needs. 
Locally elected officials are also believed to be directly linked with their constituents and 
are in a better position to understand local needs and interests as compared to their 
counterparts in regional and national offices (Litvack, 1997).  
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ii) Administrative decentralization: Cohen and Peterson (1999: 23) understand administrative 
decentralization as a dimension that “is focused on the hierarchical and functional 
distribution of powers between central and non-central government units”. Ebel and 
Yilmaz (2002) posit that functional distribution is the transfer of authority to specialized 
organizations that operate across jurisdictions. An example of functional distribution is 
creation of field offices within national ministries dealing with health care, education, and 
transportation issues. The World Bank (cited in KNRC and SPAN, 2010: 14) has adopted 
the following definition to conceptualize administrative decentralization: that it “seeks to 
redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services 
among different levels of government. It is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, 
financing and management of certain public functions from the central government and its 
agencies to field units of government agencies”.  
iii) Fiscal decentralization: In its simplest understanding, Bahl (2008: 4) explains that fiscal 
decentralization refers to “the empowerment of people by empowering their local 
governments”. By this he means that the central government would cede some or most of 
budgetary, spending and revenue collection powers to its sub-national governments to be 
exercised within their respective jurisdiction. According to Davey (2003), fiscal 
decentralization is generally understood from two major perspectives. The first is the 
division of spending responsibilities and sources of revenue between central and lower 
level governments. Secondly, it is the amount of discretion that is there for local 
governments to determine how revenues are collected and expended. Davey (2003) argues 
that fiscal decentralization allows lower level governments to set up frameworks for the 
jurisdictional expenditures, revenue collection, and legal discretion within which local 
government operates in providing services to their constituents.  It is argued that providing 
lower levels of government with powers to manage the allocation of fiscal resources is the 
most critical element of decentralization. In order for these local stakeholders to be in a 
position to exercise their mandate, they must be able to legally access revenues, either 
through own collection, through transfer from the central collecting authority, or a 
combination of the two (Litvack, 1996).  
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When forms of decentralization (deconcentration, delegation, and devolution), together with its 
dimensions (political, administrative, and fiscal), are intertwined, they become significant 
indicators that may determine the extent of decentralization. In fact, efforts to decentralize have 
not always yielded positive results. Depending on capacity and readiness of the local bosses and 
administrators to support decentralization initiatives, policies of decentralization may do more 
harm than good.  
2.4 Fiscal Decentralization 
Amagoh (2012: 72) argues that fiscal decentralization occurs when subnational units of 
government are given autonomy over the provision and financing of public goods. He purports 
that fiscal decentralization is said to offer a number of benefits for public sector governance, 
including growth, accountability and responsiveness of government officials to local demands and 
needs (Amagoh, 2012: 72). Financial institutions like the World Bank have not only been urging 
nations to embrace fiscal decentralization, but have been encouraging and supporting them to 
adopt decentralization as part of the broader strategy for enhancing public sector efficiency. These 
institutions do so on the assumption that fiscal decentralization strengthens participatory decision-
making at local government levels, which would in effect lead to acceleration of economic growth 
and development (Grewal, cited in Amagoh, 2012: 72). However, Amagoh (:72-73) remains 
cognizant that these assumption remains controversial regarding their impact on economic growth.  
Fiscal decentralization is a system of government in which a substantial share of power is granted 
to a local, provincial or regional level of government to manage and make decisions over 
management of fiscal resources directed for LED and as a system through which they can deliver 
their local development mandate (Koethenbuerger, 2007; Prud’Homme, 2003: 17). Bahl (2008: 4) 
provides a simple but comprehensive definition of fiscal decentralization, namely: “the 
empowerment of people by empowering their local governments”. This would mean that the 
central government would cede some or most of budgetary, spending and revenue collection 
powers to its sub-national governments to be exercised within their respective jurisdiction. 
According to Davey (2003), fiscal decentralization is generally understood from two major 
perspectives. The first is the division of spending responsibilities and sources of revenue between 
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central and lower level governments. Secondly, it is the amount of discretion that is there for local 
governments to determine how revenues are collected and expended.  
Davey (2003) argues that fiscal decentralization allows lower level governments to set up 
frameworks for the jurisdictional expenditures, revenue collection, and legal discretion within 
which local government operates in providing services to their constituents.  It is argued that 
providing lower levels of government with powers to manage the allocation of fiscal resources is 
the most critical element of decentralization. In order for these local stakeholders to be in a position 
to exercise their mandate, they must be able to legally access revenues, either through their own 
collection, through transfer from the central collecting authority, or a combination of the two 
(Litvack, 1996). 
Kee (2004: 168) argues that the theoretical case for fiscal decentralization dates from 17th and 18th 
century philosophers, including Rousseau, Mill, de Tocqueville, Montesquieu, and Madison. It 
started at a time in which the central governments were distrusted and small, democratic 
governments were seen as the principal hope to preserve the liberties of citizenry. In the mid-
1950s, this movement towards fiscal decentralization through the classical appeal advanced by 
Tiebout  (cited in Vigneault, 2007: 133) who claimed that decentralized provisions of public goods 
allows better fulfillment of diverse individual demands (Brueckner, 2000: 1).  
On account of many failures associated with central management in developing countries due to 
corruption, nepotism, and patronage politics, the centralized state has lost a great deal of 
legitimacy. In the new political dispensation across many governments in developing countries, 
decentralization is believed to promise a range of benefits. This new system is being proposed as 
a way of reducing the role of the state by fragmenting authority at the center, and introducing more 
intergovernmental competition, checks and balances; and in addition, as a way to make 
government more responsive and efficient (Bardhan, 2002: 185). 
Wildasin (cited in Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002: 2) identifies institutional factors such as political, social, 
legal, and economic conditions as critical elements in the analysis of fiscal decentralization. This 
institutional environment of fiscal decentralization entails overall economic development, the 
nature of the legal system, ongoing processes of political and economic reform, the operation of 
monetary and fiscal institutions, and tensions emanating from ethnic, religious, or economic 
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disparities. Consequently, it is this institutional background that determines the nature of 
intergovernmental financial systems and ultimately affects the outcome of the reform of fiscal 
decentralization process.  
In the last three decades, fiscal decentralization – the assignment of taxation powers, revenue 
collection and expenditure functions from central to lower levels of government – in many 
developing countries has become a critical theme in the area of financial management and as a 
means to enhance LED and diversification of social economic benefits to the majority of 
populations and meet their preferential needs and interests. Fiscal decentralization is generally 
interpreted as devolution of the authority associated with decision making to a lower-level 
government, deemed to be closer to the local communities. In addition, authority associated with 
decision-making is allocated on the basis of legal relationships between higher- and lower-levels 
government (Akai and Sakata, 2002: 95).  
Governments fiscally devolve their powers and functions through pressure from external actors, 
or through their own volition motivated by various reasons. Some of the common rationales behind 
the adoption of fiscal decentralization include: 
This move has been prompted by much dissatisfaction with centralized economic planning in 
inducing meaningful development and building a sustainable stability in the economy (Olowu, 
2000; Manor 1999). Due to the failure of the centralized governance model experienced in many 
developing countries, many are now resorting to decentralizing powers and have embarked on 
managing public affairs from regional policy-making bodies (Smoke, 2007: 131).  
Fiscal decentralization is seen as a package that has huge potential for governance reform and 
promises to be a prominent means for managing expenditure delivery and revenue mobilization. 
Thus, it is seen by many developing countries as a scheme for social and economic development 
strategy. In addition, it is also seen as a policy change commonly advocated by international 
monetary and donor agencies that advise these countries (Bahl and Linn, 1994: 1). According to 
Rezk (1998: 206), theoretical and policy-oriented interest in fiscal decentralization arose in the 
1980s, following the various unprecedented situations faced by countries all over the world. Bird 
(1993: 207) attributes the revival and the new strength in decentralization initiatives to developing 
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countries’ ad hoc policies purposively aimed at escaping from inefficiency, macroeconomic 
instability, and inadequate economic growth of the central governments.  
Fiscal decentralization has been argued both in the industrialized and in the developing world as a 
means to improve the performance of their public sectors (Oates, 1999: 1120).  As Smart (2007: 
204) explicitly states, decentralization of spending powers to lower-level governments is a wide-
spread phenomenon, one that appears to have become more common in recent years. He argues 
that decentralization is linked to the increase of policy responsiveness to the preference of citizens 
and to increase accountability in government. In contrast, a unitary central government tends to 
provide uniform public programs nationwide that may not be in line with local development 
interests, while local governments are believed to respond better to preferences and needs of their 
residents.  
Fiscal decentralization is commonly preferred for the healthy competition it is likely to generate 
between various levels of government. Brennan and Buchanan (cited in Vigneault, 2007: 133) 
argue that decentralization of revenue-raising authority provides an element of competition that 
constrains governments seeking to exploit their taxation powers. Also, decentralizing expenditure 
provision and revenue raising authority improves accountability, by ensuring that the level of 
government responsible for providing goods and services is also responsible for financing them.  
Bird (cited in Bird and Villancourt, 1998: 3) argues that another approach from which fiscal 
decentralization can be justified is a bottom-up approach. Fiscal decentralization generally stresses 
political values- improved governance in the sense of local responsiveness and political 
participation, for example – as well as allocative efficiency in terms of improving welfare. On the 
other hand, the top-down approach to fiscal decentralization may, for example, make the life of 
the central government easier by shifting deficits (or at least some of the political pressures 
resulting from deficits) downward. It may also be the desire of the central government to achieve 
its allocative goals more efficiently by delegating or decentralizing authority to local governments. 
Thus, with the management and the control of the local government regulated from the center, the 
goal of the central government may even be to increase the level of the national welfare. Whatever 
the rationale for this reform, Bird and Villancourt (1998: 4) argue that the main criterion for fiscal 
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decetralization can only be evaluated based how well it serves the presumed national development 
policy objectives.  
Scholars and policy circles prefer decentralizing government fiscal functions with the expectation 
that it can bring about economic efficiency, thus matching policies with local development tastes 
and preferences. This is largely because different jurisdictions have varying potentials both in their 
capacity to raise revenues as well as richness in terms of their natural resources. Stigler (cited in 
Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002: 2) notes that in systems that are fiscally decentralized, the policies of 
subnational branches of governments are permitted to vary in order to accommodate the 
preferences of their residents. In addition, designing fiscal decentralization is intended to bring 
government closer to the people. 
Several authors such as Prud’Homme (2003: 19); Musgrave and Musgrave (cited in Dillinger, 
Perry, Webb (2003: 232) agree that key governance values such as economic efficiency, 
participation, accountability, interregional or interpersonal equity and political efficiency are likely 
to thrive favorably under fiscal decentralization framework.  For example, Rao (1998: 78) views 
fiscal decentralization as a good milieu that can prompt the provision of economic efficiency 
through sustainable governance values and enhance development of LED. 
Zhang et al (1998) argue that fiscal decentralization is probably the most significant indicator of 
the extent of decentralization. Thus, the quality of fiscal decentralization can only be gauged 
depending on the level of subnational autonomy and discretion on expenditure and revenue affairs 
(Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002: 5). Therefore, as argued by Oulasvirta and Turala (2009: 314), fiscal 
decentralization can only be well conceived in the event where local governments control their 
own sources of revenue with an aim of achieving significant financial autonomy and accountability 
to their local tax payers. 
Oates (1972), Rao (1998), Bird and Villancourt (1998), Bahl (1999), Prud’homme (2003), and 
Kee (2004) have largely agreed that the main rationale behind any government decision to 
experiment with fiscal decentralization is to provide for the needs of its constituents in their 
varying demands for goods and services by enhancing  viable local economic development.  
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2.5 Local Economic Development 
As decentralization unfolds, argues Helmsing (2003: 67), the question of local economic 
development (LED) acquires more significance by addressing how local governments can 
contribute to local economic development.  
Helmsing (2003: 67) defines local economic development as a process in which partnerships 
between local governments and communities are established to administer existing resources and 
to stimulate the economy of a well-defined area. It lays emphasis on local control, coupled with 
the use of local human, institutional, physical, and natural resources within the defined area. LED 
provides autonomy and discretion to local stakeholders to mobilize resources through dialogue 
and strategic actions. Swinburn (2006: 1) argues that the main objective of establishing a well-
coordinated LED system is to consolidate local economic capacity of a local area, improve 
economic future and the quality of life for constituents. Helmsing (2003: 69) characterizes LED 
as a process in which local government and communities are established and empowered to 
manage resources that exist within their respective borders to create jobs and stimulate the 
economy.  
According to Kotze (1997: 25), development-oriented decentralization was launched in the 1960s. 
He argues that this initiative began when newly independent states began to adapt their local 
government and field administration in the interests of more efficient development administration. 
Conyers (1986: 599), a leading author in development-oriented decentralization, links 
decentralization process to development. She understands this approach as a process, and one 
which is instrumental in effecting various forms of social, economic and political growth. 
Similarly, Nel (2001: 1005) views LED as a process that allows local actors to shape and share the 
development future of their jurisdiction. This process is largely defined as participatory since it 
encourages partnership among local actors by enabling them to design joint strategies for 
development. They achieve this mainly by competitive use of local resources with the ultimate 
objective of improving local economic status of their regions. 
Helmsing (2003: 67) points out that the context for development at the local level has changed 
drastically over the years especially in developing countries in general and Africa in particular. 
These changes have been reinforced due to fundamental changes in global economic policy, 
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namely liberalization of markets and structural adjustment that was proposed by the IMF, the 
World Bank, and other international stakeholders. When liberalization and structural adjustment 
programmes were proposed, centralized governments lost the privilege of being the main 
development agency to more localized agencies. 
Oates (1993: 238) argues that the modern theory of public local finance envisages that local 
government sectors have the potential of responding to a variety of different tastes for local 
development. The main strand of this argument indicates that local government sector is seen as 
responsive to demands raised at the local level. This means that the analysis of local finance views 
local government sector as able to provide outputs of local services, tailored closely to match the 
demands of the local constituents.  
Local economic development is regarded and implemented as a perceived new development and 
growth catalyst (Nel, 2001: 1006). This is aligned with current beliefs and assumptions that there 
is a need to incorporate local beneficiaries (constituent populations) in the planning process, while 
highlighting the vital role to be played by local authorities in the development process (Edgington 
and Fernandez, 2001: 11). 
Ward (cited in Nel, 2001: 1005) argues that the concept of LED is not a new phenomenon. It has 
been linked with the definition of local government administration, especially in the countries of 
the North, for over a century. What is new is its increasing acceptability, and its experimentation 
with various community based development initiatives. This has been accelerated by the growing 
emphasis on locality in the global economy, coupled with the value placed on localized decision-
making and democratization as opposed to traditionally centralized systems. This new approach is 
commonly known as self-reliance, endogenous or bottom up development, and LED (Taylor and 
Mackenzie, cited in Nel, 2001: 1005). Therefore, LED has become a key defining factor in 
designing local government systems. 
Ribot (2002: 2) claims that decentralization in general and decentralizing the functions of fiscal 
planning and implementation to subnational governments has a necessary connection with the 
enhancement of LED. Arguably, if there is a meaningful fiscal decentralization policy framework, 
local institutions are believed to better discern and be more responsive to demands and aspirations 
at the local level (Ribot, 2002: 2). In developing countries, claims and evidence that associate fiscal 
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decentralization with infrastructure development exist. In Smoke’s (2001: 12) argument, there is 
a potential positive and significant local development outcome when local government is charged 
with responsibility for infrastructure development.  
According to Smoke (2001: 11-12), some analysts have long maintained that decentralization of 
fiscal responsibilities may stimulate LED and that leaders of subnational governments have an 
important role to play in the development process. Cheema (2005: 119) attests that policymakers, 
politicians and practitioners have over the years been supporting decentralization policies and 
programs, of course driven by a variety of internal and external factors. However, Smoke (2001: 
15) warns that development does not automatically emerge by simply decentralizing, and failure 
to decentralize does not necessarily undermine it. He points out that recent empirical evidence 
suggests fiscal decentralization can have a negative effect on growth.  
Contrary to common assumption that fiscal decentralization yield to local development, Nel (2001: 
1008) argues that this debate is still inconclusive. He maintains that whilst there is a general 
agreement that fiscal decentralization has effected some positive local economic growth, there 
remain mixed opinions regarding these assumptions. Practically, Nel continues, LED initiatives 
may begin with a great deal of enthusiasm and success, only to be followed by mediocre results 
and despondency. Hall (cited in Nel, 2001: 1008) denotes this scenario as the “rise and fall of local 
economic development”. Following Stock, (1995: 359), he argues that there is a limit to the 
achievements of local actors and communities.  For example, a study done in the U.S. by Green, 
Fleischmann, and Kwong (1996: 609) demonstrates that LED policies exerted only a limited 
positive influence on job creation throughout the economic recovery of the 1980s. Some factors 
that pose a great challenge towards developing a stable local economic growth are not only limited 
to availability and accessibility of fiscal resources, but also sound leadership coupled with an 
enabling policy environment (Nel, 2001: 1008).  
In a nutshell, Guale (2011: 28) argues that governments all over the globe have the responsibility 
to promote growth of local economies. Local governments are placed in a fundamental position 
and have the potential to play a fundamental role in LED because: 
 they play an important role in delivering the social, economic and material needs of their 
jurisdictions; 
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 they are expected to configure, design and manage their administration, budgetary 
process by giving priority to development planning processes and create an environment 
for the provision of  basic needs that would eventually promote social and economic 
development of the local community; 
 they have the opportunity to employ people from the local constituency. It has been noted 
that in some constituencies, local governments are the biggest employers. In many 
instances, they are endowed with the right to purchase goods and services, develop local 
infrastructure and oversee land development, all of which impact on local development as 
a whole; 
 they have ability to establish local permanent structures that can assure stability over time 
to support economic development, which is a long-term, on-going development strategy; 
 they can play a strategic role in creating partnerships with other local stakeholders to 
promote economic development between local governments, communities and businesses 
which are a vital feature of success in  LED projects; 
 they are most proximate level of government to the local community and the point of 
delivery of essential services which impact quality of life.  
2.6 Purposes of Fiscal Decentralization  
Fiscal decentralization serves a number of purposes. Scholars identify the following objectives: 
i. Fiscal equalization;  
ii. Economic efficiency 
iii. Fiscal accountability  
iv. Fiscal participation  
v. Fiscal transparency and information sharing 
2.6.1 Fiscal equalization 
In the words of Oakland (1994: 199), ‘fiscal equalization is a process through which a central 
government makes funds available to lower governments with the objective of reducing the degree 
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of inequality in the revenues that such governments can raise using their own revenue instruments’. 
BlÖchliger, et al. (2007) claim that the reason a central government embarks on implementing a 
fiscal equalization policy is to balance the differences in capacity of raising revenue or service 
provision. He further argues that achieving a fair redistribution of revenue is only the proximate 
objective, but ultimately, the main objective is to reduce inequalities in public expenditure. It is 
not possible to make calls for equalization without evidence of regional fiscal disparities. Fiscal 
disparities can be understood by ‘measuring fiscal outcomes in terms of levels of public services’ 
(Oakland, 1994: 199). 
This research acknowledges that fiscal equalization can be achieved through various government 
systems such as centralized, decentralized, or a combination of the two. Litvack et al. (1998: 5) for 
example, allude that central control is significant in establishing regional equity and effecting 
redistribution strategy across the country. However, for the sake of this research, fiscal 
equalization attributed to fiscal decentralized system will be explored as one of the contemporary 
ways governments pursue to achieve this objective. 
In fact, BlÖchliger, et al. (2007) claim that fiscal equalization has been directly linked to fiscal 
decentralization as it aims at rectifying potential regional imbalances. Such equalization of fiscal 
disparities is meaningful only when equalization transfers are effectively designed and 
implemented (Dabla-Norris, 2006). 
Despite efforts to foster the establishment of democratic governments across the world, imbalances 
over resource distributions between the rich and the poor have persisted. As Cochran and Malone 
(2010:183) argue, throughout history, elites have boldly justified their special claim to wealth, 
power and privilege through the development of national myths that legitimize their position at the 
expense of the masses. Democratic dispensations notwithstanding, elites have attempted to 
manipulate and control public fiscal resources to their own advantage.  
Despite assertions that local governments have achieved effectiveness through fiscal equalization 
systems in recording equity and distribution of fiscal resources, the attempt to pursue fiscal 
equalization has encountered several challenges that have hindered it from achieving its objectives 
of reducing fiscal disparities across regions (Litvack et. al. 1998: 5). Such equalization systems 
suffer from: relying on an unpredictable pool of transfer funds that does not address the financial 
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needs of localities with inadequate revenue raising capacities to provide basic services; lack of 
accountability at the local level and failure to distribute funds according to published criteria; the 
amount of equalization transfer fund is too small to make any significant level of equalization 
(Dabla-Norris, 2006: 122). 
Ribot (2002: 9) argues that in order to establish equitable regional governments, especially in 
Africa, and particularly in rural areas, there is a need for significant reform to move away from 
highly inequitable and poorly administered management of the local world. As argued by 
Mamdani (cited in Ribot, 2002: 9), rural populations across the African continent have been 
managed as subjects under highly inequitable and even despotic circumstances. Even in the current  
era where decentralization is being advocated as the new form of structuring governance,  there is 
little evidence that decentralization is instituting procedures and institutions that are meaningfully 
representative, accountable and empowered forms of local governance (Ribot, 2002: 9-10). 
According to Gituto (2007: 1), inequality and social-economic exclusion in development present 
real impediments to the realization of basic human rights for the majority of citizens and residents. 
In addition, excluded communities are denied capabilities, assets, and thus the opportunity they 
need to realize basic rights such as food, shelter, security, and health. Arguably, decentralization 
of government functions, especially those that endow local institutions with powers and autonomy 
to manage fiscal resources, may provide   distributional equity. This will enhance 
interjurisdictional distribution of government services and the equity of local government 
decisions.  
Thus, decentralization has been argued to yield more equitable distribution in local districts 
blended with greater opportunity for the benefit of poorer local populations (Ribot, 2002: 10). 
According to Sewell (1996: 144), there is plenty of evidence that subnational jurisdictions 
incorporate distributional preferences into spending decisions. However, it is also noteworthy that 
decentralization can entrench inequalities. As Conyers (2000: 8) observes, decentralization may 
lead to a situation in which localities with more capacity in terms of financial and technical 
resources continue to thrive while those with meager resources and inadequate technical capacity 
continue to lag behind. This phenomenon has been attributed to the daunting role played by the 
central government in ensuring that such disparities are kept to the minimum (World Bank, 2000: 
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10). In addition, Smoke (2001: 16) argues that widening disparities may arise if the central 
government does not show commitment to redistribute resources to poorer regions.  
In order to effect equalization, fiscal transfers have been designed in various forms to achieve this 
objective, that is, to ensure that the revenues and expenditures of each level of government are 
approximately equal. This concept is further elaborated below. 
2.6.1.1 Fiscal Transfers  
Fiscal transfer entails a process in which governments attempt to effect regional equalization by 
way of transferring fiscal powers and resources to the control of local governments. Ribot (2002: 
40) maintains that local authorities can source revenues through numerous means: 
They can be allocated a portion of national tax revenues; be given unrestricted or earmarked 
block grants; or be empowered to collect land, income or commodity taxes locally7. Each of 
these mechanisms has implications for inter-jurisdictional equity, accountability and 
legitimacy. Differing means of fiscal transfer-involving earmarking or required cost sharing-
may also have implications for whether local populations take part in the activities the 
resources support (Ribot, 2002: 40). 
Ribot (2002: 40) argues that failure to facilitate the provision of accessible grants from central 
government has stymied decentralization everywhere. Consequently, the failure to empower local 
government with fiscal resources or revenue-generating powers undermines its effectiveness in the 
short run and its legitimacy in the long run. Fiscal decentralization requires granting revenue 
resources to subnational authorities and designing a system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
to complement local resources. It therefore demands rules to govern subnational borrowing and 
includes steps to build the capability of subnational governments to carry out new responsibilities 
(World Bank, 1999: 9).  
Smart (2007: 204) argues that in the new fiscal management set-up, when the local governments 
are expected to play a major role in delivering social services, they inevitably depend to a larger 
extent on central fiscal transfers to do so. He suggests that there is a need for simple lump-sum 
transfers, with no conditionality other than the usual requirements for financial auditing, to aid in 
                                                          
7 In Ghana all these mechanisms-a portion of national tax, grants and local taxation-are in place. Nevertheless, a 
number of issues have emerged. The transfers and taxation powers are for the district assemblies. This however, is 
not the most localized level of government, although there are 110 such assemblies nationally (Ahwoi 2001: 1-3). 
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the achievement of the primary objective that ensures that all regions have adequate resources to 
provide such services at acceptable minimum standards. In addition, there is an underlying 
assumption that in a decentralized system, funds flow to responsible local political bodies with 
sufficient accountability, and that it is neither necessary nor desirable for the central government 
to attempt to interfere with local expenditure choices. 
Shah and Boadway (2007: xvii) maintained that most countries have more than one level of 
government. In addition to the national government, these other levels can include intermediate 
governments, municipal governments, or county governments. In some cases, the structure of 
government is explicitly federal, in the sense that different levels of government have autonomous 
responsibilities typically enshrined in the constitution. In other levels, the subnational levels may 
submit to the directives of the national government and may be completely dependent on them for 
their authority. Akai and Sakata (2002: 95-96) submit that since expenditure by lower-levels 
government may be financed by intergovernmental grants from higher-levels government, the 
share of expenditure in the total budget does not necessarily reflect the level of authority allocated 
to a lower-level government because, to some extent, its grant relates to the expenditure authorized 
by a higher-level government. And therefore, it becomes inappropriate to regard expenditure 
shares as necessarily an accurate measure of shares of authority.  
Given the allocation of lump-sum grants, neither do revenue shares necessarily reflect shares of 
authority. This is because the authority associated with the spending of the lump-sum funding is 
attributed to the sub-national government. Besides, Akai and Sakata (2002: 96) allege that even if 
expenditure shares or revenue shares remain small, authority is considered to be fiscally 
decentralized provided that sufficient resources for public spending are originally allocated to the 
lower level government; that is, if autonomy is achieved.  
Furthermore, regardless of the nature of political or constitutional definition of government, Shah 
and Boadway (2007: xvii) assert that subnational governments are almost never self-sufficient 
financially. Thus, their revenue-raising responsibilities fall short of their expenditure 
responsibilities, forcing them to rely on financial transfers from the national government. It is 
therefore worthwhile to investigate the role of these intergovernmental transfers, structures 
through which they are relayed to their beneficiaries, as well as checks and balances that are there 
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to ensure that they benefit the citizenry in advancing their social and economic development. 
However, there does not exist any one formula that suits all governments in conducting their 
transfers, nor a uniform checklist to ensure that their objectives are met. Therefore, each 
government, or subnational government employs unique ways of addressing how these transfers 
are managed to benefit and empower the beneficiaries at the local level.  
As noted by Islam (2007: xvii), intergovernmental fiscal transfers are a dominant feature of 
subnational finance in most countries. They are used to ensure that revenues match the expenditure 
needs of various levels of subnational governments. They are also used to advance national, 
regional, and local objectives, such as fairness and equity, and to create a common economic union. 
When these fiscal resources are disbursed to subnational governments, they ensure that revenue 
collected at the national level is equally distributed for local management and in an attempt to 
promote equalization of development across the subnational governments. Government structures 
are therefore to be aligned in a way that will facilitate this objective.  
Islam (2007: xvii) further posits that the structure of these transfers creates incentives for national, 
regional, and local governments that affect fiscal management, macroeconomic stability, 
distributional equity, allocation efficiency, and public service delivery. Therefore, there should be 
scrutiny of governance structures with regard to how they facilitate the process of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers in achieving their objectives of being client focused in delivering 
their services to the public. National Governments or subnational governments that seek to 
improve in delivering services to their clients must be open to learning from those governments, 
or subnational governments that have displayed best practices in managing fiscal transfers.  
Furthermore, they are also to take note of those governments or subnational governments that seem 
to have underperformed and be able to avoid some of the pitfalls and challenges that these 
governments face regarding the same. This issue advances the agenda on knowledge sharing and 
learning from cross-country or cross- subnational governments’ experiences with a view of 
supporting good public governance. As Islam rightly puts it, ‘it is intended to help policy makers 
make more informed choices about strengthening public sector governance and improving social 
outcomes for their citizens’ (Islam, 2007: xvii). 
- 52 - 
 
This research draws on aspects, principles, and practices of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in 
an attempt to establish the nature of governance structures and systems in delivering local 
development. Sound government structures and systems that govern the management of 
decentralized funds help determine the course of economic development and social equity, 
especially for the poor and other disadvantaged groups, such as women and the elderly (Léautier, 
2009: xv). In addition, Léautier advances the argument that the reason why developing countries 
continue to suffer and lag behind as a consequence of unsatisfactory and often dysfunctional 
governance systems includes: inappropriate allocation of resources, inefficient revenue systems, 
and weak delivery of vital pubic services. He alludes to the fact that such poor governance leads 
to unwelcome outcomes for access to public services by the poor and other disadvantaged 
members of the society, such as women, children and minorities. 
Despite the differences of approaches adopted by different governments across the globe, there 
exist certain common principles that inform the design and structures of transfers. Assignment of 
expenditure functions is an inevitable errand and applies in virtually all nations. It is influenced by 
efficiency concerns in delivering public goods and services as well as benefits of allowing 
discretion to sub-national governments in choosing programs that best suit their constituent 
communities. Typically, national governments are assigned responsibilities that deal with national 
public goods such as: defence, foreign affairs, money and banking, and national infrastructure, 
including some social insurance such as pensions and employment insurance. It could also include 
the provision of public services such as health, education and welfare. In addition, national 
governments often are assigned responsibility for providing state public goods such as national 
roads and police protection. Local governments on the other hand are regularly assigned the 
function of providing local public goods and services including water and sanitation, local roads 
and recreation facilities (Boadway and Shah, 2007: xxviii-xxxvii).  
Variations in fiscal transfers from central to subnational governments depend on factors such as 
population size, geographical size, area served, and kinds of services offered. In addition to 
minimum standard grants for each class and type of local government, Shah (2007: 44) argues that 
three more major classifications are critical in determining fiscal transfers: population size; the 
type of the local government, whether urban or rural; and service area and inversely, with the level 
of fiscal capacity. 
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In reference to the above literature, it is apparent that certain bodies must be responsible for 
designing the system that governs state-local fiscal relations. Central governments have 
increasingly taken it upon themselves to design these systems. These systems are adopted by 
central governments through centralized agencies who design and allocate fiscal resources, under 
the assumption that they have the task of delivering national objectives through favorable fiscal 
arrangements. This approach however contains a potential problem due to central governments’ 
being overly involved in making decisions that limit full benefits of decentralization to occur. Even 
though grants transferred from central to local governments are intended to facilitate decentralized 
decision-making, the influence of national government in designing decentralized systems may 
lead to bias of the system towards a centralized outcome, or highly censored decentralized local 
government with no meaningful autonomy sufficient to sustain their jurisdictions. Nevertheless, 
in order to ensure that local governments benefit from these initiatives, it is important for 
constitutionally founded restrictions against the tendency of the central government to override 
local decisions (Shah, 2007: 44).  
In other cases, the central government may surrender this responsibility to separate bodies to 
design fiscal reforms, including formulas regulating transfers. These bodies could either be 
independent and impartial bodies, or bodies made up of federal and state representatives. These 
bodies could be empowered to act as true decision-making authorities or play a purely advisory 
role. No matter the kind of body responsible, it has to be in a position to coordinate fiscal relations 
between the two levels of government (Shah, 2007: 46-47). Three common practices are 
identifiable: 
i) In countries like India, commissions are periodically formed to make recommendations 
within a specified period of time. In addition, India has instituted independent grant commission 
at the subnational state level aimed at advising on local fiscal transfers. Unfortunately, these 
commissions have proven ineffective in many countries due to governments’ tendencies to ignore 
their recommendations.  Other commissions such as those of the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission in Australia have produced very rigorous and academic approaches, producing very 
complex recommendations that are particularly difficult for governments to comprehend and 
implement (Shah, 2007: 46-47). 
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ii) Other countries like Canada and Germany use intergovernmental forums or provincial 
committees to negotiate the terms of the fiscal systems. Such a system usually opts for simplicity 
to make the system transparent and politically viable (Shah, 2007: 47). 
 
iii) Another alternative system operates in countries such as Pakistan. It incorporates an 
intergovernmental, legislative, and civil society committee equally representative of all constituent 
units, and chaired by the federal government. The aim of this committee is to negotiate fiscal 
operations and assignments between national and subnational governments. These commissions 
are periodically constituted to determine fiscal allocations effective for a particular number of 
years. The advantage associated with this approach is its potential to bringing all stakeholders such 
as donors, experts, beneficiaries, and civil society on board during fiscal deliberations. It is also 
notable that such a system is simple and transparent.  On the other hand, due to the unanimity of 
the process, there is a risk where such bodies become deadlocked as has already happened in 
Pakistan (Shah, 2007: 47-48).  
Finally, Aghón and Krause-Junk (2013) uphold that there are various alternatives in place that 
define the transfer of responsibilities and/or functions concerning income and expenditure affairs 
from the central to lower level governments. They identify four significant features:  
First is the idea that is linked to the main idea in the promotion of an ultimate decentralization 
process in both fiscal aggregates of income and public expenditure. In this case, the local, or lower 
level government is granted complete autonomy to freely decide upon the amount and quality of 
public spending and the amount of income to be collected.  Each of the lower government levels 
may do so in an open competition with other jurisdictions on the same level as well as with the 
national government. This exercise has a high potential to achieve a high level of fiscal 
decentralization, although the eventual results may be determined to a large extent by the doings 
of the central government. This is because if the latter is hesitant in waiving a certain sphere, for 
example, if it assumes all responsibilities of providing all manners of public services, then the 
decentralized governments run a risk of being marginalized and are not in a position to craft their 
own fiscal plans for their local development agendas. 
A second alternative implies the maintenance of a particular restrictive and/or limited principle 
over the dynamism which may come about from such processes and of certain provision for 
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dealing with the undesired effects which may be derived from a central or national perspective. 
Therefore, it entails the establishment of strict limits among the levels of government and allowing 
the jurisdictions of the constituent local government to act as they wish, as long as they remain 
within those set limits. Regarding expenses, this limitation means that each subnational 
government is permitted to use money exclusively for purposes within its own established powers; 
thus, the lower level governments are permitted to collect public funds only in a particular manner, 
for instance, through some taxes within the range of their prescribed competency. 
The third alternative has the following tendencies: maintaining a centralist management scheme, 
proposing for higher centralization in public planning, expenditure, and tax arrangements through 
broader restrictions exacted upon subnational governments in matters related to fiscal planning, 
expenditure, income management, and other fiscal related matters.  
 
Fourthly, there are other approaches where lower level governments’ fiscal competence may be 
reduced by regulating. Also, there are other modalities where the lower or subnational level fiscal 
competence may be regulated by being assigned certain functions of service delivery as 
compulsory, or even providing the central government with powers to determine the quantity and 
quality of the services to be entrusted to the lower level governments concerned simply with 
administrative and technical aspects of their delivery.  Furthermore, there are instances where the 
fiscal competence of the subnational or lower level government may be further curtailed, almost 
down to zero in some cases. And that would mean that there is no tangible fiscal participation 
accrued to these lower level governments. In this case, the decentralized governments would 
therefore exclusively depend on fiscal transfers provided by the central government without 
simultaneously being reassigned extra expenditure obligations. This is an extreme case of fiscal 
decentralization, evidenced in very restricted fiscal policy. If the central government went on and 
decided how to use these transfers, then it would defeat the idea of fiscal decentralization. 
Emphatically, for a decentralized lower level government to achieve higher financial competence, 
it must be able to exercise a degree of influence on the transfers made to it. Nevertheless, that 
depends on the existing financial transfer system in a given country. 
On the whole, Shah (1998:149) conclusively contends that successful decentralization cannot be 
achieved in the absence of a well-designed fiscal transfer program. He insists that simplicity, 
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transparency, and consistency with the objectives are important approaches when designing a 
fiscal transfer system.  
2.6.2 Economic Efficiency  
Ebel and Yilmaz (2003: 103); Stigler (1957); Musgrave (1959); Oates (1972); and Brennen and 
Buchanan (1980) are concerned about the most effective ways of supplying public goods and 
services, in a cost-effective manner, to the beneficiaries at the local level. And since central 
governments across many countries have failed to provide satisfactory services at the regional 
level, decentralizing fiscal responsibilities seems to promise better results in addressing particular 
local needs. Arguably, sub-national governments have the potential to become necessary conduits 
to enhance efficiency in the delivery of services. This leads to fiscal decentralization theorem:  
[w]here the governments closest to the citizens can adjust budgets (costs) to local 
preferences in a manner that best leads to the delivery of a bundle of public services 
that is responsive to community preferences. Sub-national governments thus 
become agencies that provide services to identifiable recipients up to the point at 
which the value placed on the last (marginal) amount of services for which 
recipients are willing to pay is just equal to the benefit they receive (Ebel and 
Yilmaz, 2003: 103-104). 
Geys and Moesen (2008: 1) posit that a significant way of evaluating the effectiveness of any fiscal 
decentralization policy is to find out whether or not governments use public fiscal resources in an 
economically efficient manner. After various theoretical examinations  hadbeen conducted, 
including those of Davoodi and Zou (1998), Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) Zhang and Zou 
(1998), and Hammond and Tosun, (2011), (some using cross-country empirical datasets while 
others comprised  datasets focusing on case studies within a single country) results showed varying 
conclusions on the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic efficiency. 
According to Koopsman (cited in Geys and Moesen, 2008: 1), economic efficiency is understood 
as the capacity of jurisdictions to provide a maximum amount of output for a given level of inputs 
whilst minimizing wasteful expenditure. Being closer to the constituents, it is argued, local 
governments have a higher potential to identify people’s needs, and thus end up providing the 
appropriate form and level of public services (Manor, 1999; Oates, 1972). 
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Ribot (2002: 9) argues that in order to ensure economic efficiency at the local level, it is critical 
for the fiscal decentralization system to ensure that:  
 [d]ecisions are more relevant to local needs and conditions are more likely to be effective;  
 local coordination is facilitated and transaction costs are reduced by making decisions 
locally;  
 decentralized decision making can be quicker and more flexible, therefore more efficient;  
 local knowledge and preferences can be drawn on to make decisions more relevant and 
effective;  
 local knowledge and labor can facilitate implementation, management and evaluation; 
and  
 local actors will benefit from reducing the costs of their efforts, they are likely to spend 
their resources more efficiently.  
Prud’homme (2003: 22) argues that fiscal decentralization has a potential to improve delivery of 
public goods and services.  For Oates (1972), fiscal decentralization enables different bundles of 
public services to be distributed to various constituent jurisdictions that match the needs of 
respective jurisdictions, and therefore escalate allocative efficiency. 
The demand for public services would generally vary among local jurisdictions. Consequently, for 
there to be efficient service delivery in these respective localities, there is a need to take into 
account these variations. Otherwise, if uniform delivery of services were to be effected through 
centralized fiscal mechanisms, where each jurisdiction receives similar if not the same level of 
public services, eventually most localities would  receive  inefficient services  that do not match 
their local demands (Wasylenko, 2001: 57).   
According to Oates (1972) one of the most widely debated arguments is whether fiscal 
decentralization enhances economic efficiency. According to Liu (2007: 11), this argument relies 
heavily on the premise that the sub-national government is more in tune with local needs and is 
thus much more capable than the national government of delivering necessary services.  
Both arguments for and against the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic efficiency exist. 
There are as many arguments that support the view that fiscal decentralization has a positive effect 
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on economic efficiency as the opposing views. For example, Oates (cited in Kee, 2004: 167) 
analyzed data from 58 countries, and found a positive relationship between economic growth and 
fiscal decentralization, highlighting the role for local governments, especially infrastructure 
development.  Samimi et al (2010: 5490) also found a positive relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth after analyzing data from 28 provinces in Iran. 
Arguments in support of a more decentralized form of governance point to the achievement of 
greater efficiency when the provision of public services is carried out by the level of government 
that is closest to the people (Vigneault, 2007: 133).  Musgrave’s (1983) main argument intimates 
that the government closest to the people promises better benefits and gains from of a fiscally 
decentralized system. This, according to Bahl (1999:2), is the efficiency argument that drives the 
thinking of most economists, with potential benefits including: better public services, better 
accountability on the part of government officials, more willingness to pay for services, and 
hopefully, an emergent development from below. .  
Griffin (cited in De Valk 1990: 5) notes that with the recent wave of decentralization, an apparent 
assumption is that localized planning and participation can achieve efficiency by resolving the 
implementation problems of rural development planning created by centralized planning and 
control. In the same way, Bosch, Espasa, and Mora (2012: 248), uphold that fiscal decentralization 
has a potential to increase efficiency of government. The argument stems from varying demands 
for public goods and services from various jurisdictions; a demand that central governments have 
failed to satisfy due to their limited knowledge of local conditions.  
Local actors have a higher potential to provide their constituents with what they need because they 
are motivated by fear of not being re-elected. Decentralizing fiscal responsibilities therefore 
increases the potential for different bundles of public services that better match various tastes of 
each jurisdiction, thus increasing allocative efficiency (Prud’homme, 2003: 22). In addition, local 
governments are more likely to understand different views and interests of local populations; they 
are also in a good position to allocate resources more efficiently than the central authority (Ebel 
and Yilmaz, 2002: 2). 
The basic economic argument for fiscal decentralization remains the enhancement of economic 
efficiency, that is, the provision of local outputs that are differentiated according to local tastes and 
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circumstances results in higher levels of social welfare than centrally determined and more uniform 
levels of outputs across all jurisdictions. Furthermore, fiscal decentralization provides incentives 
for local governments to be innovative in the production and supply of public goods and services 
(Oates, cited in Samimi, 2010: 5490). As Kee (2004: 168) maintains, efficiency has an economic 
value where the provision of social welfare is maximized. 
It has been argued that allocative efficiency is increased by decentralizing infrastructure decisions 
at the local level. This is due to their proximity to local populations; local governments are best 
placed to discern and respond to local demands for infrastructure services and thus augment 
welfare (Lewis, 1998: 143). Prud’homme (2003: 19) maintains that the structure of 
output/consumption has direct significance for welfare or utility. He demonstrates this by 
providing the following scenario:  
 
[i]f people get a service X for which they do not care much at the expense of a service Y for 
which they would care more but which is not provided, their welfare or utility will be small. 
A shift in the allocation of resources from the production of X towards the production of Y 
will increase welfare. Therefore, marching of services with communities’ immediate needs 
becomes relevant towards achieving local economic efficiency (Prud’homme, 2003: 19). 
 
Prud’homme (2003) identifies a major loophole in the above stated standard argument, and 
considers its merits with skepticism. He contends that this argument assumes that there are 
significant differences in the demand for public services in various jurisdictions. And in fact, this 
is not necessarily so in countries where most public services are lacking. This assumption would 
suggest that local governments are responsive to local demand. Yet, this responsiveness cannot be 
assumed to be always systematically present. 
There is always a danger that locally elected officials will spend the money in their own interests 
rather than in the interests of their constituents. Furthermore, Prud’homme challenges Oates’ view 
that locally elected leaders are to commit themselves to providing efficient goods and services for 
fear of not being re-elected. He maintains that rules that subject them rather frequently to honest 
re-elections are desirable from that point of view but not likely to be sufficient to ensure substantial 
accountability (Prud'Homme, 2003: 22).  
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Geys and Mosen (2008: 1) maintain that it is critical to ensure that local government system are 
well fitted and that local administrators are capacitated with solid managerial skills. This is because 
when local governments are not in a position to deliver on economic efficiency, it follows that 
even the economic benefits due to further decentralization are likely to be lacking. Hypothetically 
therefore, there will be only limited impact by shifting tasks to inefficient levels of government. 
 Liu (2007: 15) argues that contrary to the arguments proposed by Oates (1972), Prud’homme 
(1995) suggests that fiscal decentralization can actually undermine economic efficiency. 
Prud’homme believes that arguments presented by Oates are rooted in fragile ground. He argues 
that not only do elected officials not always satisfy the preferences of local needs, but, even if the 
locally elected officials seek to satisfy the preferences of local needs, the local bureaucracy does 
not always go along with the expectations of elected officials. As a consequence, Prud’homme 
regards as problematic the assumption that fiscal decentralization necessarily promotes economic 
efficiency.  
A critical factor to counter the dangers of implementing fiscal decentralization with an aim of 
achieving economic efficiency at the local level is that of empowering institutional capacity in 
administering local development. Therefore, efforts are made to strengthen institutional capacity 
by maintaining modern organizational practices such as budgeting, auditing, and accounting 
systems. However, even though these modern methods are lacking, it may not be considered as a 
barrier to decentralization, provided citizen participation and transparency in decision-making 
pertaining to the management of fiscal resources are ensured (Shah, 1998: 148).  
In other words, the above assumptions are based on the argument that the central government is 
more likely to be comparatively unresponsive to the delivery of public goods and services as 
compared to the local government. The center may therefore be unable to respond to particular 
regional demands, and only manage to implement uniform policies. More explicitly, specific local 
governments apparently are much closer to local populations, whereby they are assumed to possess 
knowledge of both local preferences and cost conditions that may not be guaranteed by the central 
government (Oates, 1999: 1123).  
Equally, Kee (2004: 269) claims that local decision-makers are endowed with more knowledge 
about the problems and needs of their local area than centralized decision-makers. Koethenbuerger 
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(2007) refers to the fact that more specifically, individual local governments are presumably much 
closer to the people,  since they possess knowledge of both local preferences and cost conditions 
that a central agency is unlikely to have. Bird and Villancourt (1998: 3), for example, claim that 
not only does fiscal decentralization have the potential to produce more efficient and equitable 
service delivery through making better use of local knowledge, but also to lead to greater 
participation and democracy and hence result in more popular support for government which, 
potentially, will improve  political stability. 
Decentralizing the functions of fiscal responsibilities to be managed by autonomous local 
institutions is not a panacea for local economic development. Claims that decentralization has a 
greater potential to increase efficiency through better matching of demand and supply for local 
public goods may not be the case in countries with daunting democratic spaces (Sewell 1996: 147). 
Ribot (2002: 9) views this as a critical point because many of these claims are predicated on the 
assumption that there are mechanisms in place with an enabling environment to hold local 
authorities accountable to local populations, thus improving efficiency.  
Wasylenko (2001: 57) intimates that fiscal decentralization allows more effectiveness in 
implementation of local development projects. Hypothetically, it is through economic activities 
that constituents can validly play a more direct role in determining their own local development. 
For example, services provided through public works such as: roads, water, sewers, are indicators 
for economic development. On the other hand, if central government, rather than local government 
design and finance local economic projects, arguably, it may hamper the commitment to building 
and maintaining these development projects.  The rationale behind the assumption that local 
governments stand a better chance to implement fiscal operations in a more efficient manner is 
tied to the fact that in procurement, local officials will generally be able to determine the property 
value more accurately than their counterparts in the central government. Those in central offices 
are most likely not in a position to know about the specific details about property in different 
localities (Hicks, cited in Wasylenko, 2001: 57).  
Rondinelli et al. (1989: 57) maintain that demand for public services and physical infrastructure in 
developing countries has continued to grow steadily. This has been attributed to increasing 
populations, and to local populations’ demands for better standards of living, linked with upcoming 
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national development plans coupled with international influence. And in several developing 
countries, local services and infrastructure have been provided ineffectively and inefficiently by 
central governments. Rondinelli and Ruddle (cited in Rondinelli, Mccullough, & Johnson. 1989: 
57) attribute limited services and infrastructure in areas outside national capitals to lack of: local 
incentives, adequate funds, technical expertise; and management capacity to provide services. 
Bardhan & Mookherjee (1994: 3) attribute inefficiencies of service delivery to monopoly of central 
government in service provision. Ribot (2002: 10) opines that introducing local governments as 
service providers enhances competition, thus resulting in increased efficiency. The competition 
that arises from various local governments creates more responsive governments to local 
population’s needs and preferences. Thus, decentralization mode creates an environment that 
forces local government to match service delivery to needs by remaining closer to their clients due 
to having better access to local information. 
The World Bank (2000: 109) contends that there is a vague effect of the impact of fiscal 
decentralization in accelerating delivery of services. This is attributed to the fact that the assumed 
causal relations are difficult to demonstrate. The evidence that relates the quality of service 
delivery to both central and local government is mixed. Lewis (cited in Smoke, 2001: 17) presents 
results of two studies on decentralization: One study was conducted in 10 developing countries 
that evidenced increased infrastructure at both national and sub-national and sub-national levels. 
Where service provision was low under the administration of previous governments, 
decentralization appears to have increased locally produced services. The other study, comprising 
a survey of 75 countries, indicated that facilities are better provided by the central government, 
while operational procedures are more effective when decentralized.  
2.6.3 Fiscal Accountability  
Smoke (2001: 17) argues that there is mixed evidence regarding whether decentralization of fiscal 
responsibilities to local governments improves accountability of government. However, there is 
certainly evidence, as provided by Crook and Manor (1994), Manor (1999); and Blair (cited in 
Smoke, 2001: 17) that participation, in terms of elections and interaction between constituents and 
local government officials, can be substantially enhanced by decentralization. Others, like Shah 
(1997) and Blair (cited in Smoke, 2001: 17-18), provide evidence that democratic decentralization 
- 63 - 
 
can enhance the speed, quantity and quality of responsive actions from local governments. Smoke 
attempts to link meaningful decentralization and accountability of local governments to their 
constituents. He contends that underlying most of the benefits of decentralization is the existence 
of democratic mechanisms that enable local governments to discern the needs and preferences of 
their constituents, thus providing a way for these constituents to hold local governments 
accountable to them (Smoke, 1999: 10). 
Assessing accountability institutions is crucial when addressing reform of fiscal systems. Creating 
an effective local governance system that has well framed mechanisms that enhance delivery of 
local services and collect local charges is critical in creating citizen participation and 
accountability. More modern systems of local governance, such as those run by elite management, 
have failed owing to an absence of citizen voices and accountability checks. In addition, reforms 
lack appropriate provisions for holding to account elected officials for negligence or misconduct 
(Shah, 1998: 148).  
Similarly, Smoke (2001: 32) notes that fiscal decentralization mechanism cannot be expected to 
work if there is not an adequate degree of local political development and accountability.  Ingram 
and Schneider (2006: 182) identify accountability as the most critical to democratic governance. 
They suggest that in the new era of decentralization and devolution, it is important for the public 
to become more directly involved in holding governance structures accountable. It is therefore 
important to note that transparency is a critical value when designating projects to communities in 
all dimensions including identifying, monitoring, and sustaining them.  
Altunbas and Thorton (2012) conducted research comprising data set of sixty-four developed and 
developing economies with the aim of ascertaining the effect of fiscal decentralization on the 
quality of governance, with a special focus on corruption. The authors found that countries in 
which a larger share of fiscal revenues and expenditures are located at the level of subnational 
governments, appear to be less corrupt. They also found that the beneficial impact of fiscal 
decentralization on corruption is mitigated in the presence of mechanisms enforcing vertical 
administrative decentralization. Thus, their results provided strong support to the view that fiscal 
decentralization has a beneficial impact: it improves   governance in a country by reducing 
corruption. Moreover, subnational government autonomy appears to reduce the beneficial impact 
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of fiscal decentralization on corruption, which suggests that fiscal decentralization is most 
effective in reducing corruption, when these resources are nonetheless largely directed by the 
central government.  
And finally, their results lend support to economists who take a more positivist view of fiscal 
decentralization as a means to promote better governance (Altunbas and Thorton, 2012: 66, 81-
82). Ingram and Schneider (2006: 182) imply that transparency in all transactions is to be 
considered as crucial with full disclosure of interests. It is therefore important that actors be held 
accountable not just for pragmatic goals, but also for fair and equitable actions. As Blair (2000: 
27) puts it, democratic governance at the local or national level can succeed only if public servants 
are held accountable. They are therefore to remain answerable to the people in the way they make 
decisions and the impact of those decisions on the communities. 
Smoke (2001: 14) maintains that those aligned to pro-decentralization camp view corruption as a 
much greater problem at the central level than at the local level, particularly in those countries 
where adequate accountability has been established through the development of local democracy. 
Thus, this tends to legitimize the establishment of a localized management of driving local 
development. In the view of Yilmaz, Aslam & Gurkan (2010), the concept of fiscal accountability 
can be divided into both public accountability and social accountability. In their understanding, 
Public accountability entails: 
An effective, efficient, transparent, and rule-based public financial management system that 
includes setting standards for control on intergovernmental transfer revenues, monitoring 
transfer figures, observing clear rules for responsible local borrowing, providing public 
access to borrowing information; and setting clearly defined rules for hard budget constraints 
on local governments.  
In addition: 
A crucial requirement for any social accountability mechanism to operate is to make 
information accessible to the public (including budgets and end-of-year financial 
statements); allowing strong public involvement in the budgetary process through 
participatory budgeting practices and initiating independent budget analysis and 
participatory public expenditure tracking programs that monitor budget execution and 
leakage of funds. 
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 By and large, Smoke (2001: 18) argues that the quality and distribution of fiscal resources does 
not guarantee enhanced accountability of the local government to local residents. In other words, 
accountability does not automatically emerge as a result of establishing decentralization. Firstly, 
it can be realized only if local governments are able to develop - even gradually - a genuine 
accountability to their constituents; and secondly, it becomes crucial to design decentralization 
more strategically, embedded in a gradual implementation process, while building trust between 
local government officials and their constituents (Smoke, 2001: 19). 
After noting that many developing countries have weak and inadequate mechanisms available for 
citizens to monitor how subnational governments manage their fiscal policies, Azfar, Kahkonen, 
Lanyi, Meagher, and Rutherford (1999: 13) conclusively argue that in order to achieve a 
meaningful fiscal accountability, government budgets and expenditure frameworks need to be 
disclosed to the public - recognizing that it is their right to know how tax revenues collected from 
them are spent. 
2.6.4 Fiscal Participation  
Fiscal participation entails a scenario where citizens are actively and freely involved in budgeting 
processes including the allocation and use of public funds (Justice, Melitski, & Smith, 2006: 301). 
Fox and Meyer (1995: 20) define fiscal participation as the: 
[i]nvolvement of citizens in budget priorities, and the acceptability of physical 
construction projects in order to orient government programmes toward community 
needs, build public support, and encourage a sense of cohesiveness within society. 
Kim and Schachter (2013: 456) argue that involving citizens in budgetary process is a significant 
indicator for measuring fiscal participation. They view this engagement as an important 
mechanism for assisting administrators to acquire input on citizen preferences and thus create more 
effective organizational decision-making. In many democratic societies, asserts Roberts (2002), 
the role played by citizens in the budgetary process has recorded substantial growth over the recent 
decades. He attributes the main rationale that justifies this increment to the assumption that 
dialogue between government officials and citizens is instrumental in advancing accountability in 
contested areas.  
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Such inclusion of citizens in local development affairs plays an important role in enhancing trust 
of citizens in their government, thus fostering more collaboration (Halachmi and Holzer, 2010). 
Consequently, Berman (1997) claims that incorporating citizen participation  in local development 
agendas has the potential  to reduce  citizens’ pessimism about  their governments and further 
increases their support for local government development initiatives. The dialogue that involves 
citizens’ engagement in budgetary process is essential in harmonizing citizen priorities and 
principles (Khan, 1997). 
Fiscal decentralization has been adopted by many governments as a mechanism for expanding 
participation of local communities as active agents in development, and thus, in democratic 
process. Therefore, by decentralizing the delivery of public services, there is a tendency among 
local residents to believe that through their participation in voting, they have the potential and the 
power to determine the nature and quality of services offered to them. Taxpayers at the local level 
increase their awareness of the existing relationship between the taxes that they pay and delivery 
of services. Therefore, this increased participation in affairs that affect them at the local level 
stimulates their voting patterns in favour of those leaders that have the capacity, in their best 
judgment, to deliver on this mandate (Wasylenko, 2001: 57).   
Participation in the fiscal process means that local stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives, decisions and resources over the issues which affect them (World Bank, 
1996cited in Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002: 53). It provides a forum for local debate about local 
priorities. Thus, community needs are addressed during these deliberations as opposed to projects 
that are uniformly proposed from the center (Kee, 2004: 269). In this understanding, 
decentralization is promoted on the assumption that greater participation in public decision-making 
is a positive good in itself or that it can improve efficiency, equity, development and resource 
management. Government decisions are  brought closer to citizens, thus increasing public sector 
accountability and therefore, effectiveness – where services are better matched to the needs and 
local resources, labour and knowledge are better mobilized (Ribot and Oyono, 2005: 206). 
There are various arguments presented that have indicated a significant link between 
decentralizing functions of fiscal management to local governments and citizen participation. 
According to the UNDP report on Governance and Sustainable Development (1997: 6), 
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decentralizing governments enables people to participate more directly in governance processes 
and does help to empower local communities and those previously excluded from the realms of 
decision-making by centralized mechanisms. According to the report, citizens are increasingly 
calling their governments for augmented accountability and responsiveness through greater 
decentralization and expanded autonomy of policy making at the local level. In this way, a 
government can create equitable development opportunities for its entire people. Closer contact 
between local government officials and their respective communities enhances the exchange of 
information that can be used to formulate development programmes tailored to local needs and 
priorities (UNDP, 1997: 13). 
A review of the World Bank data conducted in 42 countries found that where maintenance of roads 
was decentralized, backlogs were lower and roads were in better conditions. Furthermore, the 
report revealed that data for a group of developing countries revealed that per capita costs of World 
Bank-funded water projects were four times higher in centralized than in fully decentralized 
systems. In addition, a study of 121 completed rural water supply projects, financed by various 
agencies, showed that projects that had recorded high participation in selection and design of 
projects were much more likely to have better managed water supplies which were maintained in 
good condition as compared with those controlled by  more centralized decision-making (Bardhan, 
2002: 199).  
The existing rapport between decentralization and development links various stakeholders and 
actors like policy makers, politicians and practitioners in addressing issues related to public 
participation, by incorporating local communities in policy decisions, and in poverty alleviation at 
the local level. This encourages creativity and subnational autonomy in addressing local needs, 
thus entrenching development. Moreover, it is claimed that convening stakeholders to define 
development priorities for projects increases interest and a sense of ownership, which in turn 
stimulates sustainable development.  In this approach, community participation, enhanced through 
development strategies such as decentralization, plays a central role to boost development 
initiatives (UNDP, 2007). 
According to Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 55), there are some who put value judgment on the 
types of participation, seeing information sharing and consultation as lower quality forms of 
- 68 - 
 
participation and citing  empowerment as the feature that distinguishes whether participation is 
genuine or not. However, they argue that one reason not to make value judgment about the types 
of participation is that activities, from information sharing to empowerment, tend to be connected 
in a hierarchy. Thus, each subsequent type builds on previous ones. Therefore, it is more useful to 
think of them as interlinked rather than isolated or discrete alternatives. In a nutshell, information 
provision and transparency are the foundation for all stakeholder involvement in development 
tasks. Consulting with stakeholders is a means to improve the quality of information by creating a 
two-way flow of ideas with decision-makers. Consultation can blend into situations in which 
external stakeholders and beneficiaries either share decision-making power or actually make final 
decisions and assume responsibility for implementing them. 
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 50) point out that public participation in development process is 
central to policy implementation. Firstly, they highlight the claim that implementation often 
requires actions by large number of people in order to achieve locally acceptable results. Secondly, 
they emphasize the importance of the process by which the content of policies is formulated and 
the link between participation and democratic governance. Over the last few decades, citizens have 
increasingly organized to expand their influence in policy debates to pressure their governments 
to be more responsive and accountable, and to demand a greater role in governance. These new 
trends and demands from the public have necessitated that governments establish ways and means 
in which local communities can participate in advancing their local interests. 
Decentralized governments expose local communities to opportunities to liaise with government 
representatives and policy makers, and to participate in policy and resource allocation decisions 
regarding the projects to be established in their locality. This participation can guarantee ownership 
of development process among the community members, an approach towards alleviating poverty. 
Thus, Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 52) argue that participation has a dimension of resource 
mobilization and allocation, as well as monitoring. Thus, stakeholder participation is at the core of 
policy management and democratic governance. 
2.6.5 Fiscal Transparency and Information-Sharing  
Joumard and Kongsrud (2003: 160) contend that in a scenario where governments decentralize 
their fiscal powers and function, lower levels of government are more suitable to share their fiscal 
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opportunities and responsibility with their local constituents. Therefore, fiscal transparency and 
information sharing comprise the behavior of subnational governments’ ability to display their 
subnational budgetary and accounting figures and frameworks to the public.  
Azfar et al. (1999: 13) maintain that increasing information flows forms an informed citizenry. It 
consolidates their position to participate in fiscal policy debates; citizenry are able to react and 
evaluate information that determines government operations. In a system where fiscal authority is 
decentralized, access to this kind of information enables the public to hold government to account 
and monitor its stipulated actions. Subnational levels of governments do not have an obligation to 
share budgetary information with the public only, but also with the central government. The central 
government needs to be able to monitor the fiscal behavior of subnational governments based on 
their budgets and expenditures, as well as monitoring outputs and outcomes of these policies 
(Azfar et. al. 1999: 13). 
Brinkerhoff and Crosby, (2002) argue that information-sharing is aimed at keeping actors 
informed. Therefore, through availability of information, stakeholders at the local level are able to 
make informed decisions; provide transparency; and build legitimacy. The government provides 
information to the public through dissemination of written material through official documents, 
newspapers, or magazines; distribution of documents from government offices; press conferences; 
radio or television broadcasts; or established websites. From the public to government, examples 
include responding to questionnaires and surveys, accessing toll-free telephone “hot lines,” and 
providing various kinds of data, opinion surveys, or analyses.  
However, Narayan (2002: xix) identifies information sharing as characterized by two-way 
information flows both from government to the citizens and vice versa. He argues that these 
respective characters are manifested as a symbol of responsible citizenship and responsive and 
accountable governance. Informed citizen have higher potential of making more informed 
decisions and can utilize that advantage to demand appropriate level of service delivery while 
exercising their obligation to hold their officials accountable. 
Yilmaz et al (2010: 6) argue that information sharing and dissemination in a manner that is 
understandable to the general public is a crucial element in strengthening any social accountability 
mechanism.  It can be achieved through holding public meetings where local government 
- 70 - 
 
elucidates its budgeting and expenditure practices. Other modes of information sharing such as 
radio and other locally accessible means can also prove effective. 
Elsewhere, Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 65) identify information sharing as the most basic level 
of participation, and the one that offers the least active involvement for stakeholders. Additionally, 
a study conducted by Kim and Schachter (2013) provides critical evidence.  They conducted their 
research by analyzing the case studies of Los Angeles, and Bukgu, South Korea to demonstrate 
how participative budgeting combines exploration and refinement strategies to create a more 
effective process that would foster information exchange between citizens and their local 
government officials. The study found that citizen-administrator information exchange is crucial 
in fostering local development agenda. 
As argued by Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 54) information-sharing remains crucial to policy 
implementation for a number of reasons: 
 First of all, for implementation to be conducted according to democratic principles, 
information regarding the unfolding of development projects cannot be handled in seclusion, and 
thus, accessible and widely disseminated information is key.  
 Secondly, in order for stakeholders to participate actively in the development process, they 
are to be endowed with relevant information to enable them to make informed successive 
decisions. Therefore, without information, stakeholders may not engage in effective consultation 
or collaboration. However, many developing governments have a tendency to withhold valuable 
information from the public. They do not share basic documents on policies, procedures, 
regulations, or planned interventions. As Brinkerhoff and Crosby rightly state, ‘historical legacies 
of secrecy and information hoarding remains strong’. However, new technologies are making 
inroads into these legacies. For example, Benjamin (cited in Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002: 65) 
attests to the fact that in South Africa, in an effort to break the apartheid pattern of limited 
information flows, the Johannesburg Metropolitan council decided to create a website for council 
members, and later, local community members through which much of its business is now 
conducted. As a result, council processes and outcomes have been more transparent and 
participatory, with a wider range of citizen involvement in municipal governance.  
 Thirdly, information-sharing is vital as it stands out as a means through which public 
agencies elaborate and communicate the rationale behind policy decisions. As pointed out by 
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Fristack and Atiyas (cited in Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002: 65), policy communication is critical 
to building reform constituencies and support for change. Therefore, providing stakeholders with 
information on the potential benefits of policy change and laying out a vision will help to prepare 
for collaboration and consultation.  
Fourthly, in order for the process of policy implementation to be carried out in a transparent, 
responsive, and accountable way, citizens need information. And in order to exercise demand 
effectively, citizens need to know what public authorities are supposed to do, what they plan to do, 
what they are currently doing, and what the results are. Thus, information sharing mechanisms are 
instrumental for basic democratic governance as well as higher levels of citizen participation. 
Mugabe and Robb (cited in Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002: 66) demonstrate this point by pointing 
to Uganda as an example, where the government, together with donor support, has been 
implementing a broad decentralization policy. To increase transparency and accountability in 
decentralized management of resources, advertisements are placed in the press indicating amounts 
disbursed to each districts by sector. For instance, in education sector, budget allocations for 
schools are posted on school notice boards so that citizens can inform themselves regarding what 
is supposed to be spent on education and can compare that with what they observe. 
Kim and Schachter (2013: 456) understand empowerment through information sharing as ‘a 
decision-making process through which citizens deliberate and negotiate over the distribution of 
public resources’. This also involves the transfer of control over decision-making, resources, and 
activities from the initiator to other stakeholders. Empowerment takes place when external actors, 
acting autonomously, and in their own interests, can carry out policy mandates without significant 
government involvement or oversight. Examples are local natural resource management 
committees and community empowerment zones (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002: 55). This is 
reflected in Narayan’s definition of empowerment as the: 
 
[e]xpansion of assets and capabilities of … people to participate in, negotiate with, 
influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives (Narayan, 
2002: xviii). 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the concept of decentralization with a particular focus on fiscal 
decentralization. It interrogated various claims and motivations about why governments centralize 
or decentralize their powers and functions in order to deliver their mandate on development 
planning. The chapter outlined the various dimensions (political, administrative, and fiscal) and 
forms (deconcentration, delegation, and devolution) of decentralization. The chapter explored the 
unfolding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the enhancement, or otherwise, of 
local economic development.  Finally, it explored key purposes of fiscal decentralization, that is, 
to ensure: fiscal equalization; economic efficiency; fiscal accountability; fiscal participation; and 
fiscal transparency and information sharing. 
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CHAPTER THREE 




This chapter demonstrates how, immediately after independence, Kenya shifted from a 
decentralized constitutional system of governance to a protracted period of centralization which 
lasted for about four decades, and then back to a decentralized system through a new constitutional 
framework in 2010. Decentralization has been formalised in Kenya since 2013, when the new 
government was voted into power under the Constitution of Kenya 2010 (CoK 2010). This chapter 
pays particular attention to the shifting trends in Kenya’s fiscal policies that regulate revenue 
collection, allocation and expenditure. It explores the rationales that informed Kenya’s adoption 
of centralized and decentralized systems of governance over the course of colonial and post-
independence history. The chapter examines the objectives of current decentralized system in place 
and of the objectives of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) and how it has been rationalized 
with the current fiscal decentralization framework informed by the CoK 2010.  
3.2 Kenya: A Demographic background 
Kenya is one of the most strategically located among the countries of East Africa. The country 
borders with Ethiopia and South Sudan to the North, Somalia to the East, Tanzania to the South, 
and Uganda to the West. It enjoys more than 536 kilometers of the Indian Ocean coastline and its 
port serves its immediate neighbors and others such as: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and Rwanda. According to the 2009 Census, Kenya’s population was estimated to be 38,610,097 
(Kenya National Bureau of Standards (KNBS), 2009). Chapter 11 of the Constitution of Kenya 
2010 (CoK, 2010) establishes the decentralized government and county governments as the second 
level government after the national government. Currently, there are 47 counties in Kenya. Section 
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89 of the CoK 2010 also establishes 290 constituencies for the purposes of electing members of 
the National Assembly. 
3.3 Decentralization trends in Kenya before independence 
During the colonial occupation in Kenya, fiscal policies in favour of development in local 
jurisdictions were designed and implemented by the British colonial administration (Smoke, 1994: 
62-68). Smoke (1994: 62) explains that the East African Order in Council was passed in 1897 to 
create “native courts” among the tribes. However, the functions of these courts were not clearly 
defined, and had very little, if any authority. Basically, they were to liaise with the settler provincial 
administrators.  
In 1902 the Village Headman Ordinance was enacted. As a result, headmen were to be appointed 
by the provincial commissioners, who, by law, were empowered to appoint Africans of their choice 
to these positions. They were expected to have jurisdiction over villages or a group of villages. 
‘The stated duties of these headmen were to maintain law and order, to help the provincial 
commissioner to collect taxes, to maintain local roads, and to assist as arbiters in minor disputes 
and legal cases’. Therefore, these Africans acted as agents of the central government 
representatives. They did not claim any autonomy and all their decisions and conduct were 
accountable to the central agents of the colonial government.  
This system of decentralization was not in the interest and benefit of the local community, but 
rather, it helped to protect and advance the interests of the colonial government. In fact, as argued 
by Smoke (1994: 62), the idea of appointing individuals as overseers over community affairs was 
foreign to many traditional Kenyan tribes. Many of them were governed by councils of elders. As 
the native local government continued to interact with the colonial provincial administration, there 
was a need to create a united system between the two tiers of government, leading to the enactment 
of the Local Authority Ordinance of 1912. 
Following the passage of this ordinance, there were attempts to establish provincial 
level councils that incorporated both settlers and Africans. This generated strong 
opposition from the settlers who preferred to have separate institutions for the 
natives. There was also a great deal of controversy about how these provincial 
councils were to be selected, what their composition would be, and what 
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responsibilities would be assigned to them. In the end, it proved impossible to come 
to an agreement on these issues, and the idea of integrated provincial councils was 
dropped (Smoke, 1994: 62). 
After World War 1, the colonial regime transformed Kenya from the East African protectorate to 
the Kenyan Colony. Those who had fought in the war had returned to Kenya and a spirit of 
nationalism among natives was instigated. Smoke (1994: 63) contends that the growing political 
awareness of Kenyans and the expanding interests of the British colonialists necessitated that 
changes be made in the way the colony was governed. In 1924, the Kenya Legislative Council 
passed the Native Council Ordinance, and this legislation established Local Native Councils 
(LNC) in the districts, which were administrative subdivisions of the British provinces.  
Even at this level, all of the African members of the LNC were directly appointed by the colonial 
administration. The African nationalists were dissatisfied with this system and wanted to replace 
it with a system where natives had a commanding position over the affairs of African people. They 
claimed that provincial appointments were unacceptable and demanded to have individuals 
mandated by the people through elections to represent them at the government level. ‘Under the 
pressure of the nationalists groups, some changes slowly occurred in the LNCs over a period of 
several decades. For example, in 1937, a new Native Authority Ordinance allowed some 
councillors to be elected by the people to the district LNCs, although the district commissioner 
could still remove any elected councillor he perceived to be inappropriate’ (Smoke, 1994: 63). 
Oginga Odinga, a Luo leader and once a member of LNC sharply criticised the nature and the 
operations of LNCs: 
Matters already decided and finalised by the government were brought to the councils 
for confirmation and acceptance. Council members were powerless to change 
anything or make suggestions contrary to the decisions already made...measures 
which were unpopular were imposed through the councils, punishment for 
infringements of unpopular measures meted through us, and the government told the 
people: you elected your representatives to the districts councils; this is their decision 
(Odinga, 1967: 92). 
Even though the LNCs did not have autonomous powers, and despite the fact that they had limited 
resources, it became an arena where African matters were discussed and advanced the value of 
self-governance. Due to the pressure that came from African nationalists, and in response to a 
strong directive from the British colonial secretary, proposals were made to restructure the LNCs 
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in the 1940s. After further contentious debates, the Local Government Ordinance was finally 
enacted in 1950. This legislation established African District Councils (ADCs) to replace the LNCs 
(Smoke, 1994: 64). After analysing the structure and authority of the ADCs, Smoke (1994: 64) 
does not identify any significant difference between the operations of LNC besides the six issues 
stated below (Smoke, 1994: 64-65): 
 Firstly, the majority of ADC councillors were elected, although the method of choosing 
the chairman of the council was left to the discretion of the district commissioner.  
 Secondly, the ADCs were given formal legal status, they could sue and be sued, and they 
could enter into legal contracts.  
 Thirdly, they were given authority to appoint administrative staff and to set up committees 
to deal with specific functions, much like present-day local authorities.  
 Fourthly, the ADCs were given authority to form joint committees with neighbouring 
councils to undertake joint projects of mutual interest and benefit.  
 Fifthly, divisional and locational (subdivisions of districts) councils were formally 
established as grassroots advisory bodies to the ADCs.  
 Finally, a system of central government transfer was inaugurated with the establishment of 
partial grant for approved expenditures on health services. However, the real establishment 
of ADCs did not see the light of day due to the fact that resistance movement advanced by 
the nationalist movement in Kenya turned violent and the so called “Mau-Mau rebellion” 
ensued. This crisis ultimately led to Kenyan independence. 
Cohen and Peterson (1999: 121-122) note that towards the end of the colonial period, the British 
had strengthened local authorities by increasing their tasks and transferring, through more 
decentralized forms of distributed institutional monopoly, access to revenue sources and financial 
tasks and roles. 
- 77 - 
 
3.4 Fiscal Centralization in Kenya  
At independence in 1963, Kenya was founded under a federal constitution which was designed to 
protect the ethno-regional interests of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), one of the 
two main political parties in Kenya. However, when the Kenya African National Union (KANU), 
the second major political party in Kenya, won the elections and Jomo Kenyatta’s (Kenya’s first 
democratically elected president) plans to implement the federal system were abandoned. Instead, 
the government preferred to establish a unitary state to administer development planning (Barkan 
and Chege, 1989: 437). Cohen and Perterson (1999: 121-122) observe that immediately after 
independence, President Jomo Kenyatta undermined the heritage of local authority strategy that 
he had received at independence and forged a powerful centralized state. 
Since then, Kenya under subsequent governments headed by Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, and 
Mwai Kibaki endured about four decades of central government control over social and economic 
development. Cohen and Peterson (1999: 122) contend that the heads of state moved the country 
toward institutional monopoly by taking roles and resources away from local governments and 
transferring these powers to central ministries. By recentralizing control over the allocative 
objective, these presidents gained power to advance the political and economic interests of their 
home regions and ethnic groups. They allocated substantial government resources to areas they 
dominated, rewarding their acquaintances with employment at all levels of civil service, and 
advancing their private sector opportunities.  
As evident in the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, (cited in Cohen, 1993: 453), the Kenyan 
government had made a deliberate decision to take major responsibility to administer economic 
and social developments, a  decision the government justified as follows:  
i. Rapid and equitable social-economic and regional development activities would not occur 
if local governments were allowed to take their own course;  
ii. Effective and efficient use of the country’s scarce resources required central government 
planning and control; and  
iii. Development objectives would not be reached unless backed by adequate administration 
and technical capacity.  
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These strategic assumptions led to increased state direction of the development process and 
provision of basic services particularly in education, health, water, and transport. The country’s 
public sector became characterized by an excessively large bureaucracy that regulated most 
aspects of development through national strategy and planning systems, extensive legal 
regulations, and wide-spread state ownership of industries and manufacturing firms, resulting to a 
highly monopolistic and bureaucratic control (Cohen, 1993: 450-453). 
The power of local governments was weakened after independence in 1963, but many of them 
continued to provide services such as water, roads, and sanitation. Nevertheless, performance 
generally declined, with central government blaming the incompetence and corruption of local 
governments, while these governments blamed central control and interference (Smoke, 2007: 
139). One of the main reasons for the deterioration of the local government system can be 
attributed to tribal tensions that surfaced in the ethnically fragmented country after independence. 
This prompted a major political consolidation by President Jomo Kenyatta’s government that 
called for a recentralization of political power, administration, and control of fiscal resources to 
the central government (Khaunya, Wawire, and Chepng’eno, 2015: 30).  
Orvis (cited in Bagaka, 2008: 3) argues that the central government in Kenya reserved the 
monopoly of designing central government policies.  The responsibility for development 
programmes for local jurisdictions was extended to the provincial administration, acting on behalf 
of the central government. Centralization was reinforced even further because of the 1982 coup 
attempt against President Moi that was intended to oust him from power. This resulted in 
restrictions on political competition, the creation and entrenchment of a de jure one-party state, 
and efforts to fund efforts by local governments were derailed. Thereafter, central neglect of local 
government intensified and poor performance in social and economic spheres intensified.  The 
central government came to view local governments as problematic entities to be controlled rather 
than developmental entities to be supported (Smoke, 2007: 139). The centralization of powers and 
functions of government become concentrated in the presidency. Khaunya, Wawire, and 
Chepng’eno, (2015: 30) highlight that between 1963 and 1990, there were over 30 constitutional 
amendments enacted to give the presidency more power and control over development planning. 
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The central government under Moi made sure that even the minimal support to local municipalities 
to continue administering some level of services such as local road maintenance, water provision, 
and sanitation were abandoned, and conditions enabling local government to survive were 
thwarted. Delivery of services by the local governments declined to a point that the central 
government considered them unacceptable and even damaging to development. Rapidly changing 
central fiscal conditions also focused attention on the central budget burdens created by local 
governments, which long failed to repay donors loans received through the center’s now defunct 
Local Government Loans Authority (LGLA). The Ministry of Finance had little interest in local 
government since there was no legally framed transfer system from the post-colonial period until 
2000. So the Ministry of Local Government was in charge officially, but it was financially weak 
and not respected. As a government structure, it was left there as a caricature designed to appease 
the international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank who were constantly 
calling for reforms in favor of decentralization (Smoke, cited in Wunsch, 2001: 285).  
Largely, centralized fiscal planning became associated with unequal growth and development 
across the country, with more populations becoming poor and poorer. The unequal development 
outlook in Kenya is evidenced by investments that are only established in certain areas. To date, 
most economic activities that drive the Kenyan economies are located along Mombasa – Nairobi 
– Nakuru – Kisumu - Kakamega corridor. Figure 1 below demonstrates this fact.      
 




Other than political reasons and desires by the political elite to maintain a firm grip on power, the 
government saw central policies as critical and relevant in maintaining macroeconomic stability. 
The central government has been instrumental in regulating the Kenyan economy as evidenced in 
agriculture and manufacturing industry. The central government was not keen  to leave such 
regulations and influence under the authority of local governments and considered these sectors as 
crucial elements that engineered economic development (Wanjala and Were, 2009: 229). 
Barkan (2004: 88) attributes Jomo Kenyatta’s central administration approach to Kenya’s 
successfully expanded coffee and tea production and its booming tourism industry. During the 
period between 1963 and 1978, when  Jomo Kenyatta held the reins of power,  the economy 
recorded an average growth rate of between 5 to 8 percent in every year but two (Barkan 2004: 
Figure 1 Kenya’s economy concentrated along the “Central and Western corridors” 
Source: World Bank (2011) 
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88). These major developments and achievements were attributed to prudent macroeconomic 
policies characterized by extensive investments in infrastructure, and expansion of education. This 
economic growth was linked with prudent policies regulated through central government 
structures. The government asserted that development could not be achieved without an active and 
overt government involvement, thus calling for a strong central control of public affairs (Kenya 
Government, 1965, cited in Nyamori, 2009: 199). The irony of the economic growth in the first 
decade of independence was that most benefits were enjoyed by a few including Kenyatta’s family 
and his cohorts, and rising inequality became a glaring reality (Library of Congress – Federal 
Research Division, 2007: 3).   
The central control of the development agenda became confined to the dictates of the central 
government. As the years went by, Kenyatta became increasingly intolerant of dissent. He had the 
Kenyan constitution amended to extend his powers. This was meant to crackdown on previous 
political allies that had become increasingly opposed to his government policies and leadership 
styles. When his former ally Oginga Odinga set up an opposition party, rivalry soured the 
relationship between the two leaders, and during political tensions that followed, the opposition 
party was banned and its leader was detained. Many more leaders were detained without trial, a 
symbol of the despot Kenyatta had become (Rubia, 2013). This new political climate affected the 
economy negatively and the central administration lost its grip over economic stabilization. 
Efforts by the central government to remain relevant by redeeming itself and regaining former 
levels of economic growth and stability proved futile. Some initiatives established through Moi’s 
administration included trade liberalization, the downsizing of the public sector, and reduction of 
the role of the state in the economy by sharing some of its roles with the private sector. The 1990s 
posed enormous challenges to the Kenyan economy characterized by curtailment of external aid 
inflows as a basis for more reforms. In 1992, Kenya became a multi-party state, but Moi’s 
monopoly over politics and economy remained. The economy continued to dwindle after 2000, 
recording a negative GDP growth rate that year. It was not until the beginning of 2004 that the 
economy started to recover. This was linked with the structural reforms brought in by the National 
Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government for which the Kenyan electorate 
overwhelmingly voted in 2002. Generally, however, after nearly two decades of reforms since 
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1990, sustainable growth has remained elusive, devoid of any meaningful economic growth 
(Wanjala and Were, 2009: 230). 
Muna, Mutula, and Koma (2013: 264) clearly note that the central government was very weak in 
designing sustainable nationwide development plans. Regions that were not loyal to the 
government were left marginalized and received very limited funding. It was the norm of President 
Moi, for example, to make roadside policy pronouncement during political campaigns. In this case, 
there was little, if any accountability in the way public funds were utilized. Other arms of 
government that were expected to protect the rule of law, like the judiciary and the legislature, 
became a rubberstamp of the executive’s decisions, including those that had huge negative 
implications (Muna, Mutula, and Koma, 2013: 265).  
As a result, Bagaka (2008: 2) argues that due to over-centralization of government, Kenya 
continued to face the challenge of unequal distribution of resources, failing development efforts, 
rising corruption, growing political instability, and inefficient administration and economic growth 
(Wunsch and Olowu, 1993: 6). Largely, the central government was seen as a project maintained 
by old politicians who feared they would lose power once the center was dissolved – the ‘grey 
haired’ politicians wanted to maintain the status quo while entrenching monopoly over the 
economy (Muna et al., 2014: 1387).   Due to the economic instability associated with a skewed 
constitution that had been amended to give monopoly to the presidency, deliberations for a new 
constitution that was expected to devolve central powers and functions to lower-level governments 
were underway. The central government made some, although limited, attempts at decentralizing 
some of its powers and functions in the interest of local development (as will be discussed in the 
following section). However, these attempts only produced caricatures of decentralization with no 
significant levels of political, administrative, or fiscal autonomous powers. In fact, the only 
initiative that dispensed a lot of powers, but still under central control, was the Constituency 
Development Fund, a community based fund where at least 5 per cent of the national revenue 
would be distributed to constituencies according to a formula was passed through an act of 
Parliament, the CDF Act of 2003. The CDF was seen as a means to expand public participation in 
development planning and implementation, and as a means to fast-track local economic 
development. 
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3.5 Fiscal Decentralization Trends in Kenya 
In the 1990s, it became apparent that Kenya’s central government (under President Moi’s 
leadership) was unable to sustain running the economy, evidenced by weakened fiscal operating 
systems (Barkan, 2004: 88). According to Muna, et. al. (2014), it was the younger politicians 
(commonly known as the ‘Young Turks’ in Kenya) that were particularly robust in calling Moi’s 
government to open spaces for democracy, thus giving opportunity for the formation of other 
political parties that represented regional dynamics and greater public participation. Pressures from 
international agents began to force the government to open spaces to subnational levels of 
government and enable private players to enter the market economy. Thus, faced with budgetary 
constraints, the government was forced to liberalize the economy through structural adjustment 
programs that were proposed by multilateral financial institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank. And in the 1990s, the Kenyan government started to create an environment where the private 
sector could thrive and foster economic growth. These international financial bodies began to 
evaluate the country’s performance based on the extent to which local governments were able to 
incorporate local constituents in advancing their own development (Wanjala and Were, 2009: 
227). In other words, decentralization received renewed interest in Kenya. 
Another reason why government came under pressure to decentralize was its failure to provide for 
the sustenance of its population. More and more people sunk below the poverty line and the gap 
between the rich and the poor widened. According to the Country Profile by the Library of 
Congress – Federal Research Division (2007: 9),  Kenyan economic performance had declined 
between  1990 from  48.4% to more than half (55.4%) in 2001 living below Kenya’s poverty line. 
Overall, the levels of poverty heightened – between the 1970s and 2000, the level of poverty among 
Kenyans grew from 29 percent to 57 percent. Gituto (2007: 1) describes Kenya as one of the most 
unequal and exclusivist states globally and notes that in Kenya, poverty, inequality and social 
exclusion are deeply rooted structural and historical phenomena. This situation created a 
deterioration of social and economic status in Kenyan communities. The numbers of people living 
in poverty continued to grow owing to the increase in population size and the contracting economy 
(CCGD and IDRC, 2009: 1). Smoke (1993) argues that the central government supported this 
reform path as an attempt to tap the underutilized potential of local authorities to help meet rising 
service demands.  
- 84 - 
 
The 1960s and 1970s saw Kenya experience moderately high growth rates. However, the growth 
was skewed to the benefit of the ruling central elite (Library of Congress – Federal Research 
Division, 2007: 3). The 1980s witnessed slower growth, with the drought of 1984 providing a 
severe setback and shock to the Kenyan economy (Kelley and Nobbe, 1990). In the following three 
decades, Kenya’s economy performed dismally, with negative impact on social and economic 
parameters. ‘As a result, per capita income continued to decline, from US$ 271 in 1990 to US$239 
in 2002. By 2006, the unemployed constituted 14.6% of the labour force, with youth accounting 
for over 45% of the total’ (Francis, Nekesa, & Ndungu 2009: 1).  
Another factor that accelerated calls for decentralization was attributed to the rise of opposition 
politics. When Kenya became a multiparty system in 1992, opposition parties took to the stage 
both in parliament and political rallies. They demanded control over the economy, and 
participation in processes that determined how fiscal policies were formulated and implemented.  
Thus, the rise of opposition parties and their presence in Parliament created pressures (reinforced 
by donors) on the ruling party to diversify the economy and consider decentralization (Smoke, 
2007: 139). In response to pressure from international donors, Moi and his government designed 
a caricature of reforms by creating legal pathways that supposedly created a space for a process of 
decentralization where more responsibility over decision making would be transferred to local 
authorities. The following section is an attempt to outline some of those initiatives which date back 
to early 1980s. It is important to note that these initiatives were in the form of deconcentration and 
delegation. They could not qualify for devolution as the central government retained monopoly 
regarding funding and decision making on proposed projects.  
Following the failed attempted coup in 1982 that was designed to oust President Moi from power, 
Olowu (1990) argues that signs of decentralizing development planning began to emerge and new 
field administrative units were developed. In this regard, he adds that the Provincial Development 
Committees (PDCs) were created to review proposals from District Development Committees 
(DDC) and coordinate provincial plans and implementation with respect to rural development. 
These committees were centrally managed with senior department officers appointed by the central 
government who would liaise with local development projects. The attempt to consolidate local 
economic development ensued within the Kenyan government in the early 1980s, with special 
focus on district-based development.  
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This effort was characterized by the launching of the District Focus (DF) for Rural Development 
(DFRD) strategy in 1983. The major objective of this strategy was to transform the district to be 
the centre for rural development activities. In other words, it was designed as an attempt to promote 
democratic principles such as those of accountability, management efficiency, effective resource 
mobilisation, and, ultimately, equity (Cohen and Peterson 1999: 121). The strategy involved 
shifting most of the decisions and resources for rural development from the headquarters and the 
provinces to the district. Although the sectoral ministries retained control over general policies as 
well as multi-district and national programmes, advisory boards known as the District 
Development Committee (DDC) was charged to assume greater responsibility in planning the 
implementation of district-specific programmes (Oyugi, 1993: 109). As argued by Ndii (2010:4), 
development planning was therefore delegated to the DDC, a consultative forum that was meant 
to bring together the civil servants at the district level, elected representatives and community 
leaders. According to Ndii (2010:4), the purpose of the DFRD was to change from top-down sector 
based to integrated, participatory, bottom-up development planning. It was a way of bringing 
government closer to the people and of encouraging district communities to participate in decision-
making.  
As noted by Oyugi (1993: 127), according to the DFRD policy document, local authorities were 
required to pass their development projects through the DDCs for vetting before forwarding them 
for funding to the Ministry of Local government. Some local officials supported the concept of DF 
with the belief that it had the potential to strengthen local authorities, while others were dissatisfied 
with the way the strategy was being implemented. They highlighted the deteriorating relationship 
between local authorities and the DDC; they regarded them as nothing other than another level of 
bureaucracy through which they had to channel their project plans, and evidence emerged from 
some districts to back up these allegations. Some evidence suggested that the introduction of the 
DFRDs had the effect of subordinating the rural local authorities to the DDCs on many 
development matters.  
In other cases, there was much friction between local authorities and the DDC – there were 
examples of DDCs holding up their local investment projects for several years, even where the 
local authority had demonstrated its financial capacity to undertake the project as well as the need 
for it (Smoke, 1994: 134).  Apart from this deliberate control posture of the DDC, there was no 
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evidence as such to indicate that the local authorities had benefited as a result of the new 
relationships. In their (local authorities) planning efforts, they still received little or no assistance 
from the district planning units. Moreover, there was no evidence that any local authority had 
directly received any financial assistance from the DDC (Oyugi, 1993: 127). Moreover, as 
observed by Smoke (1994: 135), even where the DDC could bring about closer cooperation among 
local authorities in a given district to their mutual benefit, this did not occur. Thus, he observes 
that the DDCs were seen by local authorities more as instruments of control and constraint rather 
than of assistance and coordination. 
This decentralization lacked fully decentralized political, administrative, and fiscal authority to 
make it a success. By and large, this initiative ended up a failure.  As Chitere and Ireri (2004) 
argue, the failure of this decentralization initiative has been attributed to the following:  
(i) its lack of basis in an Act of Parliament;  
(ii) its reliance on an institutional framework that did not facilitate meaningful local decision 
making and mobilisation of resources;  
(iii) lack of adequate capacity in participatory planning among civil servants;  
(iv) financial allocations by ministries headquarters which, though inefficient, justified 
continued control of their field units;  
(v) dominance of the strategy by civil servants, especially staff of the provincial 
administration; and lack of people’s awareness of and participation in planning and 
implementation  
Similarly, as argued by Coleman and Fleischman (2011: 837), the main setback that hindered the 
implementation of the above stated decentralization strategies in Kenya was that making of public 
policy, planning, and budgetary decisions were centralized and remained under the direction of the 
mainstream government departments. And as such, this bureaucratic structure did not favour local 
development given that local districts with their associated municipalities had limited access to 
resources and hence provided limited accountability to the local constituency. Wunsch (2001: 278) 
argues that the establishment of these decentralized initiatives was seen as a new form of 
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centralization. This was because local government structures were not accorded real functional 
authority as the center retained the powers to control the implementation of resources allocated to 
the periphery. 
Although the DFRD was discussed by politicians and the press as if it were genuine decentralized 
grassroots decentralization, it is critical to note that a careful reading of the DF operation guidelines 
shows that the strategy was one of deconcentration rather than devolution. Barkan and Chege (cited 
in Smoke, 1994: 145) argue that political goals were at least as important as administrative reform 
objectives in designing the DF. They suggest that the main political strategies were:  
1) to restructure the clientelistic relationship Moi inherited from Kenyatta by undermining the long 
standing substantial powers of the Provincial Commissioners and neutralizing incumbent members 
of Parliament with regional followings beyond their own constituencies; and,  
2) to direct development resources to regions that had not been favoured by the Kenyatta 
government. In this view, most important function of the DF was to consolidate the power of the 
central government (Smoke, 1994: 145). As a result, rural development planning and 
administration in Kenya remained centralized, and PPCs and DDCs continued to play relatively 
weak roles. The central ministries continued to retain control over sectoral plans and budgets, and 
recommendations from the districts rarely influenced national policy (Rondinelli, 1983: 83). 
The World Bank (2002) (cited in Ojwang & Bwisa, 2014: 109) also contends that the DFRD was 
not really a decentralization initiative in its true sense but an attempt by the central government to 
expand its control outside its national capital as it had no clearly defined strategy for grassroots 
participation in decision making. Otieno (cited in Ojwang & Bwisa, 2014: 109) argues that failure 
to include local populations in its formulation and implementation was the major setback and cause 
of the failure of the DFRD initiative to realize its envisaged impacts.  
Following the DFRD initiative, the government devised another policy framework in 1999 known 
as the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF). This fund was established to transfer 5% of revenue 
collected nationally to local authorities under some predetermined formula. This initiative 
provided an opportunity for the local government and their communities to get involved in decision 
making that was pertinent to their particular needs. However, the questions lingered on as there 
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was no meaningful participation of the local government, nor their constituents due to expenditure 
imposition from mainline ministries (Devas and Grant, 2003: 312). 
Many others saw the establishment of LATF as a new path toward calling local communities to 
participate in making expenditure decisions over issues and projects around their vicinity. Indeed, 
the study by Devas and Grant (2003) shows that this initiative increased the extent of public 
consultation at the local level.  
Between September 2001 and February 2002, 1300 public meetings were held which were 
attended by some 30,000 people across the country. The projects prioritised by this process 
(wells, clinics, road repairs) appear to reflect the interests of ordinary citizens better than 
those formerly prioritised by the LAs themselves (vehicles, offices, equipment) (Devas and 
Grant, 2003: 314). 
Despite some noticeable progress in enabling ordinary citizens to participate in setting their local 
development agenda, Devas and Grant (2003) note that there was a general lack of transparency 
characterized by many decisions that were made behind closed doors and information on budgets 
and accounts that were concealed. Other setbacks included improper accounting, abuse of tender 
procedures and political appointments to administrative positions to manage these funds. The 
ministry of local government also overlooked the implementation of the fund and had no sufficient 
mechanisms to monitor these activities and did not take effective enforcement against wrongdoers 
(Devas and Grant, 2003: 314). 
Civil society in Kenya and international donor communities continued to pressure government to 
grant local government autonomy, but more and more local populations remained alienated from 
engaging in meaningful participation in development. Local authorities suffered from financial 
hitches that limited their engagement with local development stakeholders. Another setback was 
that they remained understaffed and burdened with huge debts, and this meant that they had 
minimum resources with which to deliver services to improve local infrastructure (Devas and 
Grant, 2003: 313). 
Devas and Grant (2003) argue that even though Kenya was founded on a decentralized 
constitutional framework at independence, the central government reclaimed all these powers 
under the pretext of building national unity.  From the 1970s to the 1980s, the government 
entrenched a deconcentrated system of administration whereby officials appointed to serve at the 
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local government level were accountable to the central government. Most economies of local 
governments across Kenya remained weak and depended entirely on the fiscal support of the 
central government. Systems of intergovernmental transfers to local government were tied to the 
monopoly of the central government and they had no discretion to manage their local revenues. 
Local governments received very little if any intergovernmental transfers, and elected councils had 
little or no autonomy to conduct their fiscal affairs. In 2001, Smoke (2001: 12) noted that 
decentralized governments in Kenya were responsible for only 4-5 per cent of the total government 
expenditure, which they used to provide miniature level of basic local services.  
3.6 Fiscal decentralization in Kenya since 2010 
The year 2010 is significant in Kenya’s history of decentralization as it marks the inauguration of 
the Constitution of Kenya 2010 (CoK 2010) after more than a decade of deliberations.  The 
constitutional framework established and formalized the system of decentralization. The CoK 
2010 prescribed that significant fiscal powers should be decentralized from the center to the lower 
levels of government, namely the Counties and constituencies. In particular, the CoK 2010 
establishes a decentralised form of government system comprising 47 County governments headed 
by County governors. The County government became operational soon after the 2013 general 
elections.  
 A major rationale behind the formulation of a new constitution in Kenya was to codify new rules 
that would bring about more fairness and equalisation of regional and local economic 
development. This is because many communities had been neglected through central planning and 
benefited very little from central government’s allocation. Figure 2 below illustrates regions that 
have been traditionally marginalized:   
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Source: CRA (2013) 
The Counties receive revenue transfers from the national government and have considerable 
autonomy in managing local development affairs. In addition to the transfers by the national 
government, Counties are allocated the authority to collect some revenues like property rates, 
traffic fines, and business licensing to supplement revenue collected and redistributed by the 




(CRA) has identified 
marginalised Counties 
as shown in red.  
  
•In general, these 
counties occupy vast 
geographic area  
 
•They are mainly 
located in Northern, 
Eastern and Coastal 
parts of Kenya  
 
•They tend to be 
sparsely populated, with 
low levels of economic 
development and 
activities, and high 
poverty levels  
 
•Potentially, these 
regions will benefit the 
most from the recently 
introduced revenue 
sharing arrangements in 
Kenya with the 
Equitable share and the 
Equalisation Fund  
 
Figure 2 Map of Kenya demonstrating marginalised Counties (Shown in red) 
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Section 215 of the CoK 2010 calls for the establishment of the Commission on Revenue Allocation 
while Section 216 outlines its function which include designing a formula and offering 
recommendations to the National Assembly on how to ensure that the allocated amount of at least 
15 percent is distributed in the most equitable and fair manner to each of the 47 Counties. In order 
for the CRA to determine how much will be allocated to each County, several parameters guide 
its determination: County population (45%), equal-share component (25%), poverty level (20%), 
land area (8%) and fiscal discipline (2%) (Kimenyi 2013) as demonstrated in table 2 below.  
Table 2: Revenue Sharing Among Counties in Kenya 
 
 
A 15% share of the total revenue collected by the national government is allocated to the Counties; 
thus, the size of each County share remains relatively small. If the central government continues 
to devolve 15% as the minimum requirement, each of the 47 Counties can only receive 0.3% of 
the national revenue (World Bank 2011).  In as much as the national government has shared up to 
35 percent of its revenue collected nationally, Githinji (2015) argues that the Council of County 
Governors has been persistently calling for a referendum to raise the equitable share from a 
minimum of 15 percent as stipulated by the constitution to 45% through the pesa mashinani 
(swahili for: money in the Counties) campaign.   
In order to determine the equitable shares, Section 203 of the CoK 2010 stipulates that the 
following criteria shall be taken into account when determining the allocations: 
a)  the national interest; 
(b) any provision that must be made in respect of the public debt and other national 
obligations; 
(c) the needs of the national government, determined by objective criteria; 
(Kimenyi, 2013) 
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(d) the need to ensure that County governments perform the functions allocated to them; 
(e) the fiscal capacity and efficiency of County governments; 
(f) developmental and other needs of Counties; 
(g) economic disparities within and among Counties and the need to remedy them; 
(h) the need for affirmative action in respect of disadvantaged areas and groups; 
(i) the need for economic optimisation of each County and to provide incentives for each 
County to optimise its capacity to raise revenue; 
(j) the desirability of stable and predictable allocations of revenue; and 
(k) the need for flexibility in responding to emergencies and other temporary needs, based 
on similar objective criteria. 
Section 204 of the CoK 2010 made provision for an establishment of an Equalization Fund which 
shall be equivalent to 0.5% of the national revenue collected in each year. The main objective of 
the Equalization Fund is to enable the national government to provide basic services such as water, 
roads, health facilities and electricity, particularly in the marginalised areas, to the extent necessary 
to bring the quality of those services in those areas to the level generally enjoyed by the rest of the 
nation, so far as possible. 
Each County government is charged with the responsibility of administering some key functions, 
such as health care provision, pre-primary education, and maintenance of local roads, which were 
previously overseen by the national government.  County governments are also expected to 
marshal revenue from sources within their jurisdictions such as property tax and entertainment 
(Section 204, CoK, 2010). 
Kenya’s Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) makes recommendations to the National 
Assembly with regard to the most appropriate basis for equitable sharing of nationally raised 
revenues (Section 216, CoK 2010). Precisely, it is to design a structure that will determine the 
amount of revenue to be allocated to both national and County governments, and determine how 
much each County government will get. As maintained by Kimenyi (2013), it has already been 
approved that the national government will be allocated a maximum of 84.5% revenue collected 
nationally, while County governments will be allocated a minimum of 15.0% of the fund8.  It is 
                                                          
8 There is a current push by county governments to increase the Fund they are currently receiving from the national 
government. 
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agreed that the remaining 0.5 percent is to be used as an equalization fund. Flow of revenues to 
County governments is demonstrated by Figure 3 as follows:  
Figure 3 Flow of revenues from different sources for County governments 
 
Source: World Bank (2011). 
Conditional grants, like the CDF, are also referred to as block transfers and are usually allocated 
based on a predetermined objective criteria or formula with no specified criteria on how to spend. 
Therefore, recipient Counties are free to make decisions on how to use these grants. This means 
that expenditure decision and budget allocations are determined at the local level. In that case, the 
outcomes are assumed to be more appropriate local development needs (TISA, 2012). 
These values and principles of accountable and transparent stewardship are captured in Section 
201 of the CoK 2010, which requires that public finance be guided by the following principles: 
(a) openness and accountability, including public participation in financial matters; 
(b) the public finance system shall promote an equitable society, and in particular— 
(i) the burden of taxation shall be shared fairly; 
(ii) revenue raised nationally shall be shared equitably among national and County 
governments; and 
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(iii) expenditure shall promote the equitable development of the country, including 
by making special provision for marginalised groups and areas; 
(c) the burdens and benefits of the use of resources and public borrowing shall be shared 
equitably between present and future generations; 
(d) public money shall be used in a prudent and responsible way; and 
(e) financial management shall be responsible, and fiscal reporting shall be clear. 
In order to limit negative interference by the Executive in the utilization of revenue collected, 
Section 206 of CoK 2010 has reinforced the role of Parliament and the Controller of Budget in 
authorising any the withdrawal of monies from the Consolidated Fund (where all money raised or 
received on behalf of the national government is paid). Similarly, there is to be established a 
Revenue Fund for each County government, of which withdrawals and regulations are to be 
authorised by Controller of Budget or through an Act of Parliament. All these are fiscal 
accountability measures that have been codified in order to reduce wasteful and irresponsible 
expenditure. 
As stipulated in Section 229 of the CoK 2010, the Office of the Auditor General is charged with 
the responsibility of doing financial audits at both levels of national and County governments. 
Notably, it is critical to underscore that the responsibility of this office has increased significantly. 
Under the previous system, this office could only audit the operations of the national government. 
The creation of a second level government, the County government, necessitates that all 47 
Counties be audited separately as distinct entities. If the Auditor General is to produce timely and 
clear reports, the existing human resources and local operating infrastructures are insufficient.  
The CoK 2010 provides for more citizen participation. For example, a County assembly, whose 
responsibility is to deliberate development issues within the County, provides an opportunity for 
the public to participate in the proceedings. In this case, Section 196 calls for the County Assembly 
to: 
(a) conduct its business in an open manner, and hold its sittings and those of its 
committees, in public; and 
(b) facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative and other business of 
the assembly and its committees. 
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(2) not to exclude the public, or any media, from any sitting unless in exceptional 
circumstances the speaker has determined that there are justifiable reasons for doing so.  
However, the above circumstances provided for in the constitution do not spell out clear roles on 
the extent to which the public can participate in the County Assembly. A mere listening to the 
proceedings of the Council is one (lower) dimension, but having the power to influence decisions 
on budgetary allocations would be considered as higher level of participation, and often the most 
favorable in appropriating development to local needs. Another form of public participation may 
include avenues where members of the public could be allowed to ask questions or contribute to 
certain motions that regard the development of their respective sub-Counties. 
This section has presented how decentralization was framed in the Constitution of Kenya 2010, 
with a particular focus on the sharing of power and functions between the national and County 
governments. At this point, it is important to show how the Constituency Development Fund, 
funded through nationally collected revenue, fits into the new constitutional framework. The 
decentralization formula, as captured in figure 3, provides for conditional grants as a form of 
Equalization Fund to be allocated 0.5 percent of the nationally collected revenue, under which the 
CDF has been justified. Even though there were many calls that the CDF be transferred to the 
County administration, it continues to be a fund of the national government under the auspices of 
the Members of the National Assembly.   One of the main reasons is that achieving regional fiscal 
equalization remains a major objective, which government feels is better managed at national level.  
This does not necessarily undermine the principles of decentralization.  In fact, national 
government feels that it can provide more oversight than if it were to allow Counties to distribute 
the funds to respective Counties, which in turn would distribute it to constituencies.  As such, it 
would ensure fiscal equalization across the Country.   
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3.7 The Constituency Development Fund  
The following section is concerned with presenting an in-depth understanding of the objectives of 
the Constituency Development Fund9 (CDF). The Fund was established by an Act of Parliament 
in 2003. In 2013, the Act (as amended in 2007) was repealed and substituted with the CDF Act of 
2013. It is important to note that the main objective of the Fund is to achieve fiscal equalization 
across the constituencies in Kenya.  This in turn, it is argued, will promote the local economic 
development capacity of the constituencies.  Article 4 of the CDF Act of 2013 outlines that the 
CDF is disbursed by the national government through the CDF Board directly to the constituencies 
in form of a grant. Article 5 goes on to outline the Board’s membership as comprising of: 
(a) the principal secretary in the State Department relating to economic planning or a designated 
alternate, not being below the level of Director of Planning;  
(b) the principal secretary in the State Department for the time being responsible for matters 
relating to finance or a designated alternate not being below the level of Deputy Director of 
Budget;  
(c) the Attorney-General or his designated alternate not below the level of Senior State Counsel;  
(d) four persons, qualified in matters relating to finance, accounting, engineering, economics, 
community development, or law, appointed by the Cabinet Secretary in accordance with 
subsection (5) taking into account regional, ethnic and gender balance as per the Constitution 
of Kenya;  
(e) two persons qualified in accordance with paragraph (d) appointed by the Cabinet Secretary 
to remedy any regional imbalance that may have occurred during nomination under  
(f) the Chief Executive Officer who shall be an ex-officio member;  
(g) the corporation secretary who shall be appointed by the Board and shall be the secretary to 
the Board. 
The central Board conceived above is expected to undertake supervisory and accountability roles rather 
than control. The discretion is left to the local community and the CDF committee at the constituency 
level. The Constituency Development Fund Committee (CDFC) shall comprise:   
                                                          
9 CDF schemes are decentralization initiatives which send funds from the central government to 
each constituency for expenditure on development projects intended to address particular local 
needs (PDG 2010). 
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(a) the national government official at the constituency as may be designated by the Cabinet 
Secretary or an alternate;  
(b) three men nominated by the ward development committees and one of whom shall be a 
youth at the date of appointment;  
(c) three women nominated by the ward development committees and one of whom is a 
youth shall be a youth at the date of appointment;  
(d) one person with disability nominated by the ward development committees;  
(e) one person nominated from among the active Non-Governmental Organisations in the 
constituency;  
(f) an officer of the Board seconded to the Constituency Development Fund Committee by 
the Board who shall be ex-officio and shall serve as the secretary to the Constituency 
Development Fund Committee. 
 
It is critical to note that of the ten members of the CDFC, only one member is appointed by the 
national government to the Board. The rest are recruited at the local constituency ward level. In 
this case, much of the discretion or powers of CDF projects are left to members recruited from the 
grassroots.  
 
Mwenzwa (2008) identified centralized planning as the main bottleneck that necessitated the 
government to devise the strategies for gradual devolution of decision-making power to the local 
government. In 2003, the government made attempts to close this gap through the establishment 
of the CDF. In so doing, it was expected that the initiative would foresee the decentralization of 
development planning and enable local communities to maximize their welfare aligned to their 
needs. However, he noted that its design did not reflect fully devolved decentralization. This is 
because in as much as the communities were given an opportunity to identify and run the projects 
in their locality, it was still prone to central oversight and approval.   
Ongoya and Lumallas (2005) identified the CDF as a fund which decentralized fiscal authority to 
local constituencies because it transferred the prioritization, spending, and management of local 
economic development projects.  This was a marked shift from national government development 
to local economic development. Kimenyi (2006) too believes that the Act provides the governance 
framework where beneficiary communities are given a voice in planning and implementing their 
own local economic development initiatives.  
Mwenzwa (2008) argued, however, that the CDF cannot be regarded as a fully devolved fiscal 
fund because of its accountability structure. He noted that the CDF lacks its own structure for 
accountability, as accountability remains to be aimed at national government.  Nevertheless, there 
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is a valid counter argument that in a country where there are such vast inequalities between 
constituencies, the need for accountability mechanism to go back to national government cannot 
necessarily be regarded as a necessarily undesirable.  The main objective of the establishment of 
the CDF has always been to support local community based projects in order to ensure that the 
prospective benefits are available to a widespread cross-section of the inhabitants of a particular 
area (Ongoya & Lumallas, 2005). This initiative was an attempt by the Kenyan government to 
decentralize development by actively involving local communities in enhancing their social and 
economic wellbeing. At the same time, the CDF was established to iron out regional imbalances 
brought about by patronage politics by providing funds to the constituencies to fight poverty. In 
addition, the CDF was established to off-load fundraising burdens from members of parliament, 
ensure citizen participation through decision-making in project identification, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation, transform the social and economic wellbeing of communities, change 
development focus from the district to the constituency, reduce poverty among local communities 
and add value to the delivery of services by the government (Aukot, Okendo, & Korir, 2012.: 8; 
Kimenyi, 2005: 7). 
The CDF was designed to fight poverty through the implementation of development projects at 
the local level and particularly those that provide basic needs such as education, health care, water, 
agricultural services, security and electricity. Thus, the CDF was seen as a way to enhance poverty 
reduction among local communities by promoting their social and economic wellbeing. Through 
the CDF initiatives, the government aimed to empower citizens by involving them in the decision 
making process of local economic development (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2013: 72).  
The introduction of the CDF has been hailed as one of the most significant local economic 
development funding initiatives in post-independence Kenya (Kimenyi, 2005; Oyugi, 2007).   
However, it must be recognized that there is an ongoing lack of capacity at local constituency level 
which means that fully devolved fiscal decentralization is still far from complete.  Counstituencies 
are still dependent on national government and Counties for financial resources. Table 3 below 
indicates the CDF allocations from financial Year 2003/2004 to Financial Year 2014/2015 as 
published by the Constituencies Development Fund Board (CDFB).   
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Table 3: The CDF Allocations from Financial Year 2003/2004 to Financial Year 2014/2015 
Financial Year Allocations  
(Kshs Billions) 
Financial Year Allocations  
(Kshs Billions) 
2003/2004 1.26 2009/2010 12.329 
2004/2005 5.6 2010/2011 14.283 
2005/2006 7.245 2011/2012 22.978 
2006/2007 10.038 2012/2013 21.763 
2007/2008 10.1 2013/2014 21.974 
2008/2009 10.1 2014/2015 35.565 
(CDFB, 2015). 
Nyamori (2009: 198) argues that since the CDF money is channeled directly to each constituency, 
The CDF provides a break from the previous system of central bureaucratic control where 
priorities and the disbursement of funds were decided solely by mainstream ministries. It marked 
a shift in development thinking towards the need for citizens to be empowered so as to be active 
agents in their own development. The Fund was seen as an attempt to address the failures of post-
independence centralized big project development models (Mansuri and Rao, 2003; Triantafillou 
and Nielsen, 2001; Drydyk (cited in Nyamori, 2009: 198). The CDF therefore is aimed at 
advancing participatory and community based development models, and it is hoped that this in 
turn will produce more effective and viable local economic development.  (Nyamori, 2009: 198). 
The following section provides an analysis of the provisions of the CDF Act of 2013. It pays 
particular attention to the constitution of national and local governing bodies with their roles and 
functions. It also analyses how the Act provides for the values of public participation, 
accountability, monitoring and evaluation of projects funded by the CDF in delivering local 
development projects: 
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Section 4 of the CDF Act of 2013 establishes that into the fund will be paid an amount of money 
equal to not less than 2.5% of all the national government’s ordinary revenue collected in every 
financial year, including any moneys accruing to or received by the National Committee from any 
other source. The expenditure from the Fund is limited to the annual budget which shall be 
submitted to the minister for approval in accordance with this Act before the beginning of the 
financial year to which the budget relates. Even with the current constitutional dispensation, the 
CDF continues to be an ear- marked fund of the national government reflected under Article 203 
of the CoK 2010. Section 4(2) of the CDF Act of 2013 establishes that funds in this Act are to be 
considered as additional revenue to the county governments under Article 202(2) of the CoK 2010. 
This provision was made as an attempt to align the Fund with the CoK 2010.  
The CDF is not entirely an unconditional decentralized fund.  It remains regulated through a 
national committee known as the Constituency Development Fund Board. Article 5 of the CDF 
Act of 2013 stipulates that the Board comprises principal secretaries in the state department, the 
Attorney-General, qualified persons in relevant areas of development studies taking into 
consideration regional balance. The board is drawn from various organs of the state in order to 
ensure accountability. The qualified personnel are drawn from various regions of the country to 
ensure effectiveness in Fund management and broader representation. Article 6 of the CDF Act of 
2013 specifies that the Board’s responsibility is to compile proper records, returns and reports from 
the constituencies. More importantly, they are charged with the responsibility of receiving and 
addressing complaints and disputes related to the Fund and taking appropriate action.  They are to 
approve project proposals submitted by the constituencies and send funds of approved projects to 
the constituencies. In as much as the Board is charged with the responsibility for ensuring 
accountable appropriation of the CDF, the challenge remains that no funds have been earmarked 
for this purpose, thus limiting the capability of the Board to ensure compliance. 
At the constituency level, the administration of the Fund shall be conducted by the Constituency 
Development Fund Committee (CDFC). Article 24(2) of the CDF Act of 2013 stipulates the CDFC 
to constitute by the following: 
(a) the national government official at the constituency as may be designated by the Cabinet 
Secretary or an alternate;  
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(b) three men nominated by the ward development committees and one of whom shall be a youth 
at the date of appointment;  
(c) three women nominated by the ward development committees and one of whom  shall be a 
youth at the date of appointment;  
(d) one person with disability nominated by the ward development committees;  
(e) one person nominated from among the active Non-Governmental Organisations in the 
constituency;  
(f) an officer of the Board seconded to the Constituency Development Fund Committee by the 
Board who shall be ex-officio and shall serve as the secretary to the Constituency  
Development Fund Committee.  
It is important to note that the CDF Act of 2013 is explicit in representing interests of crucial 
groups such as the youth, women, and persons with disabilities as highlighted in sub-sections b, c, 
and d above. Another critical factor to note is the role of the relevant Member of Parliament (MP) 
in the selection of the CDFC. Article 24(3) requires that the area MP convenes public fora of 
registered voters in each elective ward in the constituency within 45 days of being sworn in. After 
each elective ward has selected 5 people for consideration to the CDFC, the area MP, in 
consultation with the officer of the Board and the sub-County administrator, appoints from the 
members submitted 8 persons to form part of the Board. There is a high risk that the area MP will 
have a great influence in the selection of the Board, a phenomenon that may open the CDF to 
patronage, political manipulation, and corruption.  
Article 24 (14) spells out conditions of accountability under which a member of the CDFC may 
be removed from office: 
(a) Lack of integrity;  
(b) Gross misconduct;  
(c) Embezzlement of public funds;  
(d) Bringing the image of the committee into disrepute through unbecoming personal public 
conduct;  
(e) Promoting unethical practices;  
(f) Causing disharmony within the committee;  
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(g) Physical or mental infirmity. 
Article 48 of the CDF Act of 2013 spells out that:  
Any person who misappropriates any funds or assets from the Fund, or assists or causes any 
person to misappropriate or apply the funds otherwise than in the manner provided in this 
Act, shall be guilty of an offence and shall, upon conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a 
term not less than five years or to a fine not less than five hundred thousand shillings or to 
both. 
The above provision is an important part of the Act as it outlines consequences for individuals who 
are found guilty of misappropriating the Fund. However, it is not clear which entity is officially 
charged with the role of identifying and prosecuting wrong doing in relation to the Fund. The Act 
does not provide circumstances under which the public can be involved and the channel they can 
follow to lay their grievances.  
Article 12(4) of the CDF Act of 2013 requires that of the whole amount approved for the project, 
only 5 percent of the total allocation is to be allocated for the costs incurred through the 
administration process. The expenses incurred while administering the project must be properly 
accounted for and the returns made to the Constituency Development Fund Committee outlining 
how the money was used.  
In the interests of this study, it is critical to understand the provisions that the Act contains to 
ensure that the constituency conducts monitoring and evaluation of projects. Article 24 (17, 18) of 
the CDF Act of 2014 stipulates that staff, not exceeding 5 in number, with knowledge in 
information and communication technology, construction and basic accounting can be employed 
through the Fund for the purposes of project monitoring and evaluation and record keeping. The 
staff are to be remunerated with funds allocated for administration and recurrent expenses. The 
Act here is not explicit about the level of skills and qualifications of the staff employed for this 
purpose. Monitoring and evaluation is a technical area which should not be handled by someone 
with no more than basic knowledge. Article 31 of the CDF Act of 2013 also spells out that the 
CDFC is charged with the responsibility for monitoring and evaluating projects, and may designate 
a sub-committee, a ward committee, or a project committee for this purpose. The CDF is required 
by the Act to provide the status of on-going projects to the ward administrator, sub-County 
administrator, and the County Projects Committee.  
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This section of the chapter is also interested in understanding how the CDF Act of 2013 provides 
for public participation in the selection and prioritization of projects to be funded by CDF in their 
area. Section 24(7) requires each elective ward to come up with a list of priority projects and 
submit them to the CDFC. The Act is not clear as to how these processes of selection and 
prioritization are be conducted, and does not give any guidelines of who in the ward is responsible 
for convening  the public for projects deliberations. It does not mean that projects submitted by 
the wards are to be funded in order of that priority, they undergo another ranking by the CDFC 
after receiving projects from all elective wards. Article 25(2) requires that ongoing projects shall 
take precedence over all other new projects. This provision is relevant as it ensures that previous 
projects are not stalled or abandoned.  
Article 26(2) provides that education bursary schemes shall be considered as development projects 
for the purposes of the Fund. It allows up to 25 percent allocation of the total of the CDF in any 
financial year. This is an indication that education is seen as an integral part of advancing local 
and economic development.  
After the introduction of the County government system in 2013, the CDF is now regarded through 
the CDF Act of 2013 as additional funding in support of County development. Part VII of the CDF 
Act of 2013 establishes a County Projects Committee to make appropriate monitoring of CDF 
projects and assess whether the CDF in respective Counties serves the objectives in line with the 
provisions of the Act.  
3.8 Aligning the CDF with the Constitution of Kenya 2010 
After the CDF was in established 2003, no other major fiscal decentralization policy preceded the 
Constitution of Kenya that was later inaugurated in 2010. The CDF Act of 2003 (as amended in 
2007)  was revised to CDF Act of 2013, as an attempt to align it to the principles of the CoK 2010 
framework, including major governance values on transparency and accountability, separation of 
powers, and most importantly, enhancement of peoples’ participation (Ojwang & Bwisa, 2014: 
109). Article 4(2) explicitly places the CDF Act of 2013 in alignment with Article 202(2) of the 
CoK 2010 which states that the County governments may be given additional allocations from the 
national government’s share of the revenue, either conditionally or unconditionally.  
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After the enactment of CDF 2013, some stakeholders have argued that powers and functions 
governing the implementation of the CDF Fund should be transferred from the administration of 
the Members of the Parliament to the respective Counties. There is a perceived general consensus 
that in its current format, CDF has the potential to support infrastructural development, create 
wealth, induce poverty alleviation as well as empower community participation in development 
planning and implementation. The Institute Social Accountability (TISA, 2013) suggests that the 
CDF should be placed under County development plans, a phenomenon that will significantly 
reduce project duplication and consequent misuse and misapplication of public resources. 
However the legislators insist that the constitution permits them to mobilize funds such as CDF 
(Ngirachu, 2015). 
In the 2015/2016 financial year, the Treasury allocated Ksh 35.2 billion to the CDF to fund 
National Government functions at the constituency level such as education, security, among others.  
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3.9 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed key developments towards Kenya’s system of decentralisation. The chapter 
found that at independence, the colonial government administered Kenya through a decentralized 
system of government.  However, soon after independence, constitutional amendments were 
effected to centralize powers and functions of government in development planning. Numerous 
constitutional amendments were enacted to consolidate the powers of the presidency and local 
government operated under the surveillance of the center. Communities were locked out from 
participating in design or implementation of local development agenda. Succumbing to pressure 
from international agencies such as the IMF and World Bank, and from local CSOs, the 
government created caricatures of underfunded decentralized initiatives that enjoyed limited 
government funding and support. This chapter also presented the new decentralization framework 
in Kenya as reflected in the Constitution of Kenya 2010. It shows how power is shared between 
the National and the County government. This chapter explained the background to the 
establishment of the CDF in 2003 and how it was later revised in order to align it better to the 
principles of decentralisation enshrined in Kenya new Constitution passed in 2010.  It was argued 
that the CDF was changed into a fund aimed at supporting local economic development initiatives 
across Kenya constituencies by encouraging local communities to identify and be involved in the 
identification, management, and implementation of local development projects.  It is primarily a 
fiscal equalisation fund in that those constituencies with the greatest need receive a larger portion 
of funding.  The chapter concludes that while there is still strong national government oversight in 
how funds are distributed and spent, the rational for this oversight is to ensure regional fiscal 
equalisation and local economic development which is in line with the objectives of fiscal 
decentralisation as discussed in the previous chapter.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Research Analysis and Interpretation 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents, analyses, and interprets research findings collected during the course of this 
research.  Some of the arguments made in this chapter are based on the general literature reviewed; 
responses gathered from a number of informants interviewed; as well as my personal observations 
of LED projects in the Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies.  As explained in the research 
methodology section in the first chapter of this dissertation,  I only gathered data from officials 
that were physically involved and familiar with the CDF.  The objective was to gain their opinions 
on what some of the implementation challenges were, and whether they felt the CDF was 
appropriate for the LED needs of their community.   I did not interview or survey the general 
population as I felt that they would not know what the CDF is, its specific implementation mandate, 
or the specific intergovernmental management processes.   There are no official government 
reports detailing the outcomes to date of the CDF in either the Gatanga or Naivasha Constituency.  
(Besides reports detailing the amount of money transferred and spent, but this was not the focus 
of this study).  I was therefore dependent on the opinions of the key participants, and first-hand 
observations of LED activities funded by the CDF in the respective constituencies.  The 
conclusions I can draw from this are therefore limited.  While one cannot generalize, the opinions 
of these officials responsible for in the implementation of local economic development projects 
funded by the CDF, offers some valuable insight into some of the implementation challenges of 
the CDF at constituency level. 
As De Vos (1998: 203) observes, data analysis and interpretation entails the reduction of raw data 
into intelligible and interpretable form in order to study and test its relationship with the research 
problem, and eventually draw conclusions. Kothari (2004: 344) maintains that the exercise of 
analyzing and interpreting data involves the art of drawing inferences from data collected in search 
for broader meaning from the research findings. Pickard (2007: 150) asserts that interpretation and 
analysis of data also includes the combination of preparatory work in the literature review related 
to specific topics and themes, and primary analysis.  
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Grolemund and Wickham (2014: 185) view data analysis as a process used to extract knowledge, 
information, and insights about a reality by examining data. Thus, it is a process whereby the 
researcher builds understanding and makes sense of the data collected. Kothari (2004: 344) 
outlines two major approaches to interpretations and analysis of collected data: (i) the effort to 
establish continuity in research through linking research results with those of another, and (ii) the 
effort to establish relationships within the collected data. Largely, interpretation is an instrument 
through which the factors that seem to explain the observed elements are better understood and 
also provide a theoretical conception which guides further research. (Kothari, 2004: 344). The data 
presented in this chapter is analyzed and interpreted according to the following themes:  
4.2 Government systems for Development: Centralised vs. Decentralised 
This study purports that if a government is to fulfill  its mandate of providing efficient service 
delivery, ensuring  macroeconomic stability, promoting  equalization of growth across regions, 
and achieving eventual local economic development, then structuring its system of governance to 
deliver these objectives becomes one of its central concerns. The literature on decentralization 
shows that governments across the globe have attempted to devise and implement policies in 
search of the best possible means to deliver these objectives. While pursuing these objectives, 
some governments have opted to adopt a centralized system, while others have chosen to 
experiment with decentralization in order to pursue the objectives of their fiscal policies.  In the 
context of the foregoing, the researcher aimed to establish the preferred option of the participants 
about the two commonly constructed systems of governance, that is, centralized and decentralized.  
According to N4: 
Decentralization has granted local people the power to decide and govern their development 
issues. In my opinion therefore, the system that we are having at the moment, that of 
decentralized government structures, is the most appealing. People are starting to believe 
that they can participate in the process of government and their decisions are being 
considered. The new constitution we have contains support structures that have a potential 
to empower people at the grassroots to participate in governance.  
Van Zyl (2010) argues that due to the fact that local government is closer to the people, it has a 
better prospect of understanding the real needs of the people at the grassroots. In Kenya, the CDF 
offers an opportunity for MPs to respond directly to concrete demands from their constituents, 
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something that has proven difficult through interaction with central – executive led - government. 
In line with this viewpoint, N8 noted that: 
The decentralized system has a potential to assist in the actual cases at the grassroots level. 
This is because those at that level understand local problems and are able to prioritize 
appropriately. For example, there has been a challenge in awarding bursaries to students. 
When they apply for bursaries, those sitting at the board do not understand their individual 
needs. They end up distributing an equal amount to all applicants. Since the amount given 
to each is so meagre, those with real financial needs are neglected. However, if a local board 
would be allowed to be part of the process, they would be able to advise the board regarding 
various local dynamics.  
The introduction of the CDF as a development fund managed at the local level has come with a 
promise of a more efficient form of service delivery to local populations. Evidence has shown that 
the CDF has the potential to bypass central bureaucracies and channel development funds directly 
to local communities. Consequently, this scenario creates a platform for active participation of 
local populations in the identification and implementation of the most pressing local infrastructure 
(Van Zyl, 2010). In addition to the aforementioned, respondent N9 offered a criticism of the 
efficiency of the previous government:  
The centralized system took a lot of time to deliver development to communities and there 
was no proper communication between the government and local communities. The 
centralized government took a lot of time to provide the kind of development that was needed 
to the people. In some instances it took years for a project to be considered by these central 
government offices. Those concerns that needed urgent attention were ignored and left 
unattended.  
Respondent G3 expressed sentiments similar to respondent N9’s:  
When powers are decentralized and funds are distributed to local governments, it reduces 
bureaucracies and escalates procurement processes. Before funds reach the grassroots in a 
centralized system, they take such a long time to get approved and other times processes 
stall. In the decentralized system, governments are encouraged to get into direct contact with 
local communities. Locals are then provided an opportunity to relay their needs according to 
their priorities. As long as it is done in the right way and policies are allowed to govern the 
way money is distributed, I would prefer the decentralized system of government.  
The CDF is regarded as a critical fund for development at the local level. This is because all 
constituencies have a potential to receive an average share from at least 2.5% of all government 
ordinary revenue collected every financial year (CDF, 2013 Section 4(a)) to fund development 
needs in respective constituencies as additional revenue to the County governments under Article 
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202 (2) of the Constitution 2010. Respondent N11 preferred a decentralized system of 
decentralized governance due to its potential to diversify economic benefits to local communities:  
I think that decentralized form of government has better delivery systems as compared to the 
previous centralized government. This is because with the decentralized system, every 
constituency has an opportunity to receive some funds to complement their local 
development over and above what is provided by the national government. Most of the 
projects that could never have been established under the central management have now 
been put in place through the CDF. 
 Pursuant to the above, efficiency in resource management through decentralized plans such as the 
CDF and consequently the effective implementation and sustainability of these plans allows the 
government’s budget to be tailored to meet diverse priorities in the different areas more effectively 
using locally available systems and resources (Wabwire, 2010: 3). As respondent N9 maintained:  
The decentralized system is good because it ensures that communities receive their 
development concerns using locally available means. It brings development closer to the 
people and strengthens participation of local communities by as they get involved in the 
process of project development. 
In a similar vein to respondent N9 above, respondent G5 hailed a decentralized delivery system as 
follows: 
Decentralized system gives local people a chance to participate in the development process 
and in growing the local economy. Local communities have are able to identify real local 
concerns as compared to administration through centralized structures. Funds like the CDF 
that are controlled and managed by local governing structures have installed development 
structures that would not have been possible through the intervention of the central 
government.  
N6 purports that ‘decisions that pertains local development should therefore be left to the locals 
themselves’.  In addition, respondent N5 noted that: 
If it is well managed, local management of development is more effective than centralized 
system. This is because the former centralized government was based on uniform 
development across the Country without regard for specific needs of the community.  
On the other hand, evidence of malpractices have emerged where the implementation of the CDF 
has been marred with serious cases of corruption and massive misappropriation leading to huge 
losses of public money with no impact to target communities (Simiyu, Mweru, and Omete, 2014: 
31). Respondent N10, for example, maintained that ‘localized management of development in 
- 110 - 
 
Naivasha has failed dismally’. She did not rule out the prospect of reinstating centralized form of 
development administration, and further noted that: 
If localized structures will continue to fail in their mandate to deliver local development 
needs, it will therefore be better to have uniform development where public structures such 
as schools, hospitals or roads are initiated nationwide where everyone benefits. The main 
problem is that when development is planned at the local level, local elites and administrators 
hijack the process and only a meagre percentage, about 10 percent for Naivasha that gets to 
the people. 
The rationale behind low outcomes of development at the local level was attributed to central 
neglect, in tandem with intensification of poor performance. The central government came to view 
local governments as problematic entities to be controlled rather than developmental entities to be 
supported. (Smoke, 2007: 139). Respondent N2 was concerned that local development systems do 
not always tackle the real problems but are hijacked by local elites to serve their selfish interests:  
I would have preferred the previous centralized government. This is because everyone had a 
chance to have a taste of any intervention desired by the state. Localized funds always target 
the poorest of the poor and the most vulnerable of the communities. However, other persons 
who are not within that category never get to benefit from state interventions. I understand 
that needs of different regions differ. But since corruption and self-interested people has 
made localized system difficult to sustain, I therefore think that it is better for the national 
government to nationalize interventions where everyone has a chance to benefit across the 
country.  
Fiscal decentralization can empower local governments through the transfer of authority to expand 
their operations in collecting taxes and levies from local populations as a means of providing 
efficient services. This would translate to a scenario where elected officials are vested with some 
authority to raise certain taxes and spend monies collected for development locally (Maina, 2004: 
1-3; ADBG, 2010). However, local governments are perceived to put more pressure on local 
populations in their quest to raise more revenues to supplement their expenditure. Respondent G1 
maintained that decentralizing taxing powers to local government is not desirable particularly for 
the poor: 
The current system of decentralized government structures is not friendly to the poor. Since 
the inception of the decentralized government, many taxes have been introduced as 
compared to the previous system. It has become increasingly difficult for small business 
owners to grow since most of their profits are directed to paying taxes. Prices of farm produce 
have dropped and people are no longer making enough money to continue paying for 
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products with rising prices. Therefore, unless taxes are going to be redirected to community 
development, this government will end up being a burden for the poor.  
G8 also complained about the heightened level of taxation with the current level of taxation:  
Counties are competing to collect revenue in order to fund development projects. Previously, 
when we transported timber, we never found County Council officers collecting money 
along the road. But now, we cannot be able to pass without paying taxes. Yet, the price of 
timber remains the same. There is no way the government has come to help us, but has put 
more burdens on the cost of operating businesses.  
Respondent N5 also queried the effectiveness of decentralized development delivery system due 
to perceived incompetence of the CDF duty bearers in the following ways:   
The ones that manage funds under the administration of the local government have proved 
to be self-interested people and policies are not strict enough to enhance accountability. 
There is very little that can be associated with the CDF intervention in Naivasha. For 
example, during the 10 years that I have been in the PTA committee for both primary and 
secondary schools, I cannot point any completed project that we could possibly associate 
with the CDF project. 
Of interest here was that despite the fact that the majority of respondents that were interviewed in 
Naivasha were not impressed with the way the CDF was implemented, they still maintained that a 
decentralized system would be better in delivering development at the local level. Respondent N4, 
for example, maintained that ‘as a system and design, decentralized government has a lot of 
promises, but it is now becoming clear that it is endowed with huge implementation challenges’.  
Some of these challenges embedded in decentralized government include the confusion of the 
various roles played by different implementing government agents, stakeholders, and others.   The 
point which emerges in the literature and in the interviews is that there is still uncertainty whether 
the current configuration of the CDF is appropriate given the ongoing implementation challenges.  
Authors like Wainaina (2014) and TISA (2013) have argued that the CDF should be transferred to 
the administration of the County Government under the flagship of the Governor as opposed to 
MP. They insist that MPs should be concerned only with law-making and should not be allocated 
any funds to administer. Wainaina (2014) and TISA (2013) call for harmonization of all 
decentralized funds under the County Treasury in an attempt to ensure more prudent, responsible 
and accountable utilization and to maximize impact through such funds. Respondent N4 was 
concerned with the existing confusion as expressed below: 
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There is existing confusion that is arising regarding control of local development. The 
conflict is now rising among the Members of Parliament, Senators, and Governors. They are 
now in conflict over who is to control the CDF kitty. Governors are fighting for the CDF 
money to be diverted to the counties where all County development plans are deliberated. 
They are of the suggestion that Members of Parliament should refrain from the control of 
this fund. Women Representatives and Senators are also fighting to have control over these 
funds. Each of these politicians wants to be associated with development structures at the 
local level, making the implementation of these localised funds more complex. Therefore, 
this commotion renders the voices of the people irrelevant as the political fights escalate. 
The funds become much politicised to a point that it fails to attain their objectives. Instead 
of such initiatives being driven for the benefit of local communities, they become platforms 
for politicians to advance their own interests in such for power and wealth. 
 
It is argued that the CDF is to be seen as a constituency-based special project grant to be placed 
under the County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP). It is expected that every County has 
developed a CIDP where all the elected state officials, namely, Members of National Assembly, 
Senators, Women’s Representative and Members of County Assembly play a key role in 
identification and prioritization of projects in the County (Wainaina, 2014). 
Some respondents in Naivasha felt that their constituencies were endowed with a wealth of natural 
resources, and wanted to have full local decision-making autonomy. They do not support a 
centralized system of governance.  They feel that under a centralized system of government, these 
resources would not be properly shared to benefit local populations. N5 argued that: 
… Naivasha has a lot of natural resources. For example, electricity (Geothermal Power) is 
generated from this area, but it has remained extremely difficult for local residents to access 
it because the conditions attached to it are very expensive for local residents to meet. 
Therefore, this remains a real challenge for local economic development for Naivasha.  
According to Khamadi (2013), Counties and local populations are at a crossroads in their quest to 
reclaim ownership and control over local natural resources. This study has found that despite 
challenges, particularly the fact that counties have not yet developed systems and skilled personnel 
to manage these resources, local constituencies and communities continue to reassert their rights 
for a reasonable share in revenues collected. For example Respondent N5 critically analyzed three 
key natural resources that are vital to growth of local economy in Naivasha.  Firstly, regarding 
horticulture ‘flowers grown along Lake Naivasha, they are worth billions of shillings, and 
contribute a lot of revenue’; secondly ‘if we look at electricity, it also generates a lot of money 
through geothermal power extraction’; thirdly, ‘there is a national park that attracts a lot of 
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tourists around Mt. Longonot’. In summing up this argument, respondent N5 averred that there is 
no justifiable reason why Naivasha should not be ‘among the richest constituencies due to its rich 
natural resources and business enterprises’. He emphatically stated that:  
Naivasha has a high potential to being independent if managed through a well-coordinated 
administration, to an extent of providing assistance to other poorer areas. However, this has 
not been possible due to poor leadership and mismanagement.  
N11 concurred with the above arguments and posited that ‘Naivasha has enough resources to 
remain autonomous in managing its own development even without the help from the national 
government’.  In fact, there is hope for local communities with huge resource base following the 
enactment of the Natural Resources (Benefit sharing) Act of 2014 which establishes a system of 
benefit sharing in resource exploitation between exploiters, national government, county 
governments and local communities. This is likely to be a potential benefit for communities from 
which resources are exploited, as well as their respective governments: there is a high potential of 
returning proceeds to local communities. This would, in turn, enhance the autonomy of local 
governments. 
Despite the ongoing challenges, the respondents interviewed seemed to prefer a decentralized form 
of government.   Some respondents in Gatanga expressed the view that they are now more 
informed and feel that they are more involved in local economic development project 
prioritization.  Some respondents in Naivasha believe that the system is well structured but that 
local leaders have failed them in realizing local development objectives and priorities.  One of the 
main points raised again and again by respondent in both Gatanga and Naivasha was that there 
was too much political interference, particularly from Members of Parliament and the CDFC.  It 
was felt that this was a major factor that hindered the CDF from realizing its full potential. 
Therefore, the study has shown that despite good performances by leaders in Gatanga 
Constituency, the administration of the CDF runs a high risk of being politically manipulated to 
serve the interests of the local elites. This study has also shown that if well managed, decentralized 
funds can be more efficient in supplying economic benefits to local populations.   
However, a few respondents expressed their frustrations with the outcome of the CDF. They noted 
that some of the projects ended up benefiting only politically connected individuals and 
communities while other monies were lost in corruption. Due to these inherent problems with the 
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implementation of the CDF, they would prefer a central system of government that would 
distribute economic benefits without being excessively affected by local dynamics.  At the same 
time, however, respondents from both Gatanga and Naivasha felt frustrated in cases where the 
national government exploited their regional natural resources without their local communities 
benefiting.   Local government and communities welcome the new decentralized system if it allows 
them to share the benefits derived from local resources.  The literature on decentralization infers 
that decentralization has the potential to engage and empower local communities thereby enabling 
them to select their development priorities that best suit their jurisdictions.  It seems that if 
corruption and nepotism can be put under check, where those that mismanage or misappropriate 
funds are called to account, a decentralized system of government would indeed be the preferred 
option of governance.  
4.3 Skills, capacity and competences of the CDF managers and local politicians 
The CDF duty bearers are given the autonomy to foresee the allocation and implementation of 
these development funds at a constituency level. They are believed to be the closest to the people 
and therefore in a position to understand their pressing needs and concerns since they are elected 
from the membership of the same communities (Kimani, Nekesa, and Ndungu, 2009: 35).  
However, the literature on decentralization and my interview findings point to the significance of    
local political leadership and that administrators are at the core of understanding the realization of 
local autonomy in mobilization of available local resources. My interviews revealed that my 
respondents in Gatanga had trust in their leaders, and felt that their leaders were committed to the 
LED in their constituency. For example, respondent G6 postulates that Gatanga, through its 
leaders, has the potential of promoting local and economic development:  
I think that our constituency has a lot of resources that include financial, human and natural. 
We are well positioned to use these resources to advance development in this constituency. 
I believe that leaders in this Constituency will use this opportunity to support local 
development.  
On the contrary, many of my respondents in Naivasha were mostly very skeptical of their leaders 
and their commitment to LED.    For example, N1 expressed his fears by noting that he ‘still remain 
skeptical about the commitments and promises that they (local leaders) have made to the 
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community’. In fact, some respondents in Naivasha blamed the CDF’s poor performance on the 
inefficiency of CDF bearers at the constituency level.  N1: 
There are problems of inefficiency with CDF managers at the constituency level. A lot of 
money is disbursed to the constituencies, yet what we see are establishment of very weak 
structures, unfinished projects, while other approved projects do not even start and the 
money remains unaccounted.  
G8 voiced his opinion that one of the major reasons why CDF managers and local politicians fail 
in executing their duties is their limited understanding of the principles and values enshrined in 
the constitution that inform the implementation of the CDF fund. The fact that Kenya has been 
under central rule since independence in 1963 may explain why leaders are not fully equipped with 
the requisite expertise in governing local government under a decentralized system of government. 
Mwenda (2010: 21) argues that Counties are likely to face the risk of adopting the same old style 
or governance templates for development without embracing new realities and characteristics of 
the new environment. In line with the aforementioned argument, G8 believed that local 
government in Gatanga has leaders with good political will but proposes that they should orient 
themselves comprehensively with the CoK 2010. G8 maintains that “regarding the new County 
(decentralized) system”, he does not believe that local development stakeholders “have been able 
to comprehend it entirely”. Elsewhere in Kimilili Constituency, following a study that was 
published by Simiyu, Mweru and Omete (2014: 45), results revealed that, with regard to the impact 
of the CDF on social economic welfare of residents, some of the CDF duty bearers are not fully 
acquainted with the new regulations and policies governing the CDF’s administration. This reality 
in itself hinders the autonomy of the local government in administering its own development. 
It appears as if local skills, capacity and competence could be critical factors for the 
implementation of the CDF.   Regular training of the Constituency Development Committee, 
which included members of the CDFC in Dagoretti Constituency was associated with a successful 
implementation of the Fund. Trained committee members were able to share informed knowledge 
with project implementers which enhanced CDF implementation in Dagoretti (Kimani, Nekesa, & 
Ndungu, 2009: 46).  Respondent N3 contends that the inefficiency of local government delivery 
in Naivasha was linked with “poor management skills among the CDF managers, a lot of money 
has been lost, and ends up compromising the completion of proposed projects”.  
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In Dagoretti Constituency, when financial control was identified as one of the major hindrances to 
timely completion of CDF projects, a decision was made to train CDFC members with project 
management skills, procurement and accounting. Since that intervention, the constituency 
recorded significant success:  projects were completed without major delays and financial 
management was significantly enhanced (Kimani, Nekesa, & Ndungu, 2009: 46). This study also 
highlights that technical skills and knowledge amongst CDF duty bearers are vital in propelling 
economic development. Such competences have huge potential to boost project design, 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of development projects. N4 points out that this 
important factor is missing among CDF duty bearers in Naivasha: 
There is a trend that there exist a general lack of technical skills, capacity, and knowledge of 
managing development projects such as those financed by the CDF. If you have a group of 
inexperienced individuals managing development projects that deal with huge amounts of 
money, it would be unrealistic to expect them to drive this process efficiently.  Very little 
research is done before projects are proposed. If the pre-analysis of the project is not done, 
then the eventual evaluation in the post-project analysis is likely to record poor outcomes. 
Many of the projects that are abandoned all over the constituency suffered the same fate, that 
they were not adequately deliberated. Common practice has shown us that projects that are 
constantly evaluated do better and produce positive outcomes. However, in Naivasha, 
managers and those in project committees are so occupied in stealing the money than in the 
success of the project. Thus, there is no transparent monitoring of projects that is done.  
Similarly, N9 was concerned with the lack of skills preparedness amongst CDF managers in 
Naivasha. He proclaimed that:  
… [t]he appointment of unskilled people hinders the implementation of the CDF agenda. A 
lot of finances are lost due to such incompetence. These appointees remain in such positions 
because of their connections with politicians. Politicians use them to source money public 
funds. That is why they are forced to engage in corrupt practices. 
According to the respondents, the lack of skills, capacity and competency of CDF duty bearers 
were key factors in determining the outcome of the implementation of CDF.  Those interviewed 
in Gatanga felt that CDF officials had the necessary professional skills and competency in 
managing the CDF, and raised no major concerns. However, the majority of those interviewed in 
Naivasha were concerned that those tasked with the management of the CDF were incompetent 
and lacked the necessary skills to manage the implementation of the CDF. It would appear, 
therefore that appropriate skills such as project management, accounting, and budgeting are 
necessary prerequisites for people to manage the CDF. If incompetent individuals are assigned to 
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such positions, the CDF may be prone to mismanagement, misappropriation, and even political 
interference as political elites divert the CDF to serve their own interests.  
4.4 Responsiveness of CDF projects 
This study emphasizes the significance of the amount of time taken between the selection and the 
completion of the CDF projects as being critical factors in assessing the efficiency in the 
implementation of the CDF. The respondents in the Gatanga Constituency seemed satisfied with 
the time taken to complete the CDF funded projects. Respondent G5 was particularly satisfied with 
the efficiency of the CDF funded projects in the health sector in Gatanga:   
In most cases when we apply for funding related to a particular project in the health sector, 
it does not take very long. Once and again we get called to get the cheque to finance the 
project applied for. Every time there is a sitting to discuss the disbursement of funds, it does 
not take a long time to have the application approved. 
Respondent G7 concurred:  
For the last 10 years, local government has been very effective in delivering public goods. 
We have seen structures emerge during this period more than any other period in the history 
of the Kenyan government. I can say that schools, health centres, roads, security posts and 
education through bursaries have been established and maintained. 
On the contrary, many respondents in Naivasha were dissatisfied with the time taken to complete 
CDF funded projects. Despite the general outlook that in the past, central government was slow in 
delivering services to local communities, it seemed as if nothing had changed in Naivasha.  A 
study that was conducted to assess the impact of the CDF on social economic welfare of the local 
population in Kimilili Constituency revealed that one of the major challenges that had hindered 
autonomy of local government was inadequate and delayed funding (Simiyu, Mweru & Omete, 
2014: 45). Similarly, respondent N7 believed that it took considerably longer for leaders in 
Naivasha to utilize resources allocated and implement approved projects: ‘Local government in 
Naivasha has failed to manage local development. Projects that were supposed to be implemented 
in the first months of this elective period have not yet started’. 
Respondent N5 also lamented over the slow pace of approval and completion of the CDF related 
projects in Naivasha:  
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Projects take a very long time to complete. For example, most proposals take more than two 
years before they are approved. Even if you look in the last five years in this location, there 
is not even one that has been approved, not any project that has started. For instance, the 
construction for the kitchen and the administration block started at Muiciringiri Secondary 
School even before I was elected in the school committee, but until today it has never been 
completed. And now that I am leaving the office after five years, it still has not yet been 
completed. As parents, we have eventually resorted to contributing the funds ourselves. We 
have resolved that every parent must contribute Ksh 1000 so that we can be able to support 
the completion of these projects. We have made countless efforts to appeal for help from the 
Naivasha local government, and to the CDF, even from LATF, and yet we do not get any 
attention.  
This study also found that the delay experienced in disbursing funds for bursaries can affect 
learners from needy families. Reluctance amongst the CDF duty bearers in Naivasha limits the 
CDF’s ability to achieve its objectives. For example, respondent N7 contends: 
Local development initiatives in Naivasha take significantly longer to be implemented. For 
example, in other constituencies, CDF bursaries for this year were awarded in the months of 
July and August, but in Naivasha, even until today, learners have never been awarded. This 
is an indication that the organization of development in this constituency is inefficient.  
The results of this study show that many projects were delayed due to the fact that money was 
released in instalments that were not timely or consistent. A study conducted by Simiyu, Mweru, 
and Omete (2014: 47) on the effect of CDF on socio-economic welfare in Kimilili Constituency 
indicates that the national government was partly to blame for the delays in disbursement of the 
CDF funds to the constituencies. Some elements of delay in the implementation of the CDF 
projects were noted in Gatanga. For example G1 attributes this ineffectiveness to the fact that: 
 CDF funds are not released on time by the national government … there is an element of 
dragging certain projects before they are completed. Delays at the constituency level are 
done intentionally so that they can gain more money on interest. 
Similarly, respondent N8 complained about delays in the implementation of the CDF projects: 
… it takes a lot of time to process even the little money that is approved for the project. For 
example, in my school, there is a project that has taken over 10 years. The former Member 
of Parliament launched it and could not complete within his tenure. Then it was undertaken 
by his predecessor, and the project is still ongoing. The challenge is that they do not approve 
projects holistically, but release amounts in small instalments and eventually lead to the 
delay in the completion of the project. 
This study has found that delay in the implementation of the CDF projects was also attributed to 
inadequate funding where projects are allocated less funds than they are actually worth. Simiyu, 
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Mweru and Omete (2014: 46) called on the government to increase this kitty in order to enhance 
complete funding for projects without obstacles such as   inadequate funding and delays in the 
release of the Fund. Respondent G10 also noted that ‘in as much as Gatanga has been hailed to 
be doing well countrywide in terms of the CDF administration, elements of inefficiency exist’. For 
example, G10 added: 
There was a time where a proposal to build a hospital at Karua was approved.  Rooms were 
built but neither furniture nor hospital staff was put in place. Therefore, this became a 
wasteful expenditure and evidence of inefficient planning from local leaders. Kirwara 
District Hospital also suffers the same fate with no sufficient medical staff and enough beds 
to accommodate patients. I would therefore expect that if the CDF money is to be approved 
to start a particular project, there should be a clear plan of how they will be funded to reach 
a point of full operation. A hospital should therefore be equipped with medical staff, 
medicines, surgical theatres, mortuaries and other necessary facilities. 
Despite the fact that some respondents in Gatanga observed that there was delay in completing 
some projects, they remained fairly satisfied with the pace at which CDF funded projects were 
completed. For example, although respondent G8 was concerned with delay in completing certain 
projects in Gatanga, the appraisal concluded on a positive note: 
Even though the CDF projects in Gatanga seems to be done more swiftly, there are other 
times that we feel that projects take more than necessary to complete. What I wonder is why 
implementation takes longer to complete projects that would benefit the community, yet the 
money to do such has already been approved. However, I have not witnessed serious 
problems that hinder implementation of the CDF funded projects in this constituency. I think 
a commendable job has been done.  
This study found that despite a few concerns about delayed funding either from the national or the 
constituency levels, majority of respondents in Gatanga were content with the time taken between 
the allocation and completion of CDF projects. On the contrary, there was considerable concern 
that projects in Naivasha either took too long to be approved and allocated funds, or experienced 
long delays before their completion. The data compiled by this study revealed that there were many 
stalled projects that were started and never completed. This study has also noted that in both 
Gatanga and Naivasha, there was evidence of completed physical infrastructure such as health and 
security centres that were slow to commence their operation due to delay in appointment of 
personnel by the national government. This phenomenon has delayed the delivery of development 
through the CDF.  
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4.5 Economic efficiency 
This study highlights that the point of involving communities, particularly in the selection and 
prioritization of the CDF funded projects, is to ensure that available resources at the local level are 
tailored to meet diverse development preferences in respective local jurisdictions. This is 
adequately justified because in as much as government budget is informed through a wide range 
of regional consultations, it is not adequate in dealing with specific needs of communities from 
each of the specific local communities (Kimenyi, 2005: 3). In the fiscal decentralization model, 
matching limited resources with addressing the most appropriate needs of constituents is critical. 
Being closer to the constituents, it is argued, local governments have a higher potential to identify 
people’s needs, and thus to end up providing the appropriate form and level of public services 
(Manor, 1999; Oates, 1972).  
In order to ensure that the most pressing needs of grassroots communities are given priority, 
consultations between the CDF duty bearers, local politicians and communities are crucial. A study 
commissioned by the Centre for Devolution Studies (CDS) recommended that such consultative 
meetings should be systematic and not haphazard. During consultative meetings, selection and 
prioritization of community projects should be heralded by community members and selected 
projects decided through a majority vote. This would significantly reduce political interference by 
MPs and their cronies. Only after these exercises can leaders of those communities be engaged 
(Finch & Omolo, 2015: 2). In Gatanga, G4 asserted:   
There is no evidence of proper consultation between local governing structures and the 
community. Those in positions of power continue to dominate in the selection and 
prioritization of community projects. Most often, projects approved are not in line with the 
will of the people but only as an agreement of few individual elites. 
According to Kimenyi (2005: 2), the essence of establishing the CDF was to provide constituents 
with the opportunity to maximize their expenditure of limited funds allocated to constituencies in 
line with their particular needs and preferences. Ideally, different local jurisdictions choose varying 
projects and priorities informed by their particular circumstances and needs.  Respondents were 
asked for their perception on the congruence between the actual CDF projects and their 
constituents’ needs.  Many of the respondents in Gatanga felt satisfied, while, by contrast, most in 
Naivasha seemed dissatisfied.  
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For example, G5 noted that the CDF in Gatanga has managed to ‘provide for the community 
according to their needs, and not pushing too much of one thing from the top while many other 
areas are abandoned’. She further exemplified: 
In a hospital setting such as this, we avoid so much wastage of expired medicine because we 
are able to order according to our specific needs within a particular time. In the past, 
medicine would be distributed to hospitals in bulk, some of it would expire while others were 
not enough. 
This study argues that from the data collected in Gatanga and Naivasha, the CDF can presents an 
opportunity for MPs to exert their influence, whether positively or negatively, in the disbursement 
of these funds. This study identifies the role played by MPs in the CDF as a critical political tool 
used to determine how the Fund responds to the needs and preferences of their constituents. As 
pointed out by G8, ‘localized governance improves effectiveness in the delivery of local economic 
development’.  Pursuant with the relevance of local leadership in facilitating delivery of services 
that match the needs of people locally, G6 expounded: 
I think that if leadership is closer to the people, it facilitates more effectiveness in the delivery 
of local development. Previously, if we had wanted something done in our area, it will take 
a lot of time to have it approved by the central government. If funds are available at the 
County level, then the new system would be much better, and would end up speeding 
development locally.  
According to Kwon (2003), local authorities are given autonomy to mobilize communities and 
deliberate on the kinds of projects communities need established in their areas, without making 
reference to the central government officials for endorsement. Many have agreed that there was 
gross inefficiency with delivery of services by central government. This study argues that the 
introduction of funds like the CDF was an opportunity to address specific local economic 
development needs and preferences of local communities.  G7 points out that: 
[i]n the past, it was very difficult for communities to receive services, some communities 
received more while others were ignored. Centralized government had failed to provide even 
the very basic services to local communities. This has been made possible with the shift to 
localized form of government.  
A historical critical analysis has evidenced that attempts by centralized governments to provide 
services for grassroots communities have failed to establish projects and initiatives that are 
compatible with real needs of these communities. Owing to such failures, governments in 
developing countries have decided to experiment with decentralized structures with an aim of 
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achieving the same objectives. Indeed, many perceive decentralization as a system that has real 
potential to offer a range of benefits. This new system is being proposed as a way of reducing the 
role of the state, by fragmenting authority at the center, and introducing more intergovernmental 
competition, checks and balances; and in addition, as a way to make government more responsive 
and efficient (Bardhan, 2002: 185). In accordance with the preceding argument, respondent G10 
maintained that: 
This system is able to address specific problems that affect specific areas in different ways. 
Again, when local governments manage their own development independently, it is likely 
that they are more cautious in the way they spend their resources. The competition that 
emerges from these arrangements assists local government in fast-tracking their local 
economies.  
Ribot (2002: 10) argues that introducing local governments as service providers enhances 
competition, thus resulting in increased efficiency. The competition that arises from various local 
governments creates governments more responsive to local population’s needs and preferences. 
Thus, this study argues that the CDF can provide an environment for local government to match 
service delivery to needs by remaining closer to their clients due to having better access to local 
information. Respondents in this study seemed to feel that local government officials are better 
versed in local development needs than central administrators were. G10 noted that: 
The advantage with a localized system is that people that administer our governments are 
from within local counties. As such, they have better knowledge of the development needs 
of the local people and are capable of responding accordingly. 
One of the main rationales behind the establishment of the CDF was to increase the prevalence of 
both infrastructure and service community projects with an aim of fast-tracking poverty reduction 
and improve livelihoods by providing for the most pressing community needs. Since 2003, most 
projects in education, health, water, agriculture, roads, bridges, and others have been attributed to 
the intervention of the CDF. Despite many successes in a number of constituencies that have 
recorded significant number of completed and functional projects, other constituencies have failed 
miserably to deliver and have recorded myriads of stalled and abandoned projects (Finch & Omolo, 
2012: 4). Pursuant with the foregoing, perceptions from questionnaire respondents produced 
varying results. The researcher was interested to find out the extent to which respondents of both 
Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies were satisfied with the number of projects implemented in 
both constituencies.  
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This study has found that the outcome of data from Gatanga and Naivasha was mixed.   There was 
general satisfaction among majority of respondents in Gatanga that the CDF had played a vital role 
in matching its development objectives to their pressing development needs. However, some 
respondents felt that they were not engaged in the prioritization of community projects and 
believed that only a few politically connected individuals together with local politicians carry out 
the exercise. Majority of respondents from Naivasha expressed frustrations because they are 
neither involved in prioritization of local projects nor in their implementation. There is a perception 
that even those projects that were funded did not meet the needs of the community due to lack of 
sufficient funding, resulting in stalled and abandoned projects.  Even though limited, these stark 
discrepancies in opinions between these two constituencies could be indicative of the ongoing 
implementation challenges facing the CDF. 
4.6 CDF Project monitoring and Evaluation  
There has been evidence of efforts to “professionalize” the CDF monitoring structures in Kenya 
with an aim of improving their effectiveness. As part of the recent reforms, account managers have 
been recruited in every constituency as an initiative to improve management in compliance with 
the CDF policies (Van Zyl, 2010). Kibui and Obebo (2015) argue that at the moment, monitoring 
and auditing of the CDF has been faced by a major hurdle as the government is seen to focus more 
on the performance of newly established Counties. The auditor general has indicated that the 
allocated budget is overstretched and is unable to monitor how the CDF funds have been spent. 
The proposal to use part of the CDF money to fund the auditing exercise was rejected by the MPs, 
leaving the fund exposed to irregular expenditure and misappropriation (Igadwah, 2015).  
Respondents in both constituencies agreed that CDF monitoring and evaluation is as a vital 
instrument that could allow them to directly involve themselves and contribute to the local 
development process.  However, respondents in Gatange felt that the CDF projects were being 
effectively monitored and evaluated, however, the respondents in Naivasha did not feel that the 
CDF projects in their constituency were well monitored or evaluated. 
Rubin (1995: 31) posits that in essence, monitoring and evaluation of projects are meant: i) to 
improve performance; ii) to make choices and decisions regarding the effectiveness of the projects; 
iii) learn lessons; and iv) to increase accountability. Estrella and Gaventa (1998: 11) argue that 
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communities are securing more chances to monitor and evaluate projects with an aim of holding 
their governments accountable to set goals and development performance targets. This study has  
 
A study that focused on Ainamoi Constituency on the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation 
of the CDF projects, (Ochieng, Chepkuto, Tubey, & Kuto, 2012: 194) determined the impact of 
projects managed through the funding of CDF; the extent of involvement of stakeholders in the 
process of monitoring and evaluation of CDF projects; and investigated the utilization of 
monitoring and evaluation results on CDF projects. The findings of the study revealed that there 
is a need for the community and the CDF management committee to monitor the implementation 
of the CDF projects in order to ensure that objectives are met, as well as to ensure adherence to 
quality and standards.  (Ochieng, Chepkuto, Tubey, & Kuto, 2012: 194).  
This study has found that the process of monitoring and evaluation of CDF projects can be vital to 
safeguard against project duplication. This is because other than the CDF, there are other 
development funds managed by County and national governments. If not well coordinated, certain 
projects could overlap. Van Zyl (2010) argues that administering the CDFs at the constituency 
level can be problematic, with elements of duplication of structures due to various local 
intervention structures. And in some instances, many administrative structures experience setting 
up of monitoring and regulation structures as expensive, unnecessary, and burdensome for the 
local authority. 
It has been recorded that account managers sent to constituencies to undertake the process of 
monitoring the implementation of the CDF funded projects are more often than not compromised 
by the presence of family, friends, or political appointees in project committees. No matter the 
recommendation from these managers, most cases of corruption and maladministration are ignored 
and no serious charges are made against the offenders.  Results of a collaborative joint research 
report by Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and Social and Public Accountability 
(SPAN) (2010: 62) show that respondents were concerned that corrupt officials in the CDF had 
not been punished for their bad practices.  The same concerns were raised by respondents in 
Gatanga.  For example, G 9 pointed out that: 
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Funds in Gatanga are not properly monitored. This is because most of those people tasked 
with monitoring have close connection with those that are supposed to be monitored. It is 
one system and no one can really expose wrong doing of the other. When it comes to signing 
of documents, they will all come together and endorse no matter the quality of the work 
done. If that happens, who else will be there to oppose. They just come to monitor but only 
pay a blind eye.  
Some interview respondents in Naivasha felt that there was no evidence of any meaningful 
monitoring and evaluation conducted on CDF related projects. For example, N5 claimed  that ‘the 
CDF committee does not take initiatives to do site visit in order to familiarize themselves with the 
constituency’s development needs; or even the monitor the already funded projects to see the 
nature and quality of the work done’. Therefore, this study found that monitoring and evaluation 
of the CDF funded projects remain a big challenge in Naivasha. Respondent N7 added that ‘people 
in Naivasha are reluctant to monitor how these funds are utilized’. In the same vein, N10 added 
that:  
One of the challenges that hindering the implementation of the CDF is weak monitoring 
structures. Many projects appear on paper to have been completed. However, on the ground, 
they stand as ghost projects that have never been started, abandoned projects, and as 
substandard structures. Therefore, one wonders why the officials are not in a position to go 
out and certify the existence and the quality of the so called completed projects. That is the 
reason that I boldly say that the government has failed its people in this location; and the 
government has disowned its own people. I do not understand why the government cannot 
send their own investigators to monitor how public money is being spent and to probe 
whether money approved for projects have been properly managed. People that have 
mismanaged public funds must be made accountable for their wrong doing. 
So while some respondents in Gatanga were satisfied with how CDF projects were monitored and 
evaluated, others were dissatisfied - especially with how the process was conducted. They wanted 
the process of monitoring and evaluation of CDF projects to be conducted by an independent body 
and not the same implementing agents.  They cited examples of cases where people were found 
guilty of mismanagement or misappropriation of the Fund, yet no measures were taken to bring 
them to account.   This study argues that the lack of a credible monitoring and evaluation process 
on CDF projects can be a factor affecting the implementation of the CDF.  Proper monitoring and 
evaluation can identify where money is being lost, or where performance is weak and as such 
promote accountability.   
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4.7 Awareness and knowledge of local development plans 
This study has identified public awareness as a critical component towards meaningful 
participation in the implementation of CDF projects. When people at the grassroots are aware of 
the existence of locally available funds, terms and conditions under which they function, as well 
as their roles in such processes, there is a higher potential of an accelerated growth in local 
development arising from active participation and ownership of community projects and 
initiatives.   
Many of the respondents in this study had a good sense of the CDF policies and regulations. On 
the other hand, they did not believe that the community at large were well informed regarding the 
CDF and its operations in the implementation process.  The majority of general population in 
Gatanga and Naivasha were perceived by the respondents to have either low or very low awareness 
of CDF policies and regulations. The rationale behind this disparity of awareness between the 
respondents and the general population would be that those who were selected as respondents in 
this study were already actively involved, directly or indirectly, with development projects in the 
constituencies; additionally, they possessed higher literacy levels than the general population. 
Regarding the general population in Naivasha, N3 explained that:  
… [m]ost of the people in this community are not civically educated. I would therefore like 
to emphasize the importance of education. Once you do not have the knowledge, then we 
cannot to see development, and we shall continually remain behind in terms of development. 
Ignorance therefore is the evil for many things, including corruption. In order to deal with 
this problem, it is therefore important to create more opportunities for people to be given 
more civic education in order to impact more responsibility. 
Simiyu, Mweru and Omete (2014: 43) maintain that awareness of CDF policies and regulations is 
directly linked with the level of participation in the project implementation. Areas where 
respondents were perceived to possess low level of awareness regarding the CDF matters 
subsequently resulted in low levels of participation. The CDF Act of 2013 (Article 24: 6) invites 
the chairperson of the CDFC in consultation with relevant duty bearers to convene meetings which 
would deliberate development matters in the ward and the constituency. Respondents in this study 
noted, however, that their local leaders and administrators have not done enough to create 
awareness amongst communities. For example, G1 noted that in Gatanga: 
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… [t]here is not enough publication of information for public consumption. For instance, 
communities only see structures being established in their vicinities without knowing the 
origin of those funds or the amount of funds approved to complete such projects. In that case, 
local residents are unable to make follow ups of how such funds are used. 
Figure 4 below is an indication that the CDF office had made some attempts to create awareness 
and relay the CDF project information by displaying it outside the CDF office. However, if 
information is not disseminated to the villages, only a few individuals who visit the CDF office 
and read the content on the notice board would get the information.  In addition, it assumes that 
people are all literate.  As such, one can conclude that in Gatanga, this aspect of the CDF is largely 
neglected. 
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Figure 4: Noticeboard with the CDF Funded Projects Displayed in Gatanga 
 
Source: Field Data (2014) 
As identified by Wabwire (2010: 32), the role of the Publicity Sub Committee (PSC), which is part 
of the National Management Committee (NMC) that is chaired by the Cabinet Secretary in the 
Finance Ministry, is legally bound to create awareness among the public regarding matters 
pertaining to the CDF. The PSC is also charged with the function of responding to issues raised 
by local communities. However Respondent N4 opined that: 
Lack of information and awareness amongst the community in Naivasha is a big challenge. 
If ordinary people at the local level are not trained and given adequate information about 
development opportunities, they are likely to assist in the whole process from project 
identification to the final evaluation after completion.  
A joint collaborative research by KHRC and SPAN (2010: 48) showed that the establishment of 
one-stop-information centre (commonly known as the CDF Constituency Office) was vital because 
ordinary people could seek the CDF related information there.  It was also noted that the creation 
of this “one-stop” shop where all constituency information is stored and disseminated was critical 
to developing an informed citizenry. In this study, results revealed that an overwhelming majority 
of respondents in both constituencies were aware of amount of money set aside for the CDF 
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projects implementation. This could be attributed to the fact that most all respondents selected 
were literate, and not only gathered information from the CDF offices, but also from other media 
such as newspapers and TV. Thus, 42(85.7%) and 39(79.6%) of the respondents in Gatanga and 
Naivasha constituencies respectively indicated that they were aware of amount set aside for the 
CDF project implementation. This study also shows that not merely the awareness of how much 
money was allocated to the CDF is significant, but also how communities’ interests and 
preferences were given attention while selecting and prioritizing projects.  
This study found out that the level of awareness amongst respondents was directly linked with the 
local development outcomes, whether positive or negative. Majority of respondents in Gatanga 
indicated that they were aware of and satisfied with how CDF projects were prioritized. They felt 
that members of the CDFC respected their priorities while allocating funds to local development 
projects. The CDF Act of 2013 (Article 25: 3) tasks the CDFC with the responsibility of funding 
projects in order of community preferences and making sure that the total budget does  not exceed 
the total allocation. The order in which they are listed are therefore to be considered as the order 
in which funds shall be allocated/prioritized; moreover, provided that projects that are still 
ongoing, they shall be considered first. However, an overwhelming majority of respondents in 
Naivasha indicated that they were not aware of or satisfied with how community projects were 
selected or prioritized. They felt that the CDFC excluded them from knowing or participating in 
the selection or prioritization of the CDF funded projects. They indicated that the only projects 
that seemed to receive priority were those coming from individuals or groups that were politically 
connected to the MP or the CDFC members. 
Kimenyi (2005: 2) argues that making local communities aware of how they can participate in 
decision making regarding project identification and resource allocation is critical in determining 
the level and extent of efficiency in delivering development priorities.  
This study has found that the knowledge of how respondents in Gatanga and Naivasha could be 
involved in selecting or determining location of projects is important, but what is even more 
important is to understand whether they were actually involved or participated in those processes 
pertaining to the actual project selection and prioritization, or in decisions with financial 
implications. The following section explores how communities, in the perception of the 
respondents in this study, were actually involved or participated in financial decision making. 
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4.8 Public participation: Financial Decision Making 
This section analyses data pertaining to the extent of participation among constituents in both 
Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies. It compares data to the literature from previous studies 
pertaining to this phenomenon. It also compares and contrasts results and findings from both 
Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies. In the foregoing section, the researcher analyzed data that 
was related to knowledge and awareness that existed among respondents on the CDF policies and 
their implementation. However, it is argued here that having knowledge of development matters 
is one thing, but being involved in the process of actualization is critical. In this section therefore, 
the data is analyzed on the basis of the assumption that if more people actively participate in the 
process from selection, to prioritization, to the implementation process, the more projects will 
receive community ownership and enhance a more diversified economic gain for community 
members.  
The CDF Act of 2013 (Article 24: 6) provides for the community to identify projects that are most 
pressing in their community, and to identify the order of priority to be submitted to the CDFC for 
consideration. In tandem with this provision, perceptions from questionnaire respondents showed 
a sharp contrast between responses from Gatanga from those in Naivasha. While respondents in 
Gatanga unanimously indicated that they were satisfied with how the CDF funded projects were 
identified, a similar number of respondents on the contrary expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
way projects were identified in Naivasha. In addition, when respondents were asked to indicate 
the extent to which communities were given an opportunity/right to participate in selecting and 
prioritizing projects, a majority of respondents in Gatanga were affirmative, while on the contrary, 
majority of respondents in Naivasha strongly disagreed that communities were given the chance 
to participate in the selection and prioritization of CDF funded projects. 
This study argues that participation of local residents in the process of selecting and implementing 
CDF projects was critical to a successful outcome of the Fund. Results of a nationwide survey by 
the National Anti-Corruption Campaign Steering Committee (NACCSC, 2008) showed that 
majority of Kenyans are not given the opportunity to participate in CDF implementation processes. 
Results of perceptions from questionnaire respondents indicated that Gatanga had made significant 
attempts to allow respondents the opportunity to participate in determining the location of projects. 
By contrast, a vast majority of respondents in Naivasha did not agree that members of their 
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constituency had been given the chance to participate in determining locations of the CDF funded 
projects. This study argues that when community members are denied a chance to determine the 
location of projects, there is a likelihood that established projects may not meet the needs of the 
local population. 
This study argues that other than making attempts to understand how local communities in Gatanga 
and Naivasha participate in the selection, prioritization and implementation of the CDF projects, 
it is also critical to understand how these communities participate in monitoring and evaluating the 
performance of CDF projects. This is meant to ensure that the Fund is utilized in accordance with 
the objective of enhancing economic development within the Constituency. Oduor and Achar 
(2012: 4) conducted research which aimed to understand development planning and public 
participation in Kenya, drawing lessons from the CDF, and revealed that there was generally low 
public participation in monitoring and evaluation of the CDF performance.  They found that even 
those that are tasked to officially monitor how this fund were doing a shoddy job of touring the 
constituency without conducting any comprehensive scrutiny.  They observed that CDF lacked a 
detailed monitoring framework which would include the community in the same process.  
This study revealed that about half of the respondents in Gatanga agreed that people were involved 
in following up/monitoring CDF related projects, whereas an overwhelming majority of 
respondents in Naivasha did not agree at all that constituents participated in monitoring the 
performance of CDF funded projects. This study found that there is a link between the level of 
participation of grassroots communities in monitoring and evaluation of the CDF and the level of 
awareness regarding the CDF and their role in its management. Communities view monitoring and 
evaluation of the CDF projects as futile and time consuming,  due to the fact that there are no 
clearly established structures under which their concerns and recommendations could be addressed 
(Oduor and Achar 2012: 4).   
Based on the outcome of data collected from Gatanga and Naivasha, this study argues that citizen 
participation in the management of CDF is one of the critical non-negotiable elements in creating 
sustainable local economic growth and improving livelihoods of local populations. According to 
Oduor and Achar (2012: 1) one of the main rationales behind decentralising funds such as the CDF 
to the constituencies was to engender citizen participation in fiscal management towards 
alleviating poverty and reducing imbalances among special groups in distribution of economic 
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benefits. When the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA, 2006) commissioned a study in 25 
constituencies of the CDF with an aim of establishing whether the constituents were effectively 
involved in the CDF management processes, the study revealed that only 38.7% of constituents  
had participated in the selection and prioritization of projects, 37.8% had participated in 
determining the location of projects, while 35.4% further indicated that they were involved in 
following up and monitoring of projects, while only 22.9% have actively participated in 
management of the CDF funds. This revealed that participation of communities in project 
management was generally low. Similarly, results of perceptions from questionnaire respondents 
revealed that only about half of the respondents in Gatanga agreed that the community members 
were given a chance to participate, or were involved in the CDF fund management, whereas an 
overwhelming majority in Naivasha did not agree.  
One of the main reasons that hinders the public from participating in decisions on CDF utilization 
is linked to political interference of MPs. KHRC and SPAN (2010: 47) show that some MPs have 
resorted to manipulating the reality of constituents’ lack of knowledge and awareness regarding 
the CDF, its policies and guidelines, including their right to participate in the decision making over 
the allocation and implementation of CDF. In this case, MPs found ways to be chairpersons of the 
fund and secure monopoly over all decisions pertaining to the administration of the CDF funds. 
To an extent, they have wanted constituents to believe that the CDF money is their own and that 
they have the right to use it as they see fit. Respondents in Gatanga were fairly satisfied with the 
level of community participation in decision making pertaining to the utilization of the CDF funds, 
whereas an overwhelming majority of respondents in Naivasha indicated that they were 
dissatisfied.   
This study found that in Gatanga, the majority of respondents felt that even though there was a low 
level of awareness regarding CDF policies, the CDF officials made significant attempts to involve 
the local people in the selection, prioritization and utilization of the CDFs.  On the contrary, 
respondents in Naivasha felt that there was no adequate participation of the community regarding 
CDF projects, and that there was limited dissemination of information regarding the CDF 
processes. Largely, they felt that fiscal decisions in Naivasha were made by the political elite in 
the area.  This study argues in favour of public awareness campaigns, and initiatives that increase 
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levels of public participation in CDF processes.  It is felt that these could contribute to the better 
utilisation of the CDF, which in turn could lead to LED to the satisfaction of the local community. 
4.9 Corruption and wasteful expenditure on CDF 
This study has found that despite the fact that local governments are tasked with the mandate of 
administering their own development,  having been allocated specific funds to do so does not 
always translate into positive development impact. Maladministration and corruption by the local 
elite are identified in this study as one of the key factors that hinder the realization of this objective. 
The results of this study indicate that even though the CDF was perceived by majority of 
respondents in Gatanga to be well managed, a few were concerned with the growing elements of 
corruption. For example, G9 presented the emerging dilemma as follows:   
I think that there is good efficiency in the way local government in Gatanga facilitate the 
delivery of economic development through the CDF. However, I am not comfortable when 
I see elements of corruption that goes on in the administration. If such practices are 
entertained and are not challenged, we shall continue to waste a lot of development funds 
that could have been used to uplift this community.  
The study found that an overwhelming majority of respondents in Naivasha were concerned with 
the rife corruption which they blamed for the low levels of the CDF performance. For example, 
N3 put it that: 
Corruption is one of the main challenges that we face in this constituency. Top managers 
and project managers have a tendency of stealing public money that is meant for 
development.  
This is not unique to Naivasha. In fact, Olowu and Wunsh (2004: ix) argue that centralized states 
in Africa have been associated with ‘ineffective, corrupt, and sometimes abusive governance’. By 
adopting decentralization that swept across the African continent from the 1980s, many of these 
states expected to go beyond these inept practices. On the contrary, decentralization has provided 
a safe haven for local officials and political elite to hijack local development funds to advance their 
own interests as well as advance their political agenda. Respondent N3 reported that: 
CDF managers and local politicians divert money geared for development for their own 
selfish interest. Even if you prosecute them through the legal system, these people have their 
way and we have not seen anyone who has been convicted due to embezzlement of public 
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funds. In some instances, people have been taken to court, but all have been acquitted. 
Therefore, there are no strict mechanisms to protect these funds.  
In line with the foregoing argument, respondent N10 upheld that in Naivasha, elite capture has 
hindered local autonomy and has tarnished development projects entangled with corruption: 
I think that Naivasha cannot be said to be in control in managing local development. In fact, 
I think out of the development mandate, they have only accomplished about 10 percent, and 
they have failed in many other ways. A lot of money goes to the friends and relatives of top 
officials at the constituency level, and the fund does not serve the real development need in 
the constituency.  
Critics across the globe have often complained that Kenya’s prevalent and accepted culture of 
corruption and notorious mismanagement of public coffers is ubiquitous, regardless of whether 
such resources are managed by national government, County, or private sectors (Khamadi, 2013). 
N11 concurs with the aforementioned argument:   
Corruption guided by selfish interests does not allow Naivasha to attain its full potential … 
Politicians and their cronies have therefore played a big role in mismanaging public funds 
that could have been used to maintain public infrastructures in this area. 
This study therefore outlines that the culture of corruption in Kenya can affect the implementation 
of the CDF.  In fact, in a comparison between the levels of CDF related corruption between the 
two constituencies, Naivasha has produced the most appalling results.  Results of a report by the 
National Taxpayers Association (NTA, 2012) uncovered critical findings whereby projects funded 
and monitored in the financial year (fy) 2009/10 for Naivasha indicated that Kshs. 8,993,095 of 
the CDF money was wasted on badly implemented projects, amounting to 13% of the total CDF 
funds allocated to the monitored projects in the 2009/10 fy; Kshs. 2,500,000 of taxpayers’ money 
was wasted on abandoned projects, amounting to 4% of the total the CDF funds allocated; 
furthermore, Kshs. 15,377,212 of CDF money went unaccounted for, amounting to 23% of the 
total the CDF funds allocated to the monitored projects in the 2009/10 fy. These damning results 
are evidence that there was huge delay in the delivery of services for communities in Naivasha. 
By contrast, the key findings for the Gatanga projects funded and monitored in the same 2009/10 
fy indicated that there was no CDF money wasted.  In addition, there was no CDF money 
unaccounted for.   
Pursuant with the foregoing argument, the respondents in this study revealed a similar scenario for 
the two constituencies. In Gatanga, where CDF duty bearers were bound to face serious 
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consequences if they were found to embezzle the CDF, there was more success recorded in terms 
of its implementation. On the contrary, in the Naivasha Constituency, where seemingly no 
prosecution for those who embezzled CDF funds was conducted, the outcome of CDF 
implementation was poor. For example, when the respondents were asked whether serious 
implications went against those who mismanaged the CDF in Gatanga, results a majority either 
agreed or strongly disagreed, whereas in Naivasha, results indicate that majority either disagreed 
or strongly disagreed.  
From the interviews, Respondent N1 narrated a scenario that clearly demonstrated how corruption 
had delayed implementation of the CDF in Naivasha:  
When a certain project is approved, it ends up taking a lot of time to see it through due to 
many requirements and bureaucracies before the whole project is executed. It takes longer 
also because those that are responsible in approving these processes also want some 
compensation. Therefore, even if there is something you want signed, the one to authorize 
the signature also expects some reward. Therefore, if you need to buy cement for a tank 
construction, no one will be ready to sign unless there is an agreement of the percentage of 
the money to be rendered to them once the money is approved. Many more officials within 
the hierarchy demand their share, and it ends up that only a shoddy and substandard job is 
done, that takes a long time to complete.  
Similar forms of organized crime have led to huge losses of money that was meant for local 
development to a few individuals. Even though constituencies are calling for an increase in the 
amount of funds disbursed to the constituencies, there is no evidence that funds already 
disseminated have made meaningful impact in Naivasha. Respondent N1 further explored the 
rationale behind many abandoned projects in Naivasha:  
… [i]n a 300,000 project, around 200,000 mostly ends up as rewards to individuals. 
Therefore, after you try to use the remaining 100,000 for the project, it becomes a useless 
job and a waste of public money. That is why we have so many of these abandoned and 
unfinished projects in this constituency. Therefore, in my own opinion, efficiency of local 
development for Naivasha is very poor. 
Respondent N3 also noted that corruption was a major hindrance to effectiveness of the 
implementation of the CDF on local economic development: 
We have witnessed a lot of money that is lost due to corruption driven by greed and self-
centeredness. A lot of projects have taken too long to complete, others have been abandoned, 
and most of the completed projects are in a very poor condition.  
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In tune with the aforesaid, respondent N4 narrated the following example that clearly stands out 
as an example of corrupt practices by the CDF duty bearers.  
… there is a bridge that was proposed to be built in Longonot. The project was allocated an 
amount of about 2 million Kenya shillings.  Yet, if you go there and try to evaluate the 
structure that was eventually constructed, it is not in any way comparable to what was 
proposed. Less money than budgeted was used and the quality of the structure was 
compromised. It was expected that the bridge would be big enough to be used by donkey 
carts, motor bykes, as well as humans. Instead of constructing a concrete structure as it was 
in the plan, materials of lesser quality, timber, was used.  
Figure 5: A poorly constructed  CDF funded bridge in Longonot, Naivasha   
 
Source: Field data (2014) 
In summing up his thoughts while reflecting on the effectiveness of the CDF in Naivasha, N4 
argued that: ‘… effectiveness in the delivery of development in Naivasha faces huge challenges 
created by excessive corruption’.  
N10 pointed out some challenges in his location that affect effectiveness in the delivery of local 
economic goods and pointed out that: 
[t]here is a road construction that was approved and funded for my area. It was supposed to 
cover a distance of about 10 kilometres. On the contrary, contractors only did 1 kilometre 
and the rest was abandoned. In another bridge called Limpopo valley, money of about Ksh 
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500 000 was allocated. After many years now, the project never completed and what remains 
is an incomplete substandard structure. 
Respondent N8 noted that board members at the constituency level are responsible for frustrating 
community members, particularly when they underrate the value of projects proposed by the 
community: 
 If a community proposes a 1 million Kenya shillings project, the board members always 
find ways of approving a much lower budget. This compromises the quality and the outcome 
of the project proposed. Either, the community will end up with a substandard structure, or 
it will end up as an abandoned project. Top managers also take this chance to steal some of 
this money. They expect project owners to refund some cash once the money has been 
approved. 
Respondent N11 saw political interference as a major cause of interruption in the project 
implementation process: 
Effectiveness is particularly challenged by political interference in the project 
implementation process. They appoint their own people to manage these funds, a practice 
that compromises on the quality of projects supported. Many of these political appointees 
are involved in corrupt practices by stealing a lot of these funds under the patronage of their 
clients. It is therefore clear that there is a big gap in the management of these funds, and if 
only this fund can be well managed, it can be of great boost for local development. 
The Scoping Paper on CDFs (Tshangana, 2010: 11) in Kenya raises concerns that corruption is a 
common thread associated with the implementation of the CDF since its inception in 2003. Public 
surveys as well as individual case studies (including the outcomes of this study particularly for 
Naivasha Constituency) have highlighted grave concerns by constituents based on their perception 
on the CDF corrupt practices across the country.  Some forms of corruption identified by 
Tshangana (2010: 11) included:  
 Funding of non-priority projects which benefit a particular few, or are ‘quick-wins’ as 
opposed to more long-term development projects which are difficult to implement. 
 Favouring of particular geographic areas of MP support in selecting projects 
 Collusion in the awarding of tenders and committee officials/MPs acting as suppliers  
 Bribery in order to secure contracts 
 Double-funding of projects 
 Starting new projects instead of following through on the implementation of existing ones, 
in order for an MP to tie their name to particular project and point to their impact 
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 Tendering and procurement procedures are unclear and tenders are unadvertised. Single 
sourcing and irregular expenditure may result. 
 Poor or little contract management, leading to contractors being paid for incomplete work 
or sub-standard work. 
In addition to the above stated forms of corruption and unclear deals, this research found that there 
were respondents in both constituencies that were not aware of the channels to follow if they were 
to lay complaints about corrupt officials in the CDF.   These respondents felt frustrated that that 
no one was ready to listen to them even if they were to lay claims against corrupt officials 
pertaining to CDF funds.  If this is the case – in other words, if that there are no official channels 
in place, than this is a serious shortcoming for the integrity of the CDF. 
4.10 CDF accountability and transparency  
Accountability and transparency can play a key role in the implementation of the CDF.  In a 
previous study, Auya and Oino (2013: 311) argue that if the CDF is to achieve its desired ends in 
local economic development, fundamental principles of accountability and transparency cannot be 
ignored. It was one of the objective of this study to establish whether the CDF funds in Naivasha 
and Gatanga were administered in transparent and accountable manner. The data gathered during 
the course of this study points to the significance of accountability and transparency in Naivasha 
and Gatanga.  Based on the interview and questionnaire responses as well as observations, one can 
argue that there was a relationship between accountability and transparency of the CDF, and the 
development outcomes recorded in Gatanga and Naivasha.  The officials involved in LED projects 
in Gatanga felt that the CDF was administered in a transparent and accountable manner and they 
felt that this explained why their projects were successful. In Naivasha however, officials 
explained that LED projects were not implemented in a transparent and accountable manner, nor 
was it always clear how the CDF funds were being utilized.  It was hard to tell which projects 
could be attributed to CDF funding.   
CDF duty bearers are legally committed to ensure that the Fund is administered in an accountable 
and transparent manner, and this seems to be the case in Gatanga.  In turn, this will build more 
trust and confidence between them and their constituents. On the contrary, when duty bearer 
conceal the operations of the Fund from their local populations, as many of the local economic 
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development officers felt was the case in Naivasha, trust and support in the activities of the CDF 
duty bearers wanes.  This could be at the expense of the overall development of the constituency.  
Other studies on the CDF have highlighted daunting evidence the regarding lack of transparency 
and accountability among constituencies in Kenya. For example, results of a nationwide survey 
conducted by the Kenya Institute of Public Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), found that only a 
paltry 15% of the respondents believed there was accountability and transparency in the 
management of the CDF money while a vast 46% believed the cash to be widely mismanaged.  
Of the two constituencies studied, Naivasha was found to be lacking the most in accountability 
and transparency. At the time of the research, the sight of the following water project was an 
example of a CDF funded project that was never held to account:  
 
 
Figure 6: Abandoned Water Project in Longonot, Naivasha Constituency  
 
Source: Field Data (2014) 
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Figure 21 above shows a water project that was started on the 22 July 2009. As per the inscription, 
the water project was completed on the 5 November 2009. However, by mere observation, and to 
the knowledge of the community members, this water project was never completed and since then 
it has not come into operation. This is a good example of how public money through the CDF’s 
shoddy projects in Naivasha was misused. The inscription on the water tank shows that 
Ksh100,000 was spent on the project. This means that all money allocated to the project went 
unaccounted for and did not help the community to improve water supply. Yet, no subsequent 
funds were allocated to complete this and similar abandoned project.   Community development 
workers interviewed  felt there was no transparency in how the money was spent (or not spent). 
The CDF Act 2013, section 24(14) demands that members of the CDFC committee, who are 
charged with the allocation and implementation of the CDF funds may be removed from office 
due to the lack of the following values and principles that are associated with accountability and 
transparency: (a) lack of integrity; (b) gross misconduct; (c) embezzlement of public funds; (d) 
bringing the image of the committee into disrepute through unbecoming personal public conduct; 
(e) promoting unethical practices in the management of the CDF.  However, of interest was that 
many of the respondents in Gatanga and Naivasha felt that, to their knowledge, those held 
responsible for the mismanagement of the CDF funds had yet to be held to account.  This study 
argues that the ability to hold CDF duty bearers accountable is critical to the successful 
implementation of the CDF Fund.   If there are no proper channels in place, or if no actions are 
taken to hold miscreants to account, public fiscal resources will continue to be lost and poor 
management structures that do not respond to the needs of the local population will spread.  
Another reason why it is important to have a strong independent system of accountability and 
transparency is that it will minimize the impact of political interference.  Some respondents made 
reference to community development workers and officials feeling too uncomfortable to enquire 
how the Fund is being administered.   They feel it is not their place to demand from their leaders 
to account for how they have administered the Fund.  In addition, community workers explained 
that protests are often motivated by a lack accountability and transparency.   In the modern social, 
political and economic arena, one of the common ways in which societies display their 
unhappiness with how public matters are handled/implemented is through protests. In some 
societies, members of the public do not protest, either for lack of information that they actually 
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have the right to do so, or are afraid of a repressive power regime. A number of the CDF related 
protests have been witnessed across the country. For example, one of the ways in which members 
of the public in Kacheliba Constituency demanded accountability through protests about their area 
MP was over the composition of the CDFC. In their protests, the constituents claimed that the 
CDFC recruits were political cronies and relatives of the area MP, hence could not be effective in 
their work (Ochieng & Ruth, 2009: 5). In fact the irony of the CDFC recruitment is that it is the 
MP who convenes the public meeting from which the CDFC members are selected, and forms part 
of the committee as an ex official member (CDF Act 2013 Section 24(3). This process is therefore 
exposed to manipulation and abuse of office. 
Similarly, Masawa (cited in Ochieng and Ruth, 2013: 5) found that a lack of accountability by the 
MPs over the CDFs has tarnished the objectives of the Fund. MPs have constantly been accused 
of manipulating the Act in order to achieve their own selfish ends. Complaints have been levelled 
that MPs are appointing relatives, close friends and political allies to head offices such CDFC, a 
phenomenon that has significantly contributed to lack of transparency in the CDF Fund.  
Of the two constituencies in this study, a number of CDF related protests were recorded in 
Naivasha. However, respondents pointed out that issues raised during protests are rarely 
considered or investigated, hence people became apathetic.  Respondent N10 made an attempt to 
diagnose why constituents in Naivasha do not protest by demanding accountability over the 
administration of CDF funds: 
Local people are not proactive people in standing for their own rights. Here, people absorb 
oppression without complaining. Their ways of expressing themselves are very mild. I have 
only seen them come to complain about the CDF to my office but I have not seen them lodge 
open protests on the streets. 
Despite a general poor performance of the CDF implementation particularly in Naivasha, members 
of the community have decided not to take action and demand accountability from their leaders.  
There almost seems to be a sense of hopelessness.  This type of apathy emphasizes the need for an 
independent system of accountability and transparency over the CDF. 
In constituencies that have embraced best practices in the administration and implementation of 
CDF, accountability and transparency were seen to be instrumental in the procurement of various 
CDF projects’ tenders. Open and accountable CDF transactions mitigated conflicts among the 
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CDFC members and between the people and the CDFC. For example, evidence from Dagoretti 
showed that advertising openly for the tenders to the members of the public and opening the tenders 
on the same day by the CDFC in front of all bidders has reduced corruption in tendering processes 
giving credibility to the CDFC. The fact that the successful bidder is selected on the basis of quality 
and price eliminated favouritism. This also enhanced interaction between the successful bidder 
and members of the community, with members of the public giving support to the successful bidder 
in implementing the particular project (Kimani, Nekesa and Ndungu, 2009: 41-42). When 
community development officials were asked to indicate whether they thought there was fairness 
and transparency in the procurement of the CDF related tenders, the majority of those in Gatanga 
either remained neutral or agreed. On the contrary, an overwhelming majority of those in Naivasha 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed that there was fairness and transparency in the procurement 
of tenders in their constituency. The fact that tendering processes for CDF projects are concealed 
from the public renders the values of accountability and transparency questionable among CDF 
duty bearers.  
Research conducted by Kimani, Nekesa, and Ndungu (2009: 42) found that in the South Imenti 
and Kabete constituencies, giving priority to local bidders/tenderers was noted to have reduced 
conflicts and had improved relations among successful bidders and constituents. This was also 
vital to the enhancement of the sense of ownership of the CDF funded projects. When these 
processes are conducted in a transparent manner, they have a potential to increase accountability 
of the CDF duty bearers to the community. The perception from the questionnaire respondents 
indicated that majority of respondents in Gatanga indicated that they were satisfied with the 
accountability of the CDF duty bearers to the community. On the contrary, an overwhelming 
majority of respondents to the questionnaire in Naivasha felt dissatisfied with the accountability 
of the CDF duty bearers to the community.  
 
However, Oduor and Achar (2012: 2) remain critical of the CDF Act:  in as much as it provides 
general principles that may facilitate accountability and transparency, there are no legal provisions 
entrenched in the Act that allows the community to engage legally while demanding accountability 
of monies assigned to the CDF from duty bearers. This study notes that MPs and members of the 
CDFC manipulate the ignorance of their constituents and make it difficult for them to demand for 
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accountability.  In general, as found by Oduor and Achar (2012: 4) there is a tendency for the CDF 
duty bearers to conceal information on the CDF funded projects from their communities. In some 
instances, members of the public have to seek permission from MPs or the CDF board secretariat 
before they can be allowed to conduct a social audit of the CDF funded projects.  
4.11 Outcome of CDF in Gatanga and Naivasha 
This study found that while understanding the values and principles regulating the implementation 
of the CDF in Gatanga and Naivasha, respondents were also keen to underscore the outcome, either 
successes or failures, of this intervention on key LED related sectors namely: employment; special 
projects for special groups such as women and youth; agriculture, education, healthcare, security, 
and other physical infrastructure such as roads.  
There are several pointers in the CDF Act, 2013 that have been put in place to guide the allocation 
and implementation of the CDF funds: Special consideration for projects that are likely to benefit 
special groups such as youth, women and persons with disabilities (Section 24); funding in order 
of priority (Section 25); priority given to ongoing projects to avoid scenarios of abandoned projects 
(Section 25); Some of these include: critical areas for development such as education (Section 26). 
In this study, when the respondents were asked whether CDF projects were fairly distributed in 
the constituency, an overwhelming majority of respondents in Gatanga indicated that they either 
agreed or strongly agreed that the CDF projects were fairly distributed in the constituency. On the 
other side, respondents in Naivasha either unanimously disagreed or strongly disagreed that the 
CDF projects were fairly distributed in the constituency. Based on numerous abandoned projects 
in Naivasha, it is clear that CDF managers in this constituency do not follow the basic principle of 
finishing ongoing projects first before they undertake new ones. The study also found that since 
the CDF managers are not keen to fund key priority community projects, but tend to fund projects 
that will serve their political self-interest.  
This study wanted to understand whether the CDF was vital in creating job opportunities for local 
residents. In their earlier research findings, Simiyu, Mweru, and Omete (2014) pointed out that the 
CDF has been responsible for creating job opportunities for local residents. However, they argued 
that the CDF only offers these job opportunities on a small scale. They have identified areas in 
which the CDF has largely contributed in creating job opportunities namely: the CDF office staffs, 
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supply of materials and services to CDF projects - mainly manual temporary jobs - and allowances 
for various CDFC members. They particularly highlighted one of the major challenge in 
employment creation  by the CDF related projects is that major projects are taken by non-locals 
due to lack of capacity by constituency members. In most instances, contractors come with their 
work force limiting the number of jobs created for the locals and limiting income levels accessed 
locally.  
In essence, the CDF Act of 2013 sees this fund as an opportunity to tap local skills and develop 
others through the CDF funded projects. In Respondent G7’s view, the CDF in Gatanga made 
significant steps towards the ‘enhancement of local economic development by building and 
maintaining local public infrastructure”. However, it is also notable that the CDF does not have 
a huge impact while adding up to jobs created. The projects are rather limited in scope and suffer 
from insufficient funding. That notwithstanding, majority of respondents in Gatanga indicated that 
they were satisfied with jobs created through the intervention of the CDF. For example, as G3’s 
posited: 
The CDF should be in a position to create especially for our young people. As an 
administrator in this hospital, it is my job to make sure that I have created job opportunities 
especially those that might help local communities. Whenever there are jobs that relate to 
the hospital, I always make sure that young people that are recruited in such projects are 
tapped from the local community. At every level of job advertised, the hospital management 
makes it as an obligation first and foremost to tap local talent and skills before such positions 
are opened to people outside this area. 
However, some communities expressed their concerns regarding how these jobs are advertised and 
how the recruitment is conducted. For example, G9 was concerned that:  
The community is not aware of how these employments are done since available positions 
are not advertised to the public. In other instances, even if these positions are advertised, 
you will find that those to occupy them are already selected.  
The confidence over jobs created was not the case in Naivasha where majority of the respondents 
showed their utmost dissatisfaction. This is largely attributed to termination of their jobs when 
funding for the projects is interrupted leading to projects being stalled or abandoned entirely.  
This study was also concerned to find out how the CDF had participated in funding projects that 
promoted the interests of women in Gatanga and Naivasha. Women, in most societies, are 
categorised as a group that has been traditionally marginalised from accessing economic 
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opportunities resulting from highly partriarchal societies. Many governments have established 
various funding initiatives as an attempt to address these imbalances. The Governemnt of Kenya 
has put in place a number of interventions that are aimed at empowering women in their 
participation in economic development. The initiatives are also geared to improve economic status  
of women. These funds are:  Women’s Enterprise Fund (WEF), Youth Enterprise Fund (YEF), 
and Uwezo Fund (UF), among others. It was therefore of interest to this study to discover if  
particular attention had been given to projects promoting the interests of women. 
In his study, Gituto (2007: 27) remained critical that the CDF allocation criteria excluded interests 
for crucial groups such as the women constituency. Results from questionnaire respondents 
indicate that an overwhelming majority of respondents in Gatanga confidently agreed that the CDF 
had established projects that targeted the promotion of women economic development. For 
example, a number of maternity sections have been added to local clinics. In addition, more CDF 
bursaries in Gatanga were targeted for female applicants. On the contrary, majority of the 
respondents in Naivasha did not agree that the CDF projects established in the constituency were 
targeted to promote women economic development. This was largely attributed to the fact that the 
implementation of the CDF in Naivasha was not guided by policy but had been distorted by corrupt 
means seeking to satisfy individual and political interests.  
The youth is another crucial group that is commonly targed by government projects. It was 
therefore of  interest  to this study to understand how the CDF had been utilized to support youth 
projects in Gatanga and Naivasha. The youth, commonly understood to be between the age of 18-
35 in Kenya, constitute a huge potential working force. However,  more often than not, they 
struggle to find employment, mainly due to their lack of significant experience, or are devoid of 
sufficient skills and qualifications (Muna et al. 2014: 1388). The current  study has noted that other 
studies provide evidence that the CDF’s intention  to address issues that promote youth economic 
development are insufficiently implemented.. This is highly likely attributable to the existence of 
other projects earmarked for funding youth initiatives such as: The Kenya Youth Empowerment 
Project which was initiated in 2009 by the Government of Kenya supported by World Bank to  
improve skills and training for the youth and expand their employability; Youth Enterprise 
Development Fund; and Uwezo Fund. Nevertheless, Gituto (2007: 27) remains critical that the 
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CDF allocation criteria has excluded popular participation from crucial groups such as the youth 
constituency.   
The results of this study found that youth projects, like other development projects in the country, 
initiated by the CDF have faced  immense challenges. Many projects that were proposed and funds 
allocated with the objective of empowering young people with skills and job opportunities have 
stalled and been abandoned. An example can be found inn Kisii, as demonstrated by Kabui and 
Obebo (2015), where a multi-million shilling CDF funded youth centre was erected at Gesusu. It 
is more than seven years now since the commencement of the project and the structure has started 
to rot, while incomplete. 
The results of the current  research found that majority of respondents in Gatanga (see the figure 
below) were satisfied with how the CDF enhanced youth economic development. G6 was of the 
view that ‘CDF has brought an opportunity for money to be managed at the local level and has 
facilitated job creation especially among young people’. The figure is an example of a Youth 
Polytechnic that has been directly funded by the CDF in order to promote skills development 







Figure 7: Youth Polytechnic Funded by the CDF in Kirwara, Gatanga Constituency 
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Source: Field Data (2014) 
Figure 25 above provides visual evidence that the CDF in Gatanga successfully funds youth skills 
training in the constituency.  In accordance with the overwhelmingly positive response in Gatanga 
regarding the CDF’s support of the youth constituency.   
On the contrary, majority of questionnaire respondents in Naivasha did not agree that the CDF 
targeted projects that addressed issues that promoted youth economic development. This research 
establishes the need for the CDF to create opportunities for youth to participate in procurement of 
tenders, recruit them for skills training, and also in the construction of CDF funded structures.  
 
 
This study found that role of the CDF in supporting agriculture is critical towards enhancing local 
economic development and sustaining livelihoods among local communities. Agriculture is core 
not only in providing work opportunities to grassroots communities, it is also a source of 
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consolidating food security essential for sustaining communities. Respondent N5 expressed 
frustrations faced while trying to access professional help through for some of the CDF funded 
projects: 
Many of the agricultural officers that we consult locally are full of empty promises. They 
always promise to visit our farms but they never show up. For example, since last year, they 
came to us and advised us to dig trenches that would assist in banana production. We took 
the initiatives to dig out those trenches. Eventually, they disappeared and have never returned 
to show the kind of farming they wanted to initiate. This tells us that local government 
officials are not efficient at all, and do very little from their offices. Yet, they continue to 
enjoy their salaries despite their meagre output.  
This study found that in Gatanga, smallholder farmers’ groups have acknowledged that accessing 
subsidies through the CDF on agricultural products such as fertilizers has boosted their production. 
However, respondents in this study were concerned that CDF has not sufficiently been able to 
support agriculture in Gatanga and Naivasha either through credit or subsidies. G1 maintained that 
Gatanga has the potential to sustain its economic development growth path through agriculture: 
‘We grow coffee which has the potential of generating a lot of revenue’. However, he laid blame 
on local politicians and argued that:  
Unfortunately, our leaders promise us to protect coffee prices but on the contrary, prices 
have continued to drop. As individual farmers, we feel that we are being exploited and are 
not supported enough by the government to get adequate value for our efforts. The 
unfortunate thing is that when we elect these people, they make big promises, but when they 
get into power they easily forget and no longer show interest in people’s affairs. 
Bearing in mind that agriculture is the main contributor to the Kenyan economy, with a record of 
contributing about 26% to the GDP, and amounting to about 60 percent of total employment 
opportunities in Kenya, local funds such as the CDF should therefore not ignore supporting such 
a critical sector. Respondent G5 presented a similar argument as G1 above and noted that:  
Gatanga is endowed with many natural and human resources. Gatanga has good weather that 
favors agriculture. Food production and daily farming are a real source of revenue for the 
local people. What the CDF needs is good management from our leaders. 
In addition, Ochieng, Chepkuto, Tubey & Kuto, (2012), argue that one of the major rationales 
behind the establishment of the CDF was to improve livelihoods by raising incomes through 
agricultural, commercial, and industrial enterprises in all constituencies. Other than a direct 
intervention in agriculture, when CDF funds infrastructural projects like maintaining local roads, 
agricultural products will easily access the markets. Respondent G5 ascertained the potential of 
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Gatanga from the perspective of its proximity to big cities and maintained that ‘Gatanga is close 
to big cities like Thika and Nairobi, and business thrive due to good transport and communication 
facilities’. 
According to the Kenya Public Financing on Agriculture (PFA Report, 2014), agriculture remains 
the mainstay of the Kenyan economy with a direct contribution of about 26% of the annual GDP 
with an additional 26% indirect contribution. Agriculture is also seen as a key sector in job 
creation, currently providing about 18% of the formal employment and over 60% in the informal 
employment.  In the current study, Respondent G8 argued that the CDF should be directed towards 
empowering agriculture because it has a potential of accelerating more growth of the local 
economy:  
Local government has a role to play in helping local communities in accessing markets for 
their produce. For example, if I have a banana plantation, or I am rearing chicken, it is 
important to have somewhere I can sell whatever I produce, that is, having a ready market. 
Let me give you an example, there were some people that had started a certain project of 
rearing genetically modified chicken, which had been introduced to farmers. People 
struggled to gather some money and erected structures for these chicken. But after they 
matured, people started complaining that there is no ready market. At the end, it becomes a 
futile effort and creates for frustration for farmers. Therefore, even if the government is 
encouraging many of us to avoid overcrowding the cities looking for jobs and instead return 
to the Counties and take advantage of local opportunities; then when one comes to try such 
a business and it fails, he/she ends up becoming more frustrated. If there is a strategic 
planning facilitated by our local government, where farmers are able to access ready market 
for their produce, we would never find any reason of leaving this place to seek for jobs in 
urban areas. This would actually make life at the local level much affordable because we 
would not even need to buy food or struggle with house rentals as people in urban areas do. 
A study that was conducted by Kimani, Nekesa, and Ndungu (2009: 29) reveals that in South 
Imenti, the CDF was instrumental in enhancing agricultural productivity by providing seeds to 
farmers at subsidized rates. Farmers were able to pay up to 50% of the total cost of seeds for tissue-
cultured banana seedlings. In the current study, Respondents from Gatanga also expected that the 
CDF should be used to subsidize them on farming products. As G10 opined: 
The CDF should be used to improve food production structures. This is because even though 
we direct much of the money to improving road infrastructure, yet people are hungry, such 
initiatives remain futile. 
The results of this study highlight frustrations by many respondents, particularly those in Gatanga 
that bases its economy solely on food production. They were concerned that very little attention 
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has been paid on supporting agricultural initiatives through the CDF. Other constituencies like 
Imenti cited boosted agriculture through subsidies on agricultural products. If the CDF is to record 
a significant and meaningful support for local communities in Gatanga and Naivasha, support for 
agricultural linked initiatives must be strategized and prioritized.  Hitherto, funding on agricultural 
related projects and initiatives in Gatanga and Naivasha through the CDF remains insignificant.   
This study was also concerned to understand the effects of the CDF on education. There is a 
common consensus that education is one of the key drivers of economic development. According 
to G6: 
Whenever a constituency like this invests in education, there is no doubt that development 
will surely emerge. If we have a lot of illiteracy, such that learners do not continue with 
education after completing primary school, then there will be no relevant development in 
this area. Education has the potential to bring change; it has also the potential to bring about 
development. In fact, was it not for education, our leaders would not be in a position to take 
up position of leadership. Even for me, was I not to pass through education, I would not 
manage to conduct my duties as chief. 
The manner in which the CDF funded structures in education and learners evoked varying feelings 
amongst the respondents in Gatanga and Naivasha. Ng’alu and Bomett (2014: 429) argue that the 
lack of bursary fund to support poor students, particularly in secondary school, has increasingly 
been associated with some of the commonly known factors that restrain countries to pursue 
effective economic growth and development policies. The CDF policy guideline considers 
education bursary scheme as a development project for the purposes of this Act, provided that such 
an Act, provided that such a project shall not be allocated more than 10% of the total funds 
allocated for the constituency in any financial year (Section 25 of CDF Act of 2003).  
In North Mugirango Constituency, the introduction of the CDF has been identified with 
significance as one of the main fund that has continually supported education and educational 
structures since its inception in 2003. The results indicated that most local people were able to 
access education more easily now than before CDF was introduced (Auya & Oino, 2013: 311). 
The current study notes that the CDF is intended to fund education through bursaries particularly 
to the poor as a critical driver to stimulating local development. However, respondents in Naivasha 
noted that the help offered to poor students is insignificant. For example, respondent N10 
maintained that: 
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In the education sector, we find that many of our students from poor background owe a lot 
of money to their institutions. When they apply for bursary through the CDF, they receive 
very insignificant amounts that barely make any difference. For example, if a student owes 
the institution an equivalent of Ksh 60,000, getting a bursary of Ksh 2,000 is so little that 
hardly makes an impact. 
This study argues that the CDF is not equitably distributed to poor and deserving students and that 
many students from poor families still cannot afford to finance their education despite CDF 
intervention. When the researcher asked respondents of both Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies 
the extent to which they agreed that the CDF assisted poor students with bursaries, majority of the 
respondents in Gatanga either agreed or strongly agreed while those in Naivasha disagreed or 
strongly disagreed. As N2 contended: 
Corruption is one of the major challenges that face the implementation of the CDF in this 
constituency. For example, it has come out clear that money set out for bursaries only go 
to children of those that are known to the officials. Children of principals of schools are 
being funded by the CDF bursary fund, yet, children of parents that are most in need go 
without financial support. 
Despite satisfaction with how CDF had supported education by the majority of respondents in 
Gatanga, G4 was concerned with deteriorating quality of education in Gatanga:   
CDF should also be used to support and educational structures such as schools. The level of 
education in this constituency has continuously regressed. In the last couple of months, the 
area MP has continuously emphasized on the need to support education in the constituency. 
He has called all that are concerned to prioritize education as one of the drivers of 
development.  
This study found that majority of respondents in Gatanga were satisfied with the intervention of 
the CDF on education. However, some felt that the Fund was insufficient while others contended 
the transparency in selecting the neediest learners as beneficiaries of the Fund. However, majority 
of respondents in Naivasha were dissatisfied with the extent of intervention of CDF on education. 
Corruption was highlighted as the main hindrance either in relation to the determination of the 
amount of funds allocated or even in process of beneficiary selection.    
This study has found that the CDF is a key local funding initiative that was expected to support 
and improve local infrastructure development. In the view of Simiyu, Mweru, and Omete (2014) 
the CDF has been a vital strategic driver whose main objective is largely aimed at supporting local 
development infrastructure. The current study found that many rural roads in Gatanga had been 
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repaired and maintained through the CDF. This improvement has not only eased the movement 
within the region, but also produced other positive effects in other sectors such as agriculture by 
facilitating easier delivery of their produce to the markets. However, despite a lot on money being 
allocated to refurbish local roads in Naivasha, majority of those roads are easily washed away by 
heavy rains or stall due to insufficient funding, mostly lost through corrupt deals. For example, as 
N3 lamented: 
The nature of our roads, especially those that connect the rural areas are impassable. A lot 
of these roads that have been eroded by heavy rains have not been maintained and no proper 
drainage system has been installed. I think that the CDF has not been utilized well enough 
to support infrastructure development in this area.  
G10 argued for an improved health infrastructure, stating that ‘if local communities are healthy, 
they are able to bring significant impact to the economy ... the CDF should pay more attention to 
health’. Most respondents in Gatanga pointed out that majority of the health facilities (see an 
example in Figure 26) have been funded by the CDF. The researcher’s observation in the 
constituency also confirmed this fact. CDF funded health centres were found in almost every 
village in Gatanga. The fund has either been used to build community health dispensaries or to 
supplement supply of drugs to hospitals and other health centres. Figure 26 below shows Mukarara 
Community Dispensary built over a period of 2 and a half years from July 2006 to 2008. The 
inscription also shows that a cumulative 2.35 million was spent.  
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Figure 8: Mukarara Community Dispensary, Funded by the CDF in Gatanga 
  
Source: Field Data (2014) 
In the Kimilili constituency, results of a study conducted by Simiyu, Mweru, and Omete (2014: 
42) revealed that together with road infrastructure, health centres and health facilities were the 
highest funded by the CDF in that constituency at 14.2%.  
According to N2, the health sector in Naivasha has not been allocated sufficient funding, or rather, 
funds allocated do not end up fulfilling their objectives due to corruption or mismanagement. As 
N2 contended:  
… the whole of this area is served by two small clinics, yet nurses do not even reside here. 
They commute daily to Naivasha Town because there are no structures put up for their 
accommodation. When one gets sick in the night, it is always a big challenge to access 
medical attention. The CDF should therefore be used to enhance health structures in order 
to ensure that community health needs are efficiently supplied. 
A study that was conducted by Auya and Oino (2013: 311) found that there has been a positive 
impact in the health sector since the introduction of the CDF in 2003 in the North Mugirango 
constituency.    
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Another issue which emerged during the course of this study was the perceptions of selected 
respondents regarding the extent to which CDF had contributed towards the improvement of 
community safety and security.  G6 put the issue of security in the perspective of local economic 
development and argued that ‘… there is no development that can be established anywhere without 
security’.  He explained that a positive outcome of CDF funding was the establishment of police 
administration blocks across the constituency. Figure 28 below shows an example of completed 
administration blocks for the Administration Police in Gatanga.  
Figure 9: Administration Police’ Blocks funded by the CDF in Mabanda, Gatanga 
Constituency 
 
Source: Field Data (2014) 
In the Kimilili constituency, the CDF was also used to fund the construction of various security 
administrative units that included 10 chief’s offices, 6 administrative police camps, 3 police posts 
and residential rooms in various police stations across the constituency.  This, the authors argued, 
led to a significant reduction in the local crime rate, making the area more conducive for LED. 
(Simiyu, Mweru, & Omete, 2014: 44). A respondent in Gatanga, G1, emphasized the need for 
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completing the security infrastructure in Gatanga.  He was concerned that in some areas, finished 
blocks have not been supplied with security personnel:  
There are many police posts established all over the constituency. Despite efforts supported 
by the previous administration, many of these established structures are without security 
personnel. Therefore, more intervention needs to done in order to bring these centres into 
full operation. 
In Naivasha, community workers had not succeeded in implementing any safety or security 
development programmes through the CDF.  A number of proposals had been submitted either to 
build police posts or Chiefs’ administration blocks for more personnel but most of these if not all 
have failed to complete. N1 narrated a scenario of a funded project that was never started, yet the 
cash had been disbursed: 
For example, there was a time when we were allocated an equivalent of Kshs 300,000 to 
build residential structures for the police administration. This was planned with an aim of 
enhancing security within the area. At the end, even though we knew that money had been 
approved and was disbursed to commence the project, none of that happened. Years have 
passed now, the money disappeared, and the project never started. When we attempted to 
follow up, no one really explained to us about how that money was accounted for. 
Eventually, we got tired of tracing that money because we realized that we continued losing 
more of our own money, yet no one was willing to do any investigation into the matter.  
In addition to the failure of the CDF to reform the security sector in Naivasha, N7 contended: 
Security in this constituency is very poor. The entire region in this area has been given only 
five police officers. Land to build houses for their accommodation is readily available, and 
very little CDF funds have been allocated, resulting to only shoddy houses being erected. 
From the above, it appears as if the CDF has been utilized more effectively in the Gatanga 
Constituency than in Naivasha.  First-hand observation demonstrated clear examples of 
successfully completed local economic development initiatives funded by the CDF.  These projects 
improved the overall infrastructure profile of the constituency, making it conducive for further 
economic development.  It could be reasoned that if the CDF continues to be utilized in Gatanga 
in this manner, it could eventually become fiscally independent from national government – and 
fiscal decentralization can finally be regarded as devolved.  There was sufficient evidence to 
conclude that CDF had made significant strides in providing jobs for the local community on the 
CDF related projects. There was also a significant boost in agriculture sector, education, health, as 
well as security. Members of Gatanga community were able to access better learning facilities, 
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nearer schools, hospitals, and police posts. In fact, at the time when this data was collected on site, 
it was almost impossible not to site a CDF funded project in almost every 2-3 kilometer radius. 
This was not the case for Naivasha; in as much as it was rare to locate a CDF funded project across 
the constituency, the visible ones were dilapidated, abandoned and poorly constructed. Most 
respondents had negative sentiments regarding how the CDF had been managed to realize their 
aspirations regarding local economic development.   In this context, the CDF is unable to nurture 
and promote fiscal decentralization.  In fact, it justifies the critics’ calls for more national 
government involvement.  The nature of this involvement is crucial.   This thesis argues that 
political leadership plays a key role in whether or not the CDF can promote fiscal decentralization 
or not. 
4.12 Analysis of leadership role in the implementation of the CDF 
This study has identified that the quality of leadership/leaders that oversee the implementation of 
the CDF, and their political will is critical in defining resultant local growth and development. Van 
Zyl (2010) argues that decisions about how the CDF funds are assigned and utilized depend on the 
elected Members of Parliament (MPs). The degree to which these funds are controlled by the 
parliamentarians, and their impact on respective constituents, vary from one constituency to 
another. In their responses, respondents in the current study all highlighted the significant role 
played by MPs in the allocation and overall implementation. Their behaviour, attitudes, political 
will or lack thereof, determined the outcome of development and confidence among constituents 
in respective Naivasha and Gatanga constituencies.  
The literature on decentralisation and local economic development points to the significance of 
local leadership in LED (Diamond, 1987, OECD, 2015).  This study found interesting echoes of 
the connection between local leadership, the implementation of the CDF and LED in both the 
Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies.  Respondents in Gatanga largely attributed the successful 
implementation of CDF funded LED projects to a committed local leadership. The respondents 
perceived their MPs, since the inception of the CDF in 2003, as competent and enthusiastic in 
utilizing locally available funds to support of local development. However, in Naivasha, the 
majority of respondents did not believe that their local leaders were well prepared, or rather, had 
sufficient political will to implement local economic development policies, and represent their 
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development needs at higher forums where such policies are debated.   They felt that their leaders 
were not motivated to serve the public interest but their own. 
In the questionnaire conducted in this study, respondents were asked whether they believed that 
their leaders had shown enough commitment to ensure that policies regulating the operations of 
CDF were efficiently implemented. The perceptions of questionnaire respondents indicated that 
the majority of those from Gatanga believed that their leaders showed sufficient commitment in 
ensuring that CDF policies were efficiently implemented to support development at the local level. 
On the contrary, results indicated that the majority of respondents in Naivasha did not believe that 
their leaders had done enough to ensure that CDF policies were efficiently implemented to enhance 
local development.   
Respondents felt that their national leaders had specific roles and responsibilities.  As noted by the 
Kenya Department of Parliamentary Research Services (KDPRS, 2008), MPs universally are 
expected to execute five major roles namely: making legislation; making budgetary allocations; 
oversight; representing constituencies; appointing government officials (the Executive). In most 
cases, constituents genuinely expect their MPs to do regular visits and attend to most of their public 
functions like public meetings and making visits to community projects in progress.  In the current 
study, Respondent N1 indicated that they were not convinced that their elected MPs sufficiently 
represented their local development preferences:  
During elections, we always give our agenda that include our wishes to our leaders. But 
when they go to the national level, they push their own agenda and not what we have sent 
them to represent us. They do not discuss the development wishes of the people. After 5 
years of their electoral terms, you will find that they have not done what we voted them to 
do. So they return to us during elections, and we present them the same concerns. So we 
have been on the same things in and out. 
Presenting the same argument in different words, N1 further noted with concern that those they 
vote to parliament to plead for them only:  
 [t]ake their own interests and therefore, there is nothing of what we send them that gets 
represented at that higher level. Our leaders have a tendency of not talking in parliament 
regarding the things that ask them to. They end up concerning themselves with other issues 
that have nothing to do with the developmental wishes of the constituents. Therefore, we 
always find ourselves rotating at the same point without making any development. 
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On the other side, there is positive perception among majority of respondents in Gatanga, who 
believe that their local leaders have shown considerable commitment to enhancing local economic 
development. For example, respondent G7 was quoted saying:  
Our MPs have done well in terms of representing our local needs at higher levels of 
government. I do follow their speeches in parliament and other forums and I am content with 
the effort they put in to make sure that our constituency is well represented’. 
Kenyan parliamentarians have notoriously been known to avoid sittings in Parliament. However, 
as argued in Jamaica Observer (2013), sessions that have discussion of MPs salaries on the agenda 
always record overwhelming attendance. This phenomenon resonates in respondent N2’s 
observation:  
Our local government leaders are only interested in pushing their own interests, especially 
those that have to do with their own salaries. When they go to Parliament, very little of 
constituency development is debated. 
When the newly established Commission for Salaries and Remuneration Committee slashed MPs 
salaries from $126 000 to $78 000 in early 2013, the MPs flocked and filled the House to overrule 
that decision. Interestingly that afternoon, it was noted that only a handful of MPs were left in the 
House despite other important motions and reports to be debated (Sapa-AP, 2013). 
Respondents questioned the responsiveness of their local leaders. They maintained that their 
leaders do not revert and engage with communities after attending meeting with officials from 
higher government offices.  N1 argued that:  
[e]ven though we prepare our memorandum with demands that concern our development 
needs, our leaders do not return to engage us pertaining our demands. We therefore believe 
that these people are only in these positions because of their salaries, and only appear during 
electoral campaigns to ask for votes in order to retain their prestigious positions.  
MPs are expected to assist and mobilize resources to confront emergent local challenges. They are 
expected to mobilize stakeholders such as relevant ministers, dedicate their time in the House to 
present and represent the grievances of their constituents, and eventually push for action to address 
issues raised (KDPRS, 2008). Despite the fact that MPs do not return to communities to listen to 
their grievances and development needs, respondent N5 further raised a concern thereof: 
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If they were really engaging our needs and concerns, (then) they should be calling us for 
meetings to update us with such information ... Therefore, no one bothers to know our needs, 
let alone to represent them at the higher levels of government. 
G10 remained critical of the level of local government’s commitment. He does not reckon that 
local leadership in Gatanga has tapped all locally available resources to significantly boost the 
growth of local economic development. He contended that he did ‘not think that local leaders 
doing enough to make sure that our issues are given priority at high levels of government. For 
example, in case the milk gets too much, we end up losing it and eventually we cannot get money 
out of it’. He further alleged that: 
These are some of the areas that our leaders should have made sure that we have enough 
markets that can consume our milk, or rather initiate industries that could manufacture milk 
products locally. These are fundamental activities to our daily living and our leaders must 
be in a position to support such structures in order to improve local and economic wellbeing 
of the local community.  
Respondent G10 asserted that their local leaders have not prioritized funding and protecting 
agriculture related initiatives, which, in essence, forms the backbone of Gatanga’s economic 
development. He pointed out that: 
Banks sometimes loan money to farmers and only pay back after they receive their bonuses. 
In this this year, the bonuses were very low such that many farmers were not able to repay 
their loans. This has also affected the signatories that had signed for farmers to access the 
loans. Their bank accounts too are frozen and cannot be able to access their money. If you 
look at coffee farmers, they are so much affected by low payments and some have actually 
decided to uproot it due to frustrations. I have not seen our politicians aggressive enough to 
defend the farmers or even propose initiatives that can assist in mitigating such 
circumstances.  
One of the central objectives of the CDF is to emphasize the active role that community members 
play through consultations with development agencies and local leaders. They are therefore to be 
regarded as principle agents for their development locally.  Research that was undertaken by 
Mwenzwa (2008: 3) noted that consultations between local leaders and their respective 
communities regarding their development is inadequate. Respondent N6 too criticizes the fact that 
local leaders do not engage communities in deliberating local economic initiatives, saying: ‘I have 
never seen them come to us in order to engage us on our development needs. Therefore, we have 
no forum to relay our opinion regarding development of our area’. Similarly, N6 maintained that 
leaders in Naivasha have not shown interest to represent address concerns and noted that: ‘many 
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times they just dictate the kind of development initiatives of their own liking, and disregard the 
interest of the majority’.  
The CDF Act 2013 (Section 24: 6-7) calls for the CDFC chairperson, in consultation with area 
MPs, constituency’s sub-county administrator and ward administrator, to convene open forum 
public meetings in every ward in the constituency to deliberate on development matters in the ward 
and the constituency. This should be done within the first year of their election, and every two 
years thereafter. Each ward is therefore expected to submit a list of deliberated priority projects to 
the CDFC. In the current research, respondent N4 did not believe that local leaders in Naivasha 
were committed to gather views and demands regarding local development from the people: 
Our views are not considered and are usually ignored. For example, if you look at many of 
the projects here in Naivasha managed by the CDF, the views of the people are not given 
any priority. Many of the approved projects do not reflect the opinions of the people but 
stand as an imposition from self-interested politicians. There is usually a lot of political 
interference regarding development plan within this constituency. Local leaders therefore 
ignore the decisions of the local people and are not being implemented. 
The responses from the community workers in Gatanga felt that there was a general sense of 
commitment of leaders to good governance.  Respondents felt that there was transparency in how 
procurement processes for tenders were undertaken, and how local economic development projects 
were prioritized, as well as how funds were allocated.  This, they believed, contributed to the 
constituency overall local economic development initiatives.  The results of a study conducted by 
the IEA (2012) show that some constituencies in Kenya have recorded significant improvement in 
infrastructure such as bridges, roads, schools, health centres, police posts, education, and water 
facilities through funding from the CDF.  In the current research, Respondent N7 noted that poor 
infrastructural development in Naivasha can only point to lack of competency among local leaders: 
Poor infrastructure in Naivasha calls in question the quality of leaders charged with 
overseeing local development: firstly, the road infrastructure that could assist the people of 
Naivasha to transport their farm produce to the market is very poor; secondly, the level of 
education in Naivasha is very low as compared to other constituencies due to inadequate 
facilities in learning institutions. Therefore, I conclude that Naivasha has suffered from poor, 
incapable, and corrupt leaders. 
Research conducted by the National Taxpayers Association (NTA) (2013, 13-14) found that in 
constituencies where MPs were development conscious, had political goodwill, and were able to 
mobilize constituents to participate actively in the implementation process, there was evidence of 
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social economic transformation of those communities. In the current research, Respondent N11 
was skeptical of the commitment for economic development displayed by local leaders in 
Naivasha:  
It is clear that nothing much is bargained for because there are many development issues that 
have not been attended to for many years. For example, our roads in this constituency remain 
dilapidated. Water supply has also remained to be a big crisis. Local leaders have conspired 
to divert development funds through corrupt deals and have not been used to alleviate such 
problems. 
Gikonyo (2008:33) found that certain MPs exercise their roles and functions with undue arrogance. 
They argue that MPs can be observed to connive with few key members of the CDFC, while the 
rest are manipulated and used to rubberstamp decisions that have been made by MPs and their 
associates. They often breach the CDF policies and regulations and defraud the fund by hijacking 
identification and projects procurement processes.  Cheeseman (2014) argues that in as much as 
many leaders had been linked to corruption and mismanagement of the CDF, this would not 
translate that all MPs having participated in the misappropriation of these funds. Many seized the 
opportunity to build a reputation and displayed competency in the management of the CDF where 
positive examples of ‘CDF stars”, such as Peter Kenneth (a former Gatanga MP), emerged and 
have been widely cited. The current study found that, in general, respondents in Gatanga were 
more positive on the impact of local leadership on development. They attributed the advancement 
in their local and economic development to the quality of their leadership structures. For example, 
G1 believed that it is due to the commitment and dedication of their former Member of Parliament, 
Peter Kenneth, that Gatanga has recorded an accelerated growth in local economic development. 
As G1 outlined: 
We have been led under the leadership of a very dedicated Member of Parliament, Mr. Peter 
Kenneth. In regards to the CDF, he has facilitated an accelerated development in all parts of 
this constituency. He was active in propagating our local development concerns at the 
national level. Every Tuesday and Wednesday, his office was open to the public where he 
remained to listen and address people’s problems. People would line up to speak with him 
and he was always interested on individual stories. It is with a better understanding of their 
needs that he was able to represent them at the higher national debating forums.  
The case of Gatanga in the administration of the CDF has been exemplary. A study conducted by 
Mwangu and Iravo (2015: 26-27) revealed that while many other constituencies across the country 
registered failures in implementing the CDF, Gatanga Constituency achieved a 53.3% rate of 
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projects that had been completed within the timeline that they had been scheduled for, and 66.7% 
of projects completed within the initial budgetary allocations, with a correlation analysis between 
monitoring and project success resulting to a value of 0.673**. This was an indication of a strong 
relationship between the two variables. To the current researcher, it is observable that there are 
better and accessible health, peace and security, and education systems, as well as extensive 
physical infrastructure. Respondent G9 opined that their local leaders have demonstrated 
willingness to associate themselves with grassroots communities and bring about meaningful local 
economic development, saying: 
Mr. Kenneth, the former MP was able to support a broad based development in Gatanga. He 
supported funding in various priority areas across this constituency. He was able to visit this 
constituency constantly and had a fair idea of the development needs thereof.  
Alluding to the vast infrastructure development that has been established in Gatanga over the last 
decade, G5 associates it with good governance by their local leaders: 
We are certain that our leaders are competent in putting our development agenda forward 
because if they do not do so, we could not be in a position to access development 
opportunities that have been introduced in the constituency thus far. If you walk around, 
there are health centres that have been established in the last few years in all villages where 
all are able to access health facilities at their reach. 
Respondent G8 noted the selfless commitment from their leaders in making sure that the CDF 
achieve its objective of improving local economic development, saying: 
If you look at roads such as these, were have seen them being maintained; other 
developments such as electricity has been connected to most of our rural areas that have 
remained without power for years. So, there is a clear evidence that leaders are committed 
to promote development in this constituency. 
This study found that there was general contentment among respondents in Gatanga with regard 
to how local leaders administered the implementation of the CDF in Naivasha. There was 
considerable political will among leaders in Gatanga to implement the objectives of the CDF. This 
leadership commitment in Gatanga was largely attributed to the successful implementation of the 
CDF to the satisfaction of the local population. However, the leadership in Naivasha was found to 
be self-seeking and prompted by greed for public funds. A lot of funds meant for community 
projects in Naivasha were paid back to the officials in form of bribes. This study also found that 
the respondents felt that there was not enough coordination between various regimes of elected 
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MPs. The newly elected wanted to support their own projects and abandoned those that were 
administered by their predecessors. In the end, they felt that this contributed to a lot of projects 
being left incomplete scattered across the Naivasha Constituency.  
4.13 Summary 
Based on a review of government report, secondary studies, first-hand observations, and responses 
from key informants, this study contends that the implementation of CDF funded LED projects in 
Gatanga can be regarded as relatively successful because of numerous well established and 
completed projects across the constituency.  In stark contrast, the CDF funded LED projects in the 
Naivasha Constituency were much harder to trace, and those that were visible were either of poor 
quality, poor designed, unfinished or altogether abandoned projects. Respondents there also cited 
cases on ghost projects that were funded and never started. There was also little data available 
from the constituency on the outcome of CDF funding.  This study argues that the respective 
outcomes of the CDF funded LED projects in Gatanga and Naivasha can be attributed largely to 
the quality of local leadership, how leaders are able to manage the overall LED process. Sound,  
visionary, well-motivated and coordinated leadership under the flagship of the respective MPs in 
Gatanga were noted to have championed values such as mobilizing communities to participate in 
project selection and prioritization as a means to match development with people’s needs, 
dissemination of information, emphasized on accountability and transparency. On the other hand 
however, leaders and the CDF administrators in Naivasha were accused on rife corruption, 
maladministration and lacked the necessary skills to coordinate the utilization of the CDF. Efforts 
to build systems of accountability, transparency, participation, dissemination of information, as 
well as economic efficiency to match people’s needs were ignored. The next chapter concludes the 
study and considers the main arguments of the thesis. 
- 164 - 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the study.  It considers the significance of the key findings of this study 
which was in essence a study on fiscal decentralisation in Kenya with specific reference to the 
implementation of the CDF in the Gatanga and Naivasha Constituencies in Kenya.  It presents the 
key thematic governance values that this study regards as critical to the outcome of the 
implementation of the CDF in Gatanga and Naivasha Constituencies in Kenya.  It also presents a 
set of recommendations and argues that these could have a positive outcome and assist 
constituencies such as Gatanga and Naivasha in Kenya to achieve local economic development as 
espoused by the CDF.   
5.2 Fiscal Decentralization 
One of the main objectives of this study was to understand the rationales that prompt governments 
(including Kenya’s) to decentralize some of their powers and functions to the control and 
administration of lower-levels of government. This study found that devising systems of 
decentralization has become one of the contemporary means that governments across the world 
have undertaken in an attempt to induce economic development in local jurisdictions (Rondinelli, 
1983: 181). The attempt reflects dissatisfaction with centralized economic planning in inducing 
meaningful development and building a sustainable stability in the economy. Aligned to the 
preceding uneasiness with the ability of central governments to deliver, decentralization was seen 
as a new means to experiment with an aim of achieving governments’ objectives of attaining 
development across both across their jurisdictions (Olowu, 2000; Manor 1999). 
This study identified the following key reasons as to why governments opt for fiscal 
decentralization: 
 Fiscal decentralization is seen as an opportunity for governments to develop and reinvent ad 
hoc policies purposively aimed at escaping from inefficiency of service delivery, 
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macroeconomic instability, and inadequate economic growth previously coordinated by central 
governments (Bird, 1993: 207).  
 Fiscal decentralization is also seen as a means to improve the performance of public sectors 
serving local communities. In this case, governments’ task force would be geared towards 
serving a particular jurisdiction to which they are assumed to be well versed with the pressing 
development needs of their respective jurisdictions (Oates 1999: 1120).   
 Arguments for fiscal decentralization are also underpinned by the assumption that it has a high 
potential to increase policy responsiveness to the preference of citizens and to increase 
accountability in government. This is largely because local governments were considered as 
closest to the people and would be the most appropriate level of government (Smart, 2007: 
204). Hence, local governments are believed to respond better to preferences and needs of their 
residents (Smart 2007: 204; Smoke, 2007: 131).  
 Also, decentralizing expenditure provision and revenue raising authority is believed to have 
the potential to improve accountability. This is informed by the fact that the level of 
government responsible for providing goods and services is also responsible for financing 
them, which in effect makes it more diligent (Buchanan cited in Vigneault, 2007: 133).  
 The other advantage associated with fiscal decentralization is that policies of subnational 
branches of governments are permitted to vary in order to accommodate the preferences of 
their residents. If policies therefore are adapted to suit local preferences, this in effect enhances 
economic efficiency in those local authorities (Wildasin, 1997; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002: 2).  
 Designing fiscal decentralization is intended to bring government closer to the people. When 
governments are perceived to be closer to the constituents, they are able to demand 
accountability for funds allocated to development. They can also access government bodies 
easily to respond to their concerns and demands (Stigler, cited in Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002: 2). 
 Fiscal decentralization broadly defined presents the government with the opportunity to initiate 
allocative efficiency through redistribution and equalization of fiscal resources, enhance 
economic efficiency, as well as promote interregional or interpersonal equity and political 
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efficiency (Prud’Homme, 2003: 19); Musgrave and Musgrave, cited in Dillinger, Perry, Webb, 
2003: 232).   
 Proponents of fiscal decentralization purports that local governments are prompted by the urge 
to compete and provide efficiency in governance with the aim of achieving local economic 
development (Rao, 1998: 78). 
This study has also found, although to a lesser extent, the existence of dissenting voices that warn 
of the impacts of decentralizing government and cannot be ignored. In a similar vein, it has been 
pointed out in this study that it is not in all cases that decentralized governments have recorded 
efficiency in delivering on LED. The literature made a critical observation that decentralizing the 
functions of fiscal responsibilities to be managed by autonomous local institutions is not a panacea 
for local economic development. Several case studies like those of Sewell (1996: 147) and Ribot 
(2002: 9) have shown that claims that decentralization had a greater potential to increase efficiency 
through better matching of demand and supply for local public goods may not be the case in 
countries with daunting democratic spaces. This study also found that part of the reason that 
decentralized governments are failing and are inefficient is largely due to the lack of favorable and 
sufficient mechanisms in place and an enabling environment to hold local authorities accountable 
to local populations.  
5.3 Fiscal decentralization in Kenya 
Another key objective of this study was to determine the rationales behind a decision taken by the 
once highly centralized government in Kenya to implement a system of fiscal decentralization.  
This study noted that since independence in 1963 to the inauguration of the new decentralized 
system in 2013, development planning in Kenya has always been centrally administered. Kenya 
under subsequent governments headed by Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, and Mwai Kibaki had 
endured about four decades of central government control over social and economic development. 
Cohen and Peterson (1999: 122) contend that the country moved toward the institutional monopoly 
by taking away roles and resources away from local governments and transferring these powers to 
central ministries. By recentralizing control over the allocative objective, these presidents gained 
power to advance the political and economic interests of their home regions and ethnic groups. 
They allocated substantial government resources to areas they dominated, and those that were seen 
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to oppose the regime were marginalized. This centralization was challenged and the system of 
central monopoly on development planning was revoked and ushered in a new era with the 
inauguration of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (CoK, 2010). 
This study showed that the CoK, 2010 establishes a decentralized government system of 
governance for Kenya. The CoK 2010 provides for a devolution of a range of political, 
administrative, and fiscal powers and functions to the constituencies.  
Administratively, decentralization in Kenya is targeted to provide local administrators with the 
powers and functions of endorsing community projects without necessarily having to receive more 
authorization from officials of the central government. This would mean that the problem of a 
central bureaucracy that is commonly associated with delays in addressing immediate needs of 
local communities is mitigated.  
Politically, this study showed that the Kenyan government supports the notion that a decentralized 
system will make a government politically more representative and accountable. Politicians 
elected at the local levels are deemed to be closer to their local communities that elect them. This 
scenario is assumed to contain huge potential in the enhancement of accountability and 
transparency. The locally elected leader mobilize local communities in selecting and supporting 
development projects that are their real preferences. This study has shown that decades of central 
administration have ignored certain dimensions of local development that are easily detected 
through local development agents.  Therefore, their needs are theoretically better addressed 
accordingly in the order of priority.  
Fiscally, each constituency is assured of receiving a certain amount to fund basic local 
infrastructure like schools, hospitals, bridges, and security.  Local managers and political leaders 
are accorded the discretion to determine the budget and the nature of projects to be funded, of 
course guided by the budget and priority projects. The local managers and politicians are invited 
to mobilize communities and involve them in the project selection, fiscal allocation and encourage 
them in participatory budgeting. The outcome of this Fund administration is enhancement of 
service delivery through the establishment of local basic structures. Thus, the rationale is that fiscal 
decentralization will make service delivery more efficient and effective. 
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The study has demonstrated that the process of devolving government in Kenya is still in its initial 
stages of implementation and not all systems have effectively been established in each of the 
counties. There is a need to fast-track the creation of requisite institutional structures as embedded 
in the CoK 2010. If well implemented, decentralized governments will be in a better position to 
formulate policies that are compatible to local conditions, set targets, as well mobilize and manage 
both local human and natural resources to enhance local economic development.  In addition, there 
is also a need to be more comprehensive in system that will support the transfer of powers from 
national to newly established decentralized structures with an aim of enhancing efficiency of 
government in advancing local economic development. 
This study has found that confusion remains amongst various political powers in the administration 
of certain funds meant for local development. It will be critical to delineate functions more clearly 
to avoid overlap either between national and County governments, or between various levels of 
governments at the County level. The roles of various elected officials namely, the President, 
governors, members of the National Assembly, County women representatives, members of the 
County assembly, as well as other state and non-state actors should be more clearly defined and 
aligned to allow a smooth complementarity of powers and functions. Thus, powers and roles for 
each unit or political institution should be guided by clear legislation and administrative guidelines 
and frameworks with the sole purpose to achieve an effective fiscal decentralization system. This 
will lessen ambiguity and friction between different role players and enhance accountability and 
transparency in administering public coffers.   
5.4 The Constituency Development Fund 
One of the main objectives of this study was to determine the rationale behind the Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF) and ascertain how it has been implemented in Kenya with specific 
reference to the Gatanga and Naivasha Constituencies. The CDF Act of 2003 was enacted by the 
Kenyan Parliament 2003 and later revised (as amended in 2007) to CDF Act of 2013. In the CoK 
2010, the CDF is understood to fall under the equalization fund in the form of a conditional grant 
(see Figure 3).  The CDF is regarded as a fundamental decentralized Fund disbursed by the central 
government and serves a multitude of purposes:   
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Firstly, the CDF is targeted to give greater autonomy to lower-level governments at the 
constituency level to mobilize and involve communities in addressing their local development 
needs and concerns. The involvement of the local community in local economic development is 
premised on the notion that they will participate in the selection, prioritization, and implementation 
of projects that are have the potential to address their local development needs and preferences.  
Secondly, it was designed as a fiscal equalization mechanism. In other words, it enables the central 
government to dispense some of its nationally collected revenue to constituencies based on a 
formula (see Table 2). In essence, this formula favours the constituencies that are most in need of 
central government’s funding. Constituencies that receives greater funding are considered as 
having been historically neglected under the previous central administration. Its redistributive 
nature is premised on the notion that local governments are in need of central government support 
if they are to achieve a sustainable level of local economic development. As such, sources of 
funding like the CDF are seen as integral components of Kenya’s system of fiscal decentralization. 
Thirdly, the assumption is that once local authorities facilitate the establishment of local economic 
development projects funded by the CDF, constituencies will become politically, administratively, 
and financially independent from central government. As such, Kenya will achieve a system of 
decentralized decentralized government as espoused in the Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
However, this study has shown that there are still some general implementation challenges. For 
example, the literature shows that many constituencies have argued that central government 
funding remains inadequate. As a result, they are challenged to meet their administrative functions 
and responsibilities. In effect, this challenges the sustainability of decentralized system of 
government. Constituencies cannot act autonomously if they are to continue relying on this extent 
of central government support. 
This study has found that more than a decade of implementation of the CDF has witnessed a myriad 
of development outcomes in varying constituencies across the country. Some, like Gatanga have 
recorded tremendous success in managing the Fund. This study has showed that there is a broad 
based establishment of services and infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, roads and bridges, 
police posts, agricultural projects, among many other examples in Gatanga Constituency. 
Therefore, in many constituencies where the fund was implemented to serve its purpose, the CDF 
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has played a vital role and most communities can now have easier access to essential services such 
as healthcare and educational facilities - much more so than when it was initiated. However, other 
constituencies like Naivasha performed very poorly with a trail of incomplete projects, ghost 
projects, projects of poor quality, amalgamated with corruption, nepotism, incompetence, and 
maladministration by duty bearers and local politicians. MPs used it as a tool for political 
manipulation for rewarding their cronies and punishing their adversaries.  
The study interrogated how policies and guidelines regulating the CDF were implemented towards 
the creation of a viable local and economic development. The study collected extensive empirical 
data from respondents selected in Gatanga and Naivasha. Their responses were qualitative in 
nature, seeking to understand the level of their awareness on the status, relevance and effectiveness 
of the CDF funded projects in Gatanga and Naivasha.  
The extensive empirical data collected in Gatanga and Naivasha has resulted in this study drawing 
a number of conclusions on notable key drivers of local economic development in relation to the 
CDF. Although these conclusions are limited to Gatanga and Naivasha, a perusal of other studies 
in different constituencies on CDF seems to point to some shared experiences. Nevertheless, 
opinions raised in this study are limited to Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies. The study also 
presents a number of recommendations that if implemented have a potential to enhance the 
performance of the CDF and funds of similar nature in Gatanga and Naivasha. These findings and 
recommendations could also be extrapolated to other constituencies with similar characteristics 
and experiences as Gatanga and Naivasha. The recommendations herewith are not just a set of 
general assertions enclosed in broad statements for government to consider. They are a set of key 
requisites and practical propositions against each key driver to local economic development. If 
these are implemented and strengthened holistically, there is a profound prospect that the CDF and 
other decentralized funds of its nature can provide for greater effectiveness in delivering economic 
benefits to local communities in Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies.  These are summarized as 
follows:   
5.4.1 Skills, capacity and competencies of CDF managers and local politicians  
This study argues that skills, capacity and competency of CDF duty bearers were key factors in 
determining the outcome of the implementation of the CDF. If local government administrators, 
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politicians, and members of the community are to improve in ensuring that decentralized funds 
match their development needs and enhance local economic development, they must be equipped 
with skills, technical and professional expertise that will enable them to manage functions handed 
over to them from the centre. No training for CDF duty bearers was cited by respondents either in 
Gatanga or in Naivasha. The findings in this study showed that training of local role players in 
executing their mandate lacked significantly, a phenomenon that negatively impacted development 
outcomes both constituencies. Training of the CDF duty bearers, local politicians, as well as 
representatives of communities on project management, monitoring and evaluation systems, as 
accounting systems remain critical in developing an effective fiscal decentralization system. 
Training the task force has the potential to improve the impact of decentralized funds in promoting 
LED, and in effect improve peoples’ lives by leveraging them from poverty.   
In order to enhance skills and professional preparedness of the CDF duty bearers, this study 
recommends that: 
 The government should earmark funds for training of local development role players in 
order to enhance their performance while managing local development projects. Trainings 
should be organized differently for different role players, of course depending on the 
functions and roles they are expected to play in the implementation process.  
 CDF duty bearers should attend regular training conferences and workshops to improve 
their competencies in leadership and management skills. 
 The government should  demand, through legislation, that members of the CDFC and other 
strategic key positions be publicly advertised and recruited on merit based on academic 
qualification, experience of work and community engagement.  
5.4.2 Responsiveness 
This study argues that responsiveness of local government is critical to an effective local economic 
delivery system. Delivery of timely and quality local projects is critical to evaluating the 
effectiveness of local government. No local community would be satisfied with delay in the 
implementation of CDF approved projects, entertain shoddy projects, or applaud failure to deliver 
approved projects at all.  This study has found that delay in release of funds not only by the 
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constituency office but also by the national treasury has been identified as one of the major 
setbacks limiting the effectiveness of the CDF in delivering local economic benefits to local 
beneficiaries in Gatanga and Naivasha. In Gatanga, majority of the respondents were satisfied with 
the responsiveness of the CDF duty bearers in facilitating the delivery of basic infrastructure to 
the community. The respondents in Naivasha agreed that the CDF projects either took too long to 
be approved and funds allocated, or experienced long delays before their completion. The 
observation made in Naivasha revealed that there were many stalled projects that were started and 
never completed. If one of the objectives of the CDF is to deliver quality projects in a timely 
manner to local communities, then the delivery system must be reformed and challenges addressed. 
This study makes the following recommendations:  
 The national government should ensure that there is proper planning that facilitate a timely 
disbursement of the CDF funds to communities as per the set timelines. Planning in 
advance can assist in making sure that funds do not delay the implementation process.  
 The study also recommends that this kitty be increased to be able to fully finance projects 
in constituencies. Many projects are delayed because funding is too limited to enable 
completion.   
 Stern disciplinary measures should be put in place to ensure that funds meant for local 
development are not lost through corrupt deals by CDF officials. 
5.4.3 Economic efficiency 
The literature has argued that matching projects to the most pressing needs of the community is 
critical towards advancing local economic development. It has also noted that local governments 
are the closest level of government in a position to identify projects that have the potential to 
maximize benefits to the constituents (Manor, 1999; Oates, 1972). Thus, it is argued, it is important 
to decentralize decision-making to the grassroots level so that real needs that face communities 
can be identified and addressed accordingly. This approach also has the potential to tap into local 
knowledge and preferences through community experience and expertise in local environment 
(Ribot, 2002).  
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Local labour has the potential not only to facilitate a more effective implementation, but also 
provides jobs and skills training opportunities. This study has also noted that decentralized delivery 
of services by governments can be more effective in addressing the needs of the community 
because they are able to respond to varying needs in various jurisdictions. This is opposed to 
wasteful expenditure that is associated from uniform delivery of public services by central 
government that are mostly inefficient and may not match the need of the community (Wasylenko, 
2001). This study argues, therefore, that localized governments are better placed to deliver efficient 
services that are best aligned to the real needs of the local community. Also, having a government 
that is closer and accessible to the community provides constituents with an opportunity to hold 
their leaders to account. Constituents are also likely to pay for services because they have an 
opportunity to monitor its use and be part of decision-making of how such funds can be utilized. 
Prud’homme, (2003: 19) conceptualized this phenomenon as follows: 
 [i]f people get a service X for which they do not care much at the expense of a service Y for 
which they would care more but which is not provided, their welfare or utility will be small. 
A shift in the allocation of resources from the production of X towards the production of Y 
will increase welfare. Therefore, marching of services with communities’ immediate needs 
becomes relevant towards achieving local economic efficiency. 
However, this study revealed that majority of respondents in Gatanga indicated that they were 
satisfied with how the CDF projects matched the needs of the constituents, while on the contrary, 
those in majority of respondents in Naivasha indicated that they were dissatisfied. These results 
compel the researcher to conclude that the CDF in Naivasha has failed to address the real needs of 
the local community, meaning that the Fund has failed to live up to its mandate. In as much as 
many respondents from Gatanga indicated that the CDF projects had matched the pressing needs 
of the local community, this was no guarantee that it was based on active community participation 
in identifying their development priorities. The success can only be attributed to a highly motivated 
leadership who were keen to link up with community leadership to identify projects that were 
appreciated by the community.   However, the literature decentralization, including arguments on 
fiscal decentralization contend that when capacity is lacking at the local level, it is perhaps better 
to retain a degree of central control until such capacity has been achieved.  The question then is 
what capacity is needed at local constituency level. 
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If the CDF is to attain its objective of addressing the key priority projects and maximize the 
benefits to the local community, there is a dire need to transform the current CDF delivery system 
to one that is able to facilitate the key priority areas of the community are prioritized.  This study 
proposes the following recommendations:  
 To establish a policy guideline where people are actively involved in the selection and 
prioritization of projects. By so doing, communities will be involved in selecting priority 
projects that would address their most immediate needs. The CDF administrators should 
desist from taking an active role in this proceedings, rather they can only facilitate the 
process. 
 That the government should assign teams of researchers from various sectors to assist local 
communities carry out research that can enlighten them regarding potentials of their local 
jurisdictions. They are to act as consultants to government and the people by assisting 
communities do feasibility studies. For example, if particular projects are established in 
particular jurisdictions, they could potentially yield more economic benefits than were 
proposed in others.  At times, communities are not able to discover such capabilities but 
contemporary scientific methods could be applied by researchers and experts from different 
ministries to assist local communities with new insights.  This invaluable information can 
therefore boost communities in their deliberations. 
5.4.4 Monitoring and evaluation 
Monitoring and evaluation of projects is a vital component and should be done regularly in order 
to ensure compliance between the project outcomes and Fund’s objectives. The lead agents in this 
process should be well trained professionals, competent in monitoring and evaluation systems. 
Despite the central role to be played by such administrators, communities as well must be trained 
and made aware of the instrumental role they can play in monitoring and following up of 
established projects as well as how such funds are allocated and implemented. When the 
community remains vigilant of how public funds are utilized by duty bearers, it would translate to 
better service delivery that has an opportunity to boost their economic wellbeing.  
This study revealed that the level of awareness amongst community members of how they could 
get involved in monitoring and evaluation was relatively low in Gatanga, with an overwhelming 
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majority in Naivasha indicating that such involvement of communities was inexistent. About half 
of questionnaire respondents indicate that in Gatanga, community members were involved in 
monitoring and evaluation of the CDF projects while vast majority of respondents in Naivasha 
demonstrated that community members are not involved in matters related to monitoring and 
evaluation of CDF projects. The study argues that if this scenario is improved, comprehensive 
monitoring by officials and community members will contribute to the enhancement of CDF 
delivery system.   
If the CDF is to record meaningful outcomes where quality projects are established, the 
instrumental role of monitoring and evaluation in advancing the impacts of key drivers of local 
economic development cannot be overlooked. Thus, the study makes the following 
recommendations: 
 That an independent committee in charge of monitoring and evaluation of the CDF projects 
must be established to evaluate quality, readiness, and ascertain whether projects are 
aligned to the plan to which the funds were approved. The committee must enjoy security 
of tenure in every constituency and not as a once-in-a-while delegation.  
 That there should be an official opening for all the CDF funded projects. The monitoring 
and evaluation committee must make a recommendation to the board that the projects are 
ready to be handed over to the community. MPs must officially preside of over the handing 
over functions of all the CDF funded projects. An official invitation to such functions 
should be extended to the members of the public as a symbol that they have received the 
project.  
 That every project proposed for funding must be profiled. Project profiling should include 
a follow-up checklist and must be regularly updated. Projects should therefore be evaluated 
against key milestones, and any nonconformity should be motivated. Therefore, anyone 
who is interested to know the status of the project must be in a position to access such files 
and get to know the most recent update of that particular project. All project files must be 
made available to members of the public on request. Projects that are stalled, abandoned, 
or poorly constructed should be interrogated and such reasons should be made public 
during official public forums.  
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5.4.5 Awareness and knowledge of local development plans 
The results of this study have demonstrated that awareness and knowledge of local development 
plans is vital to a successful implementation of the CDF. When local communities and CDF duty 
bearers are equipped with relevant and appropriate information regarding local plans and projects, 
they are likely to participate accordingly and contribute to creating sustainable local projects. The 
CDF managers are also to play a vital role in disseminating information to their constituents in 
ways that are accessible. This study has found that majority of respondents believed that 
communities in Gatanga and Naivasha have either low or very low awareness of how they are to 
participate in the CDF implementation processes.  
If local governments are to enhance the delivery of CDF development objectives, impacting 
knowledge through civic education, and spreading awareness of local development initiatives 
amongst local communities should be emphasized. This study therefore calls for an immediate 
remedy from government in order to make sure that citizens were well equipped with knowledge 
of its policies and spread the awareness of how such communities could participate. This study 
makes the following recommendations:  
 That government should devise a strategic plan and organize civic education workshops to 
educate local populations regarding government policies and initiatives for local 
development. In such workshops, local communities should be able to ask questions and 
raise concerns regarding existing policies and their applications.  
 That government should train and disburse local volunteers, particularly young people, to 
conduct door-to-door campaign that involves educating communities on key issues 
pertinent to local development. This would include  (although not be limited to) the 
constitution, roles of communities in participating in the development process, rights and 
responsibilities as enshrined in the constitution; nature and amount of local funds available 
for local development; ways in which they could be involved in holding their governments 
accountable; as well as functions of national and County governments. 
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5.4.6 Public participation 
This study argues that public participation is a key component while developing a sustainable CDF 
implementation system. When members of the public participate in giving inputs pertaining to 
their own development, appropriate projects aligned to the pressing needs of the community are 
established and are likely to receive local ownership and support. This study concluded that in 
Naivasha, the CDF is far from obtaining its objective of mobilizing the community to participate 
in development planning and decision making. However, even though the respondents were 
satisfied with the level of community engagement in the CDF implementation process in Gatanga, 
there were also dissenting voices that were concerned with the exclusion of the public in the CDF 
implementation process. The findings of this research notes that there is a need for a paradigm 
shift by establishing strategies that will ensure that constituents participate in the CDF decision-
making process. It will be critical to devise means that will maximize the opportunity of how local 
communities (not only in Naivasha which was perceived to have experienced most challenges but 
also in Gatanga) can engage more in activities such as identification, prioritization, procurement, 
and other components of the CDF projects’ implementation. So far, only influential people linked 
to the CDFC and local politicians have taken control over these processes and through 
manipulation excluded local communities from participating.  
Evidence accumulated elsewhere has shown that community participation in decision making 
pertaining to local problems has been recorded as one of the major boost to local economic 
development. For example, organized participatory budgeting in Brazil has been hailed as one of 
the most successful story of democratization in that country (Otieno, 2013). However, this study 
has found that in both Gatanga and Naivasha, there is lack of a strategic plan of how to involve 
respective communities in key decision-making opportunities. Therefore, it is vital to increase the 
level of participation by community members when affairs pertaining to their local economic 
development are concerned. In order to ensure that communities at the grassroots are more 
involved in decision-making regarding their development concerns, this study recommends: 
 That the government should institutionalize, through legislation, a policy guideline that 
clearly spells out how and when communities could participate within the implementation 
process for decentralised funds. In effect, if such systems are put in place, there is a huge 
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potential in maximizing the impacts of local economic development and improving 
livelihoods among local communities.  
 That public forums, at the level of the ward in every constituency, should be put in place 
on a regular basis where members of the public are invited to deliberate development 
issues pertaining to their jurisdictions. MPs, the CDF officials, and other elected officials 
like the County Representatives should be represented. All these stakeholders are to 
prepare progress reports for all projects approved, including their future plans. A session 
of “question and answer” (Q&A) should be reserved during those forums where members 
of the public ask questions and raise their concerns to their local public servants. 
 That the government should design a strategic plan that includes communities in their local 
budgeting processes. They should have an active role in decision-making pertaining 
allocation and prioritization of the CDF funds to community projects. Communities from 
villages/wards may be represented in the budgeting forums by representatives elected by 
them. This would expand the relevance of communities in CDF implementation, and not 
just limited to project identification.  
5.4.7 Transparency and information sharing 
Results in this study revealed that a lot of vital information pertaining to local development was 
concealed from, or not readily available to constituents. It was notable that the CDF office in 
Gatanga had a notice board with a list of funded projects that was open to the public. In as much 
as this was a clear sign of commitment to values of transparency, on its own, that method is not a 
sufficient demonstration of transparency as only very few people visit these offices. That 
notwithstanding, majority of respondents in Gatanga had trust that their government was fairly 
transparent in dealing with the CDF allocation and implementation. On the other hand, a 
unanimous voice from respondents in Naivasha believed that their constituency leadership had 
concealed valuable information regarding the CDF operations. They noted that constituency 
leadership had not provided them with an opportunity to know about planned activities, projects 
being funded, as well as resources made available through the CDF funding.  
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If local governments are to record significant local economic development, sharing information 
with community members regarding available opportunities, local projects being undertaken, 
procurement processes, and the amount of funds available cannot be disregarded. This study makes 
the following recommendations: 
 That all projects profiles, including amounts allocated to each project, and well as the 
statuses of those projects should be published and made available for public viewing. 
 Those constituencies should be obligated to have a CDF website where progress on related 
projects and other related information should be published. 
 That the CDF board at the constituency level be obligated to publicly advertise their jobs 
and tenders on constituency newspapers, CDF website (see bullet point above) and notice 
boards at the constituency offices.  
 That there be an independent recruiting board with members drawn from various sectors. 
This will reduce monopoly and discretion of CDFC and MPs in the appointments for both 
tenders and CDF related employment opportunities.  
5.4.8 Fiscal accountability  
This study argues that accountability is at the core of any development project. Findings in this 
study indicated that accountability for the CDF in Naivasha was nearly non-existent. Local CDFCs 
and politicians used the CDF fund as an opportunity to accumulate private wealth as well as reward 
their political cronies. Overall, this study established that corruption was among the frontline 
challenges that had plagued the implementation of the CDF in Naivasha. Misappropriation of these 
coffers by MPs and CDFCs negatively impacted on the outcome of economic development in local 
jurisdictions. The impact of such accountability and corruption led to shoddy structures being 
erected across the constituency due to the fact that monies had been squandered privately. Rife 
corruption in Naivasha was also evident by rampant abandoned and incomplete projects. In 
Gatanga, some respondents pointed out trends that hindered accountability on the CDF related 
projects such as: irregular awarding of bursaries and CDF related jobs, or undisclosed procurement 
of tenders. Despite these unethical practices, there was sufficient evidence that political leaders 
and the CDF duty bearers in Gatanga had remained largely accountable to their communities 
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pertaining to the utilization of the Fund. One could easily notice a lot of well-established CDF 
funded infrastructure ranging from roads, hospitals, schools, police administration units, and 
agricultural projects.  
It is of utmost relevance to highlight that the CDF Act 2013, section 24(14) provides that members 
of the committee that foresees the allocation and implementation of CDF funds may be removed 
from office due to some of the following reasons linked with mismanagement; (a) lack of integrity; 
(b) gross misconduct; (c) embezzlement of public funds; (d) bringing the image of the committee 
into disrepute through unbecoming personal public conduct; (e) promoting unethical practices. 
However, to the knowledge of the respondents in both Gatanga and Naivasha, there are no officials 
that have lost their jobs after being held responsible for any of the above misconduct. 
If decentralized funds are to be utilized in an accountable manner as proposed, drafting of 
legislation itself is not sufficient, further, it should be followed by clear consequences to the 
perpetrators. This study recommends that:  
 There should be put in place an independent oversight commission, either by the national 
government or the County government, not based on party politics, to ensure that funds 
allocated for local development are spent in accordance with the spirit of their own 
establishment. Such a commission should be able to investigate the conduct of MPs or 
other CDF duty bearers and charge them if found guilty of misappropriation or any form 
of corruption whatsoever.  
 Regular public workshops should be scheduled where communities are educated on how 
to hold their leaders to account. In such forums, the public should be given a space where 
they can ask questions to their leaders and those who administer their funds. MPs should 
be liable for impeachment if they deny their constituents such privileges.  
5.4.9 Leadership  
As identified in this study, the quality of local leadership is critical in defining the outcome and 
quality of local economic development. It was the visionary leadership of Peter Kenneth, the area 
MP that transformed Gatanga from an insignificant and inept local economy to one of the most 
competitive jurisdiction in the country. He championed this agenda through community 
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mobilization in building a citizen-centred local economic development. He was determined to 
overhaul the system of service through the renewal of local governance structures. The active role 
played by Peter Kenneth therefore was a critical component towards facilitating a viable local 
economic development delivery system. His record stands out as exemplary for subsequent 
legislators in Gatanga and an inspiration to many across the country.  
Thus, Gatanga remains a symbol of good leadership and administration through which it witnessed 
increased growth and development. Even though there are still many areas that still need further 
development in Gatanga, success in the implementation of the CDF fund can largely be attributed 
to a visionary local leadership and a dedicated team of local administrators. Key drivers of local 
economic development that led to the emancipation of local community included: accessible 
education and healthcare for many by building and equipping schools and health centres; creating 
sustainable peace, security, and establishment of the rule of law by building police and chiefs’ 
administration blocks and allocating staff even in remote areas of the constituency, improved 
physical infrastructure such as roads; affirmative action for the marginalized citizens such as youth 
and women; as well as integrity in the management of public assets and protection of natural 
resources. 
This study concludes that where such leadership is lacking, (like in Naivasha) local economic 
development suffers.  Local leadership in Naivasha did not serve the purpose and objectives of the 
CDF or the local citizenry. MPs in Naivasha and the CDFCs were linked with the failure of the 
implementation of the Fund. There was no confidence that was perceived from respondents in 
Naivasha pertaining to the fact that local leadership had provided any commendable leadership in 
serving the purpose for which the CDF was started. Despite the fact that this fund was a chance 
for MPs to showcase their abilities in local governance, those in Naivasha failed dismally and 
caused much resentment amongst their constituents.  
Thus, the respondents in both Gatanga and Naivasha directly or indirectly emphasised how good 
local leadership can circumvent the shortcomings linked with the implementation of the CDF. In 
other words: this study argues that good local leadership can surpass problems associated with of 
skills shortages.  Good local leadership can ensure the efficient and effective utilization of the 
limited resources available. Good local leadership can mobilize communities positively to 
participate in decision-making and in local development processes and can be enthusiastic and 
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willing to share information regarding development plans and resources available. Therefore, good 
local leadership is regarded as being at the core of a sustainable decentralized system of 
governance. 
The Kenyan government constitutionally obliges local leaders to deliver their mandates of 
improving the livelihoods of their constituents.  Based on the empirical findings of this study, the 
following recommendations are made: 
 In order to ensure compliance with the purpose of local leadership, there is a need to 
comprehensively institutionalize operations of the CDF in a bid to force role players to 
serve the common purpose of advancing local economic development. This must be 
supported by a legal framework that allows prosecution of those involved in malpractices 
of corruption and misappropriation of funds. At the commencement of their mandate, MPs 
should be made to sign a code of conduct that legally binds them to serve the purpose and 
objectives of decentralized funds.  
 This study also proposes that MPs and other senior administrators of the fund should be 
formally monitored and scored rated on a regular basis, for example every 6 months. Score 
cards issued will reflect the overall performance of the leader and by gazetted or exposed 
publicly and made accessible to their constituents.  
 This study recommends that the government should consider offering incentives to 
constituencies based on their performance over the utilization of the CDF. This would 
ensure that those that are involved in malpractices such as corruption and misappropriation 
of funds, including underspending should not be rewarded. Incentives should be rewarded 
accordingly based on their performance. In this case, poorly performing constituencies 
would therefore wish to compete with their counterparts with an aim for higher funding for 
local development.  
5.5 Originality of the Study 
The originality of this study lies in the extensive empirical data collected in both the Gatanga and 
Naivasha constituencies. The data collected provided detailed and insightful information that 
allowed the researcher to understand prospects and challenges associated with the implementation 
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of the CDF. Preliminary literature studies indicated that no case study of this nature has ever been 
undertaken in either of these two constituencies.   This study diagnosed problems and challenges 
affecting the implementation of the CDF and presented a number of practical recommendations 
that can be put in place.  It is argued here that these recommendations have the potential to 
contribute towards the achievement of the CDFs’ objective in these two constituencies.  
The recommendations offer a number of systematic approaches and strategies on each of the key 
drivers of LED (See Table 4). Therefore, the researcher believes that this study provides the 
Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies and perhaps even other constituencies (with similar 
characteristics and facing similar challenges to these two constituencies in Kenya), with an 
analytical toolkit containing well-organized instruments that can be adopted to ensure that the CDF 
supports local economic development.   The recommendations are drawn from the literature on 
fiscal decentralisation but also from the experiences during the course of the study (the first-hand 
observations, and responses from development workers and officials). 
The strength of this study is that it reviewed two constituencies, Gatanga and Naivasha, thus 
enabling to some extent, an instructive comparison. On the one hand, Gatanga appeared to have 
made good use of the CDF, and had a number of ongoing and completed LED projects as a result.  
The community development workers identified key factors in their success as being good 
leadership, mechanisms of accountability and transparency, management skills and monitoring 
and evalution.  This, they argued, resulted in Gatanga’s significant improvement in development 
in education, healthcare, security, roads, as well as in agriculture.   On the other hand, Naivasha 
was found to be a constituency marred by entrenched maladministration, misappropriation, 
corruption and disconcerted leadership.  Of interest is that community development workers raised 
the same factors which they thought were fundamental if the CDF were to succeed.  They felt that 
based on their experience in Naivasha, a lack of :  good leadership, a lack of accountability and 
transparency, a lack of skills and competence, and a lack of monitoring and evaluation, results in 
the failure of the CDF to promote LED.   
This study also is singular in another way. Most studies available in this area have not been able 
to capture a holistic approach to the CDF. Most available data of peer reviewed papers and 
government reports deal with single phenomena. For example: Otieno (2013); Oduor and Achar 
(2012) only investigated  citizen participation; Kimenyi (2005) focused on efficiency and efficacy 
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of the CDF; NTA (2013) dealt with transparency and citizen participation; and Ng’alu and Bomett 
(2014)  looked at the role of the CDF on education. This study therefore provides a systematic 
review and analysis on a wider range of key notable aspects and shows how they can be integrated 
to advance local economic development. It acts therefore as a ‘one-stop-shop’ and blends these 
key elements in a single framework as demonstrated in Table 4 below: 
It was the objective of this study to find out how key governance values associated with defining 
an effective implementation of fiscal decentralization system such as: accountability; economic 
efficiency, effectiveness; participatory budgeting; public participation in project identification 
formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; informed the realization, or otherwise, 
of the CDF main objective, that of enhancing the development of local economy.  It is worth 
emphasizing that the data collected in this study revealed that leadership in the CDF intervention 
was the most central underlying value that prompted hugely on its impact on local economic 
development, whether positively (for Gatanga) or negatively (for Naivasha). Without a meaningful 
intervention by diligent leadership over decentralized funds, no significant economic delivery can 
be guaranteed.  
This study therefore identifies leadership as the most fundamental element in building a successful 
and effective local economic delivery system. One of Gatanga’s former MPs, Peter Kenneth, 
followed by his predecessors were seen and cited by most respondents in this study as the most 
instrumental in inducing a positive local economic development outcome. Similarly, most ills 
associated with poor delivery of the CDF in Naivasha were attributed to poor leadership that was 
linked to lack of political will, corruption, and maladministration, and misappropriation of the CDF 
funds.  
This is perhaps the main point of focus for government: to groom, motivate and empower local 
democratically elected leaders through skills and training; to commit local leaders to a leadership 
that is dedicated to serving the public with diligence and respect. It is only with a credible 
leadership that any constituency can be assured that all other elements that contribute to the growth 
of local economic development would fall in place. This argument is buttressed by  Sorensen and 
Epps’ (1996: 115) warning, that: ‘without an active leadership in the public sector, even the best 
conceived ideas and set of policies can eventually undermine the efficacy of a strategic long term 
view’. 
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Table 5 below is a presentation of the concluding recommendations made by this study.  It 
identifies and summarises the key governance values and demonstrates how these are associated 
with the enhancement of LED.  The argument embedded in the Table is that these specific 
recommendations have the potential to promote local economic development in Gatanga and 
Naivasha, and perhaps even other constituencies in Kenya that share similar traits. 
































































Projects profiles published for public viewing; Design constituency 
CDF website; publicly advertise jobs and tenders; establish an 
independent recruiting board  
Policy guideline for community participation; Public forums-
progress reports from CDFC; Q&A sessions between leaders 
and communities; participatory budgeting 
 Independent monitoring and evaluation; Official handing 
over public functions presided by MPs; Project profiling  
Capacity, Skills and 
Training 
Door-door-workshops; Civic education workshops - on 
constitution; accountability; functions of national and county 
governments. 
Clear-cut timelines for disbursement of CDF funds (from 
national and constituency); CDF allocation be increased.  
Earmark funds for regular training; CDF management positions 
publicly advertised; recruitment on merit  
Institutionalization/legal framework/code of conduct for 
leaders; Score cards; Incentives; Leadership training courses for 
MPs, CDF administrators and community representatives 
 
Policy guideline for communities’ involvement in policy 


































Local economic development 
A CDF Perspective  
 
Recommendations for the Implementation of the CDF in the Gatanga and Naivasha 
Constituencies, Kenya (Source: Author’s) 
 
Independent oversight commission; regular public 
workshops; Impeachment of officials linked with 




N/B Leadership is underlined as the most core value (fundamental link) with potential to induce positive change to LED 
Table 4: Fiscal decentralization framework: a CDF perspective  
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5.6 Contribution to policy 
It is critical to note that this study is timely situated because it is conducted at a time when Kenya 
is at the height of implementing the Constitution of Kenya 2010. The CoK 2010 proposed a process 
to devolve most government functions from central to County and sub County level governments. 
This robust initiative begun in 2013 after a new government was voted in to power. Policy makers 
and practitioners are now looking for solutions and practical suggestions as a way of making sure 
that devolution deliver to its promise, that of augmenting economic development even to the most 
remote jurisdictions of Kenya.  
The new constitutional framework presents Kenya with a window of opportunity for newly 
established County governments to offer policy solutions for development needs for their local 
populations. It is more than a decade since the establishment of the CDF in 2003, making it 
germane decentralization initiative to offer lessons and highlight challenges in creating a viable 
local economic development in Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies. This study has presented 
practical recommendations that have the potential to inform better policy formulation and 
implementation strategies under the dispensation CoK 2010 in Gatanga and Naivasha 
constituencies.  
The researcher therefore believes that positive and negative outcomes experienced from the design 
and implementation of the CDF in Gatanga and Naivasha constituencies presents valuable 
information to their respective Muranga and Nakuru County governments. The areas of focus 
identified in this study through the recommendations suggested have huge potential to aide County 
governments as they design and implement their County development plans. Recommendations 
herein have the potential to inform the development and sustenance of a sound decentralized 
system that is in a position to respond to the needs of their respective local populations by 
improving their wellbeing, and leverage them from poverty. If policy makers and practitioners are 
to create a viable system that can provide a fair resource allocation system, ensure social equity, 
and enhance local economic development, then they cannot afford to ignore such lessons drawn 
from a major decentralized initiative such as the Constituency Development Fund.   
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5.7 Suggested area for further research 
In addition to enhancing local economic development, another rationale behind central 
government embarking on a fiscal decentralization system of governance is also geared towards 
balancing the differences in capacity of service provision (BlÖchliger, et. al., 2007). According to 
Oakland (1994: 199), it is also aimed at reducing inequalities in public allocation and expenditure. 
There is enough observable evidence of disparity in resource distribution among various 
constituencies in Kenya. This phenomenon was shaped by skewed development pioneered by the 
previous centralized governments where fiscal resources were only directed to certain regions 
while others were disregarded.  In the wake of devolution, both national and County governments 
will need credible studies with critical analysis of the inequalities that still persist between various 
regions and constituencies. Since there is limited evidence pertaining to the CDF and resource 
equalization, this study suggests further research to investigate the extent to which the Fund has 
ensured that revenues and expenditures are fairly distributed and suggest recommendation for 
further alignment.  
Secondly, it is recommended that similar research be conducted in other constituencies so that the 
outcomes can be compared. If conducted, these initiatives will enhance the potential to better 
understand how the CDF can be used to enhance local economic development.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Hello, my name is Muna Wilson Kamau, a PhD candidate with the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
in South Africa. I am conducting a study regarding the implementation of Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF) in Naivasha and Gatanga Constituencies.  
I would like to ask you a few questions. You do not have to answer any question you do not wish 
to answer. The questions should take about 1 hour. After the questions you can ask whatever 
questions you may have. Your name will be held in strict confidence, and will NOT appear on any 
documents or publications unless with your express permission. Please answer the questions as 
honestly and openly as possible. There is no "right" or "wrong" answer. 
 
Part I: Identification Details 
 
1. Constituency  
2. Location  
3. Date of Interview  
4. Time of Interview  
5.Name of Respondent  
 
 
Part II: Demographic Details 
 
6. Age_____ (years) 
 
7. Gender: 
[1] Male  
[2] Female  
 
8. Marital Status: 
1) Single  
2) Married  
3) Divorced  
4) Widowed  
 
9. Disability: 
[1] Yes  
[2] No  
 
10. Did you go to school? 
[1] YES  
[2] NO  
 
11. If above is yes, what is the highest grade obtained? 
 
1. primary school  
2. Secondary School  
3. Diploma/certificate in higher education  
4. University Degree  
5. Masters  
6. Doctorate  
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12.What is your occupation? 
1. No work  
2. Farmer  
3. Herder  
4. Seller  
5. NGO worker  
6. Teacher  
7. Other  
 
13.What are your primary sources of information about events in your constituency, other parts of Kenya, or the world? (Tick all that 
apply.) 
1) Newspaper  
2)Radio  
3) Friends/relatives  
4) District Officer  
5) sub-Location Chief  
6) Councilor  
7) Location Chief  
8) Member of Parliament  
9) other __________  
 
Part III: AWARENESS AND KNOWLEDGE OF CDF  
 
14. Have you noticed any new projects being implemented in the community during the past two years? 
[1] yes  
[2] no  
 
15. How are these projects financed? 
1. CDF  
2. Church  
3. Harambee  
4. Other  
5. Don’t know  
 
16. How did you learn about CDF? (Mark all those that apply) 
 
1. Know of the existence of the CDF Act  
2. Member of location development committee  
CDF  
3. Through other community members  
4. Chief’s baraza.  
5. Seen notices/posters/newspapers  
7. Member of project committee, e.g. school,  
8. Other (specify)………………………..  
 
17. Are you aware of any CDF projects or activities in this location? 
[1] YES  
[2] NO  
 
18. If YES, which ones? 
1 School  
2 Hospital/Health Clinic  
3 Road renovation  
4 Agricultural project  
5 Water Projects  
5 Security  
6 Bursaries   
7 Other…  
 
19. Do you know the status of the above projects? 







1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
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20. In your opinion, what is the level of awareness of CDF among the general population in this location? 
1.Very high  
2. High  
3. Low  
4. Very low  
5. Don’t know  
 
 
21. Do you feel that CDF projects are yours (community owned)? 
[1] yes  
[2] no  
 
Opportunity/right to participate in CDF decision making: Please give details in the table below: 
 
22. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Neutral  4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree 
 1 2 3 4 5 
people are given the opportunity or right to 
participate in selecting and prioritizing  
projects  
 
     
People are given the opportunity or right to 
participate in determining the location of projects. 
 
     
People are given the opportunity or right to 
participate in follow up/monitoring of 
projects 
 
     
People are given the opportunity or right to 
participate in the Management of project funds 
     
 
 
23. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Neutral  4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I know how I can be involved  in selecting and 
prioritizing projects 
 
     
I know how I can be involved 
In determining the location of projects. 
 
     
I know how I can be involved in  in follow 
up/monitoring of projects 
 
     
I know how I can be involved in the management of 
project funds 
     
 
24. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Neutral  4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I have tried to get involved in selecting and 
prioritizing projects 
 
     
I have tried to get involved in determining the 
location of projects. 
 
     
I have tried to get involved in follow up/monitoring of 
projects 
 
     
I have tried to get involved in the management of 
project funds 
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Part IV: POLICIES AND REGULATIONS FOR CDF 
 
25. Are you aware of any government regulations governing CDF? 
[1] yes  
[2] no  
 
26. How did you come to know about them? 
1. Through reading CDF Act  
2. From political rallies  
3. Through other community members  
4. Chief’s baraza.  
5. Seen notices/posters/newspapers  
8. Other (specify)………………………..  
27. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding CDF policies and regulations? 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree  3. Neutral  4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 They are well designed to promote local economic development      
2 They are well defined to coordinate the implementation of CDF       
3 Local government officials are committed to ensure that policies 
regulating the operations of CDF are implemented 
     
4 They ensure transparency and accountability of the utilization of 
CDF 
     
5 They provide proper monitoring and evaluation of CDF projects       
6 They provide proper regulation mechanisms against project 
duplication 
     
7 They protect local communities from being manipulated by the local 
bureaucracy 
     
8 They have serious implications/consequences against those who 
engage in corrupt practices pertaining CDF funds 
     
9 They are designed to ensure that local proposals are given priority      
10 They guarantee local autonomy to the local government in guiding 
local development 
     
 
PART V: CDF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
28. Are there ways of identifying and prioritizing development projects in your Community? 
[1] yes  
[2] no  
 
29. How were the projects funded by CDF identified? (Mark all that apply) 
1. Community identified/agreed  
2. Extracted project from district plans  
3.CDF committee identified/proposed  
4. MP suggested project  
5. MPs close associates determined the project  
6. Don’t Know  
 
30. Have you ever taken part in identifying any CDF project or projects in your location? 
[1] yes  
[2] no  
 





32. Do you know anyone who has taken part in identifying at least one project for the CDF? 
[1] yes  
[2] no  
 
33. Do you know how money meant for CDF project(s) implementation is provided to your community? 
[1] yes  
[2] no  
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34. How is CDF money provided to your community (please tick one)? 
1. District Officer  
2. CDF committee  





5. Don’t know  
 
 
35. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 CDF projects provide job opportunities for local residents in this 
location 
     
2 Residents from this locations contract/procure CDF founded 
projects 
     
3 CDF target projects that address issues that promote women 
economic development 
     
4 CDF target projects that address issues that promote youth 
economic development 
     
5 CDF has improved the living standards in our locations        
6 In this location, CDF assist poor students with bursaries      
 




37. If yes, how does the community monitor/keep track of CDF project implementation? 
 
1. Project committee in place  
2. Project accounts kept  
3. Monitoring committee  
4. Feed-back during meetings  
5. Other means used (specify)  
 
 
PART VI: ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES IN CDF 
38. Do you know of any cases of corruption in CDF projects? 
1. YES  
2. NO  
 
39. If YES, what forms of corruption do you know of? 
 
1. Payment of bribes  
2. Awarding of tenders irregularly  
3. Shoddy implementation of projects  
4. Nepotism  
5. Other (specify)  
 






41. What is your assessment of the CDF complaints system? 
1. Very effective  




3. Not effective  
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44. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
1. Strongly Agree  2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Those responsible for the mismanagement of CDF have been held 
accountable 
 
     
2 I am aware of the channels to follow in order to lay complaints 
against corrupt officials over the CDF 
     
3 There have been protests in my constituency regarding the 
implementation of the CDF projects 
 
     
4 I have participated in some of these protests      
5 CDF projects are fairly distributed in the constituency      
6 Money set aside for CDF projects are accounted for      
7 CDF project proposals by the community are given priority      
8 Procurement of tenders is fair and transparent      
9 Politicians facilitate equal development agenda in all locations in the 
constituency 
     
10 Constituents are aware that they have a responsibility to report any 
mismanagement of CDF Funds 
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Part VII: ASSESSMENT OF CDF PERFORMANCE 
46. What is your level of satisfaction with CDF projects in your community? 
1. Satisfied  2. Fairly Satisfied  3. Dissatisfied. 
 Indicators or Performance Criteria 
Level of Satisfaction 
Level of satisfaction 
1  
 
How projects are identified 1 2 3 
2 Types of projects within the constituency 1  2  3 
3  
 
Location of projects within the 
constituency 
1 2 3 
4 Transparency in management of CDF 
funds 
   
5 Community participation in decision 
making (voice) 
1 2 3 
6 Information sharing among the 
community members 
1 2 3 
7 Cost of projects  1 2 3 
8 Dispute/conflict resolution mechanisms 
in place  
1 2 3 
9 Composition of CDF committees  1 2 3 
10 Relevance of projects to people’s needs  
 
1 2 3 
11 Quantity (number) of projects 
implemented  
1 2 3 
12 Time taken to implement projects  1 2 3 
13 Targeting of beneficiaries i.e. meeting 
the needs of special groups (women, 
children, youths)etc 
1 2 3 
14 CDF project reach (spreading benefits to 
all community 
members) 
1 2 3 
15 Equity (Addressing the needs of the 
most needy e.g. remote 
areas, disabled etc) 
1 2 3 
16 Accountability of CDF duty bearers to 
the community  
1 2 3 
17 impact of CDF projects on poverty i.e. 
improving livelihoods 
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Appendix 2: Interview Schedule 
 
Hello, my name is Muna Wilson Kamau, a PhD candidate with the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
in South Africa. I am conducting a study regarding the implementation of Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF) in Naivasha and Gatanga Constituencies.  
I would like to ask you a few questions. You do not have to answer any question you do not wish 
to answer. The questions should take about 30 minutes. After the questions you can ask whatever 
questions you may have. Your name will be held in strict confidence, and will NOT appear on 
any documents or publications unless with your express permission. Please answer the questions 
as honestly and openly as possible. There is no "right" or "wrong" answer. 
1. In your opinion, what do you think is the level of local representation at the national level 
where decisions over fiscally decentralized funds and policies are deliberated? 
2. What do you think is the extent of autonomy/independence in the management of 
development agenda in this constituency? 
3. What is your opinion about the role of fiscal decentralization in local economic 
development of this constituency? 
4. What do you think about the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization policies and 
frameworks in Kenya? 
5. What are the challenges that exist toward the implementation and administration of CDF? 
6. What is your opinion about the management of local development by local government as 
compared to the previous centralized government? 
7. What do you think that can be done regarding the implementation of CDF toward 
promoting local economic development? 
8. Do you have any other concern that you would like to raise regarding the implementation 
of fiscally Decentralized funds and CDF in particular? 
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Appendix 3: Observation Check List 
 
 Status of newly started 
Status of on-going 
Status of finished  
Status of unfinished projects 
Location of projects 
Types of projects established 
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Appendix 4: Affiliation with Kisii University, Kenya 
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Appendix 7: Authorization from County Director of Education, Murang’a County 
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Appendix 8: Authorization from County Director of Education, Nakuru County 
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Appendix 9: Authorization by County Commissioner, Nakuru County 
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Appendix 10: Informed Consent Letter 
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